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ABSTRACT
LIVING WITHIN THE SACRED TENSION: PARADOX
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR CHRISTIAN
EXISTENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF
SØREN KIERKEGAARD
Matthew T. Nowachek, B.A.
Marquette University, 2016
This dissertation presents an in-depth investigation into the notion of paradox
and its significance for Christian existence in the thought of the Danish philosopher and
theologian Søren Kierkegaard. The primary aim of the study is to explore and to develop
various expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s authorship in order to demonstrate the
manner by which Kierkegaard employs paradox as a means of challenging his
Christendom contemporaries to exist as authentic Christians, and more specifically to
enter into the existential state I am identifying in this project as living within the sacred
tension. With this aim in mind, I begin with a discussion of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious
task in response to his Christendom culture and I provide a broad characterization of the
notion of sacred tension as the telos of this task. For the majority of the study I then
focus on four different expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought. These four
expressions are: paradox that is associated with the faith of Abraham (as presented in
Fear and Trembling), paradox that is associated with the nature of the self and the task of
selfhood (as presented in The Sickness unto Death), paradox that is associated with the
God-man (as presented in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and
Practice in Christianity), and paradox that is associated with Christian love (as presented in
Works of Love). In addition to arguing that Kierkegaard employs these expressions of
paradox to help usher his contemporaries into a state of sacred tension, I also argue that
such sacred tension can be understood in terms of various concrete Christian virtues. In
this respect, I claim that Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is not merely negative or
deconstructive in nature, but rather it is infused with the robust positive content
associated with Kierkegaard’s particular understanding of Christianity. Viewing
Kierkegaard’s thought and writings in this manner helps to reaffirm the significance of
the notion of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought and to highlight the value of the notion
of sacred tension for a reassessment of both Kierkegaard’s existentialism and its
contemporary implications.
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INTRODUCTION
To explain the paradox would then be to comprehend even more deeply
what a paradox is and that the paradox is the paradox.1
My life, like everything else in the sphere in which I belong, for which I
work, is in the sphere of the paradox…2
It is impossible that what I have to say regarding the paradox should
become popular.3

The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) is often considered to be
the thinker of paradox par excellence. This title is certainly warranted, for Kierkegaard not
only engages with the notion in numerous places within his authorship, but he also
clearly understands it to be intimately tied to his life and authorial task.4 For several years
within Anglophone Kierkegaard studies, paradox received a great deal of attention. In
particular, it was at the center of the debate concerning the (ir)rationality and (il)logicality
of Kierkegaard’s thought, with one side declaring Kierkegaard’s account of paradox to be
misologistic, anti-intellectualistic, and utter nonsense,5 and with the other side defending
it as being merely supra rationem as opposed to contra rationem.6 In the decades following
SKS 7, 201 / CUP, 220.
SKS 26, 191, NB32:104 / JP 6, 6918.
3 SKS 22, 224, NB12:135 / JP 3, 3091.
4 SKS 26, 191, NB32:104 / JP 6, 6918.
5 See, e.g., Herbert Garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard: A Study of Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965); Herbert Garelick, “The Irrationality and Supra-rationality of
Kierkegaard’s Paradox,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 2 (1964), 75-86; Henry E. Allison, “Christianity
and Nonsense,” The Review of Metaphysics 20, no. 3 (1967), 432-60.
6 See, e.g., Cornelio Fabro, “Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic,” in A Kierkegaard
Critique, ed. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 156-206;
N.H. Søe, “Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of the Paradox,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard A. Johnson and
Niels Thulstrup (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1962), 207-27; Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard:
‘Paradox’ and Irrationalism,” Journal of Existentialism 7, no. 27 (1967), 401-16; Alastair McKinnon,
“Believing the Paradoks: A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?” Harvard Theological Review 61, no. 4 (1968): 633-6;
Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Irrationalism Revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly 9, no. 2
(1969), 165-76; Alastair McKinnon, “Paradox and Faith: A Kierkegaardian Contribution to Religious
Thought,” in The Challenge of Religion Today: Essays on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. John King-Farlow (New
York, NY: Science History Publications, 1976), 166-89; Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard and the ‘Leap of
Faith’,” in Kierkegaardiana 16, ed. Joakim Garff, Arne Grøn, Eberhard Harbsmeier, and Julia Watkin
(Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1993), 107-18; C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s
Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 89-90, 117; C.
Stephen Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality: A Reading of Fear and Trembling,” in International Kierkegaard
Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1
2
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this debate, consensus has settled in favor of the latter view.7 One important
consequence of this has been that Kierkegaard’s thought regarding paradox has since
then received far less sustained and focused consideration, and certainly far less than I
suggest it deserves. Although this shift has not been as pronounced in the Continental
tradition where scholars have typically been more sympathetic to Kierkegaard’s account
of paradox and to paradox in general,8 it appears that the Anglophone context (save for a
handful of notable exceptions9) has relegated Kierkegaard’s account to something of a

1993), 9-27; C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays (Waco, TX: Baylor University
Press, 2006).
7 For scholars siding with the latter view, see e.g., J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 116, 119; Robert Herbert, “Two of Kierkegaard’s Uses of Paradox,” The
Philosophical Review 70, no. 1 (1961), 49; Fabro, “Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic,” 174-5; Robert
E. Larsen, “Kierkegaard’s Absolute Paradox,” The Journal of Religion 42, no. 1 (1962), 39; Søe,
“Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of the Paradox,” 207-27; Vernon C. Grounds, “The Postulate of Paradox,”
Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society 7 (1964), 18; Leroy Seat, The Meaning of “Paradox”: A Study of the Use
of the Word “Paradox” in Contemporary Theological and Philosophical Writings with Special Reference to Søren
Kierkegaard, Dissertation (Louisville, KY: The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1967), 143, 216-17;
McKinnon, “Believing the Paradoks,” 165-76; Timothy Tian-min Lin, Paradox in the Thought of Søren
Kierkegaard, Dissertation (Boston, MA: Boston University, 1969), 102; Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard:
‘Paradox” and Irrationalism,” in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis, MN: Burgess, 1969),
107-11; Timothy Tian-min Lin, “Various Interpretations of Kierkegaard’s Paradox: An Appraisal and
Suggestion,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 3 (1971), 291; Benjamin Daise, “Kierkegaard and the
Absolute Paradox,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1976), 8; C. Stephen Evans, “Is Kierkegaard
an Irrationalist? Reason, Paradox, and Faith,” Religious Studies 25, no. 3 (1989), 347-62; M. Jamie Ferreira,
Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 89-90; Merold
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1991), 100-2; Evans, Passionate Reason, 87-90, 104, 117; Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality,” 9-10;
Sylvia Walsh, “Echoes of Absurdity: The Offended Consciousness and the Absolute Paradox in
Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and
Johannes Climacus, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994), 42; Stephen N.
Dunning, “Paradoxes in Interpretation: Kierkegaard and Gadamer,” in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed.
Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press,
1995), 128; Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed (Oxford: Clarendon,
1997), 53-4; C. Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 78, 83;
Christopher Insole, “Kierkegaard: A Reasonable Fideist?” Heythrop Journal 39, no. 4 (1998), 373; John
Lippitt and Daniel Hutto, “Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 98 (1998), 279-80, 286; Tim Rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology (Aldershot and
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001); George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Montreal and Kingston,
London, Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University, 2005), 134-5; Sylvia Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s
Dialectic of Christian Existence (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 66-7;
Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 2005), 145; C. Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard and the Limits of Reason: Can There Be a
Responsible Fideism?” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64, no. 2 (2008), 1022-3, 1028; C. Stephen Evans,
Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 120-1; F. Russell Sullivan, Jr.,
Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), 14.
8 See, e.g., the work of the Danish scholar Arne Grøn, particularly Subjektivitet og Negativitet:
Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997).
9 See, e.g., the work of Noel S. Adams, Matthew Bagger, Ronald L. Hall, M. Jamie Ferreira, and
Anthony Rudd.
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place of peripheral importance. In dedicating this study to the notion of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, and particularly in attempting to place this notion into dialogue
with Kierkegaard’s reflections on Christian existence, I hope to make a worthwhile
contribution to (re)focusing current Anglophone Kierkegaard scholarship on paradox
and thereby to strengthening the line of Kierkegaard research that embraces paradox as a
key component of Kierkegaard’s view of what it means to exist as a Christian.10 Before
outlining the specific argument and structure of this study, we may begin with a few
preliminary and definitional remarks on paradox and Kierkegaard that prove useful for
setting up the argument of the chapters that follow.

Preliminary and Definitional Remarks on Paradox and Kierkegaard
In beginning our study it will be helpful to touch upon the notion of paradox in
general as well as to provide a brief outline of two broad descriptions and uses of it that
we encounter in Kierkegaard’s writings.11 Paradox is itself a rich notion and as such it has
historically been characterized in numerous and varied ways.12 However, within much of
contemporary philosophical discourse, and particularly within the Anglophone tradition,
paradox is seen at best as something of an epistemic puzzle to be solved or at worst
simply as an expression of hopelessly confused reasoning. For example, W. V. O. Quine,
in his influential essay “The Ways of Paradox,” characterizes a paradox as “just any

10 In his book The Uses of Paradox: Religion, Self-Transformation, and the Absurd (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 2007), Matthew Bagger attempts what on the surface appears to be a similar
project. In my reading, however, by arguing that Kierkegaard employs paradox as an unintelligible,
horrible, appalling, offensive, and absurd contradiction in order to harness it along with its accompanying
cognitive dissonance as an instrument for ascetic self-transformation (see The Uses of Paradox, 17-18, 25-6,
52), Bagger offers a far too limited, one-sided, and even negative account of the existential implications of
paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought.
11 Portions of this section are reproduced verbatim from Matthew T. Nowachek, “On the NonBracketing of Fairy Tale in Paradox Discourse: Kierkegaard, the Analytic Tradition, and the Importance of
Inclusivity,” International Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2012), 5-20. Permission for reuse of this material
has been granted by the publisher.
12 For a survey of various uses of paradox in the history of philosophy, see Roy Sorensen, A Brief
History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

4
conclusion that at first sounds absurd but that has an argument to sustain it.”13 For
Quine, any given paradox can be divided into three different classes, namely veridical,
falsidical, and antinomical:
A veridical paradox packs a surprise, but the surprise quickly dissipates itself as
we ponder the proof. A falsidical paradox packs a surprise, but it is seen as a false
alarm when we solve the underlying fallacy. An antinomy, however, packs a
surprise that can be accommodated by nothing less than a repudiation of our
conceptual heritage.14
What this and many other Analytic descriptions of paradox implies is that paradox,
despite how resistant to philosophical analysis it may initially appear, is ultimately
something to be resolved through conceptual clarification and the progression of human
understanding. Again, to quote Quine, “One man’s antinomy is another man’s falsidical
paradox, give or take a couple of thousand years.”15 In this view, then, although
paradoxes may be interesting and might lead to interesting insights, they are ultimately
meant to be overcome with more refined philosophical categories—a result considered
by many to be the paragon of intellectual progress. It is largely due to the prevalence of
this philosophical framework that many contemporary scholars writing on paradox
within the Anglophone tradition have entirely ignored Kierkegaard.16 Even scholars who
are favorably disposed towards Kierkegaard’s thought have at times fallen under the
influence of the Analytic tradition in their descriptions of paradox in Kierkegaard.

13 W. V. O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York, NY: Random House, 1966),
3. Bagger provides several additional descriptions of paradox developed from within the analytic tradition
that include an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from
apparently acceptable premises (R.M. Sainsbury), an apparently acceptable argument with a puzzlingly
unacceptable conclusion (J.L. Mackie), a collection of independently plausible, but jointly inconsistent
propositions (N. Rescher), a statement assuming a form that conflicts with a conceptual truth (G.
Matthews), and a riddle with a number of good answers (R. Sorensen). See The Uses of Paradox, 2.
14 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, 11. With antinomy, Quine is quick to point out that revisions of our
conceptual heritage have indeed occurred, but under the auspices of the scientific enterprise.
15 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, 11.
16 For example, Roy Sorensen and R.M. Sainsbury in their major studies on paradox mention
Kierkegaard not a single time in either the text or bibliography of their respective works. See Sorensen, A
Brief History of the Paradox; R.M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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Timothy Jackson, for example, in an article on Fear and Trembling, employs Quine’s own
terminology and imagery in order to describe what he takes to be Kierkegaard’s view on
the relation between faith and paradox. As he remarks, “Faith (re)solves paradoxes,
but…de Silentio is like someone who is unaware of leap-year day coming every four
years and thus cannot understand how someone can be twenty-one having had but five
birthdays. He lacks the crucial principle that would clarify how Abraham’s paradox is
truth-telling…”17 Drawing on a brief remark Kierkegaard makes in his journals that faith
“solves” (løser) the divine paradox of the God-man,18 Jackson rounds off his
interpretation of Fear and Trembling and even goes further in drawing out the consequence
of faith for paradox in general:
[F]aith is able to “solve” the “divine” paradox of Christ, and it is but a small step
to imagine an analogy to the Hebrew Abraham’s “solving” the paradox of Isaac.
As Anti-Climacus, the superlative Christian and the pseudonym closest to
Kierkegaard’s own personality, writes in The Sickness Unto Death: “…salvation is,
humanly speaking, utterly impossible; but for God everything is possible—The
believer has the ever infallible antidote for despair—possibility—because for
God everything is possible at every moment. This is the good health of faith that
resolves [løser] contradictions.”19
Although Jackson does not ultimately side with Quine’s conclusion that it is
philosophical analysis which removes the paradoxicality of paradox, he does argue that
the person who is equipped with the “higher understanding”20 associated with passionate
belief in God is thereby able to transcend the apparent contradiction of the paradox and

“Is Isaac Kierkegaard’s Neighbor? Fear and Trembling in Light of William Blake and Works of
Love,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 17 (1997), 116. In footnote 40 Jackson acknowledges his use of
Quine’s example from “The Ways of Paradox.” See also Timothy P. Jackson, “Kierkegaard’s
Metatheology,” Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 1 (1987), 81.
18 SKS 18, 176, JJ:111 / JP 3, 3077. Cf. SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 40. It is important to be cautious in
drawing too strong of conclusions from single journal entries (in this case from 1843), especially when
there are numerous journal entries that present an alternative view and when Kierkegaard develops
contrary ideas in his later works.
19 Jackson, “Is Isaac Kierkegaard’s Neighbor?” 116.
20 Jackson, “Is Isaac Kierkegaard’s Neighbor?” 115.
17
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ultimately to (re)solve it.21 Simply put, Jackson’s view would therefore imply that
paradox, as seen from within faith, simply ceases to be paradoxical.
In contrast to such accounts, I argue that Kierkegaard understands paradox in a
far different manner.22 Although he acknowledges the reality of a certain kind of paradox
that should be subjected to philosophical analysis with the aim of overcoming it,23
Kierkegaard does not believe that all forms of paradox should be treated in this fashion.
Indeed, for Kierkegaard paradoxes fundamental to the ongoing practice of the Christian
life and that demand perpetual existential engagement such as those he associates with
Abraham’s faith, selfhood, the God-man, and Christian love (which we discuss in
Chapters 2-5) are neither puzzles to be solved nor nonsense to be overcome through
more refined philosophical categories. As Johannes Climacus remarks in Postscript, such
“correction” as that carried out within the Analytic tradition ultimately destroys the
paradox in that it “removes the paradox and makes it clear that there is no paradox. But
[this approach] is certainly no explanation of the paradox but rather an explanation that
there is no paradox.”24 For Kierkegaard, engagement with the paradoxes that he
characterizes as existentially significant should instead assume the form of an explanation
that, according to Climacus, “makes clear what the paradox is and removes the
obscurity”25 in order to help the individual “to comprehend even more deeply what a
paradox is and that the paradox is the paradox.”26 Moreover, Kierkegaard insists that
paradox in its most important form is not something one (re)solves once one has come
into faith, but rather remains something that demands perpetual existential engagement.

21

It is difficult to ignore the striking similarities between this kind of language and that employed

by Hegel.
22 See Bagger, The Uses of Paradox, 3: “Many of [the analytic] analyses…exhibit a philosopher’s
bias. They give argument too prominent a place in the definition of paradox…Søren Kierkegaard, as if
responding to Quine, even goes so far as to insist that there is no argument which could assuage the
absurdity of the Christian paradox.”
23 See, e.g., the paradox of inquiry that is discussed in SKS 4, 218-21 / PF, 9-13.
24 SKS 7, 200 / CUP, 219.
25 SKS 7, 200 / CUP, 219.
26 SKS 7, 201 / CUP, 220.
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Such resistance to analysis or (re)solution means, in Climacus’ terminology, that such
paradoxes are absolute rather than relative.27 Or, as Kierkegaard writes in his essay “The
Difference between a Genius and an Apostle,” such paradoxes are “essential” as
opposed to the “transitory” or “immanent” paradoxes that vanish as they become
assimilated into human knowledge.28 In offering a reading of paradox in the thought of
Kierkegaard we should therefore be careful to avoid any reductionistic framework that
attempts, ultimately, to do away with paradox. As Climacus fittingly puts this cautionary
point, the task for an existing individual centers on “becoming aware of the paradox and
holding on to the paradox at every moment, and most of all fearing in particular an
explanation that would remove the paradox…”29
In attempting to characterize paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought, it is important to
recognize that Kierkegaard describes and uses the notion in two broad senses. The first
of these is what I am calling the etymological sense and that which is a reflection of the
etymology of the term paradox itself. More specifically, the term is derived from two
Greek words, para (meaning “beside” or “contrary to”) and doxa (meaning “opinion” or
“expectation”) to form the construction paradoxos. According to Liddell and Scott, this
constructed word connotes “contrary to opinion, unexpected, strange, marvellous,”30

On this distinction, see SKS 7, 198-203 / CUP, 217-23. See also SKS 7, 527-9 / CUP, 579-81;
Seat, The Meaning of “Paradox,” 257-66. Lin follows Kierkegaard’s terminology in his distinction between
absolute and relative paradoxes. See Paradox in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, 23-4. Vernard Eller describes
this distinction in terms of essential and transitional paradoxes. See “Fact, Faith, and Foolishness:
Kierkegaard and the New Quest,” The Journal of Religion 48, no. 1 (1968), 56.
28 SKS 11, 98-9 / BA, 175-6. See, especially, SKS 11, 99 / BA, 175: “Insofar as the expression
‘paradox’ is used only in the inessential sense of the transitory paradox, of the anticipation that condenses
into something paradoxical, which, however, in turn vanishes.”
29 SKS 7, 167-8 / CUP, 182. See also SKS 7, 195 / CUP, 213; SKS 7, 200 / CUP, 218-19.
30 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English
Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 507. For the Danish definition, see Ordbog over det Danske Sprog,
bind 1-28, udgivet af Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1918-1966), bind
16: “an utterance or claim that is contrary to general current beliefs” (my translation). Cf. William Little, H.
W. Fowler, and J. Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Volumes I-II, 3rd ed,
rev. and ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967 [1933]), vol. 2, 1428: paradox is defined as
“contrary to received opinion or expectation.”
27
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which is also a meaning clearly reflected in the Danish definition.31 It is precisely this
sense that Kierkegaard emphasizes when he claims that paradox is that which stands in
contrast to human categories or human ability and thereby functions to reveal the
limitations of human reason. Put in another way, in encountering the paradox, the
understanding is confronted by something that runs contrary to what it could have
expected or rationally anticipated, which is to say that the paradox operates as a form of
alterity and as a challenge to the assumption that human knowledge is self-sufficient and
complete.32
In their efforts to interpret the notion of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought,
several scholars have provided nice characterizations of this etymological sense. For
example, M. Jamie Ferreira notes, “The paradox provides the occasion for the
understanding to step aside, and it provides the occasion which allows it to do so.”33
Similarly, Timothy Lin remarks that for Kierkegaard “the purpose of the paradox is not
to reject but to limit reason. The paradox is a sign which shows the limitation of
reason.”34 Leroy Seat, in his extensive study of paradox in Kierkegaard is even more
explicit in pointing to what he identifies as “‘paradox’ in its etymological sense.”35 As he
sees it, paradox within Kierkegaard’s thought represents “situations or states of affairs
that are unusual and unexpected and that are beyond man’s natural capacity for
understanding,” which are “not logically self-contradictory, but…are contrary to normal
expectations.”36

See, e.g., Christian Molbech, Dansk Ordbog, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1859), 406: “som
modsiger, strider imod en af de Allerfleste antigen Mening.”
32 See, e.g., SKS 19, 390, Not13:23 / JP 3, 3073. Paradox in this sense is clearly directed at the
systematic Danish Hegelians who make claims of going further than faith, paradox, etc., and going further
with relative ease.
33 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, 88.
34 Lin, Paradox in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, 104.
35 Seat, The Meaning of “Paradox”, 217.
36 Seat, The Meaning of “Paradox”, 216.
31
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The second broad sense in which Kierkegaard describes and uses paradox is what
I am calling the dialectical sense or a dialectical relation. Before explaining this, however, we
should touch briefly upon the notion of dialectic. Although dialectic is typically
associated either with Greek philosophy as “the art of critical examination into the truth
of an opinion”37 or with Hegel’s rational process of Aufhebung that moves through the
unification of opposites to higher syntheses,38 the Danish term dialektik can also connote
concepts that contain a relationship of opposites or a multiplicity of meanings held
together in a state of ambiguity.39 In Stephen Dunning’s description, dialectical structures
“involve a series of opposed poles, and the way in which those oppositions are related to
one another determines the character of the dialectic.”40 Whereas one type of dialectic is
that where two opposites negate one another (i.e., a contradiction) and another type is
where two opposites are resolved in a higher synthesis (i.e., Hegelian Aufhebung),
Kierkegaard’s dialectic is fundamentally of a different sort. As Dunning notes,
“Kierkegaard himself is justly famous for advocating a dialectic of paradox. Here a
genuine unity is achieved, but one that accentuates rather than supersedes the
contradiction between the two poles.”41 As Sylvia Walsh lucidly puts this point,
In Kierkegaard’s view the dialectical task is to sustain a dual or paradoxical
perspective that emphasizes the opposition, duplicity, and tension between the
concepts rather than a synthesis and mediation of them as in Hegelian dialectic.
Opposites, however, do not always contradict each other; sometimes they are

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 500.
See Jon Stewart, “Introduction,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about
Mediation, ed. Jon Stewart (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 14.
39 Ordbog over det Danske Sprog, bind 3: “om begreber, der rummer et modsætningsforhold, en flertydighed.”
40 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 8.
41 Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness, 8. See also Ronald L. Hall, The Human Embrace: The
Love of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Love: Kierkegaard, Cavell, Nussbaum (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 2: “[A] paradox, or more precisely, a paradoxical relation, for
Kierkegaard, is a particular kind of dialectical relation in which a positive reality is taken to include within
itself what it, by its very nature, excludes. This dialectic of paradox is different from a Hegelian dialectic as
follows: in Hegel, the tension of the negation of thesis and antithesis is relieved in a synthesis; in the
dialectic of paradox, opposites form a structural unity in which the tension of negation is accentuated and
not resolved.”
37
38
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complements, and…this is especially true of the dialectical concepts and
categories of Christianity as Kierkegaard understands them.42
This discussion of dialectic can thus be nicely summed up in Paul Ricoeur’s succinct
statement: “A dialectic without mediation—this is the Kierkegaardian dialectic.”43
The concept of dialectic as defined here serves as a good basis for understanding
how Kierkegaard describes and uses the notion of paradox in a dialectical sense. Lin, in
his detailed study of paradox within Kierkegaard has correctly picked up on precisely this
idea. As he describes it, paradox for Kierkegaard represents “the joint relationship
between two opposite existential entities.”44 For Lin, it is crucially important to keep in
mind that Kierkegaard’s paradox plays out not merely on a conceptual level, but also as
the dialectic between existential entities. Thus, as he notes, “Kierkegaard is concerned
with paradox as a reality rather than paradox as a pure concept. He uses the word
‘paradox’ mainly in the sense of a reality rather than a concept. In his philosophy there is
a duality of thought and existence, and his primary concern is existence rather than
thought.”45 Armed with this foundational insight, Lin offers something of a general
definition of paradox in Kierkegaard based around five central points:
First, Kierkegaard’s paradox itself is a category or concept devised by him for
interpreting the truth of Christianity…For him, paradox is a positive rather than
negative category…Secondly, although paradox itself is a category or concept,
Kierkegaard maintains…that paradox is not an empty concept but has reference to
reality. This is the reason why he reacts against any attempt “to reducing the term
paradox to a [mere] rhetorical expression.” Thirdly, paradox refers to the joint
relationship between two opposite existential entities. For example, Kierkegaard
insists that the Incarnation is a paradox…According to him, the Incarnation is a
Walsh, Living Christianly, 6.
“Two Encounters with Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard and Evil, Doing Philosophy After
Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard’s Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. Joseph H. Smith (New Haven, CT and
London: Yale University Press, 1981), 320. Quoted in Seung-Goo Lee, Kierkegaard on Becoming and Being a
Christian: The Relation of Christianity to the Ethical Sphere of Existence in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard
(Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema, 2004), 26.
44 Lin, Paradox in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, iv. See also, Lin, “Is Kierkegaard’s Paradox
Paradoxical?” 21, 26.
45 Lin, Paradox in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, 71. See also Walsh, Living Christianly, 6: “for
Kierkegaard dialectic is never simply a dialectic of concepts; rather it involves the interpenetration of
thought and existence. Existence is itself dialectical, but in a qualitative rather than a logical sense…”
42
43
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paradox in the sense of a joint relationship between God and man…Fourthly,
paradox involves two opposite existential entities…Lastly, paradox refers to the
joint relationship between two existential entities rather than two pure concepts. In
this sense, Kierkegaard’s paradox is existential rather than logical, for it refers to
existence rather than pure thought.46
With these five points, we may venture a general definition of Kierkegaard’s dialectical
description and use of paradox. I suggest the following: paradox may be understood as a
positive unity of opposing existential entities whereby these entities are neither
undermined nor mediated into a third synthesized entity, but rather are held together in a
joint reciprocal relationship.
To conclude this section, we may summarize briefly the preliminary remarks on
paradox made above. First, it is important to remember that for Kierkegaard paradox in
its most significant form is not something to be overcome or to be (re)solved, but rather
it is to be continuously and existentially engaged within its full paradoxicality. Second,
Kierkegaard describes and uses paradox at times in an etymological sense with the
primary purpose of limiting human understanding and ability as well as gesturing beyond
them. Third, Kierkegaard also describes and uses paradox in a dialectical sense, which
extends from his specific understanding of dialectic,47 to connote and to emphasize the
constructive relation of opposing existential entities. This is, of course, not to say that
these etymological and dialectical senses should be understood as entirely distinct from
one another. To the contrary, in most cases where Kierkegaard points to the term or the
concept of paradox both of these senses are implied and intertwined. A clear example of
this, to which we will return in Chapter 4, is Kierkegaard’s account of the absolute
paradox of the God-man. For Kierkegaard, this paradox represents not only the relation

Lin, “Is Kierkegaard’s Paradox Paradoxical?” 21-2.
It is, of course, important to reiterate that even though not limited to its historical context, such
an account of dialectic certainly extends from a particular historical setting. For a helpful account of the
polemical milieu within which Kierkegaard develops his view of dialectic, see Stewart (ed.), Mynster’s
“Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation.
46
47
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between the dialectical opposites of the eternal God and a particular finite human being,
but it is precisely this paradoxical relation that remains beyond comprehension and thus
serves as a fundamental challenge to human understanding and ability. Although we
should thereby understand the etymological and dialectical senses of paradox as
complementary to one another, there is also a certain value in following Kierkegaard’s
lead in recognizing their distinction. To borrow a metaphor from Merold Westphal,48 just
as one comes to see the full complexity and beauty of one and the same precious gem by
marveling at its various distinct faces, so also can one receive a more complex and
nuanced view of paradox by focusing on its different senses. Approaching Kierkegaard’s
account of paradox in this manner, I suggest, will not only help us remain in-line with
Kierkegaard’s own discussion throughout his writings, but it will also provide us with
several interesting insights that would otherwise not be as apparent.

A Brief Outline of the Study
For the remainder of this study, I develop my argument in five chapters and a
conclusion. In what follows here, we may briefly outline the argument and structure of
each of these.
In Chapter 1 my central aim is to articulate the particular reading of Kierkegaard’s
thought that will serve as the foundation upon which I build the argument concerning
paradox and Christian existence in Chapters 2-5. The argument I put forward may be
summarized as follows. In response to the problem of his nominally Christian Danish
culture (what Kierkegaard identifies as Christendom), Kierkegaard takes upon himself the
ethico-religious task of (re)introducing Christianity into Christendom with the goal of
helping his contemporaries to become authentic Christians. Becoming an authentic

48

Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 7-8.
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Christian for Kierkegaard, however, does not mean that one attains a static state in which
one ceases to develop or to grow. To the contrary, this goal can be better understood as
the restless process of becoming characteristic of the existential stance I identify as living
within the sacred tension. With the notion of sacred tension, I suggest that Kierkegaard is not
primarily asking his readers to carry out specific moral actions or to perform specific
religious practices, but rather he is encouraging each one to adopt a general disposition where
Christian faith can take root and can be perpetually fostered. To demonstrate this point, I narrow
in on the fundamental sacred tension Kierkegaard associates with the dialectic of
grace/works. Furthermore, with respect to the overall project of the study in linking
paradox and Christian existence in Kierkegaard’s thought, I make the case that
Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is deeply existential in nature. More specifically, by
modeling his account on that of Socrates and his “care for the soul,” Kierkegaard
likewise sees himself as undertaking a crucial existential task with the aim of fostering
existential transformation. One consequence of construing Kierkegaard’s task in this
fashion is that if we are able to show that paradox has a key role to play in such a task,
we then have good reason to believe that paradox will be an essential piece of a
Kierkegaardian account of Christian existence. As I argue in conclusion, this chapter
proves crucial for setting up the argument concerning paradox and Christian existence in
Chapter 2-5.
For Chapter 2, I consider the first of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, namely the expression that is identified with the faith of Abraham
in the pseudonymous work Fear and Trembling. Furthermore, I draw out its significance
for Christian existence. My argument can be summarized as follows. The notion of
paradox in Fear and Trembling plays a significant role both in its dialectical and
etymological senses within the faith of Abraham. In contrast to the loss of tension
associated with the departures from paradox characteristic of the tragic hero and the
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knight of infinite resignation, embracing paradox is precisely what underlies and informs
Abraham’s existential stance as one living within sacred tension. I claim, therefore, that
Abraham serves as an exemplar for the person of faith, particularly with respect to the
specific virtues he displays within the sacred tension. As such, we may say that Fear and
Trembling and its discussion of paradox as tied to Abraham’s faith offers valuable insight
into the nature of ethics as well as into the manner by which ethics and Christian
existence are related to one another. In this respect the text serves as an important
challenge to Kierkegaard’s Christendom contemporaries.
In Chapter 3, I take up the second of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, namely the expression associated with the nature of the self and
the task of selfhood as presented in the pseudonymous work The Sickness unto Death.
Furthermore, I narrow in on the concrete implications this expression of paradox carries
for Christian existence. The line of argument I trace out in this chapter can be
summarized in the following manner. Anti-Climacus employs the notion of paradox in
its dialectical and etymological forms in order to provide an account of what it means to
become a self that is both properly related to itself and properly related to God.
Moreover, in contrast to the loss of tension associated with despair and sin, this account
functions as an expression of sacred tension that can be described in a concrete fashion
in terms of the virtues of dedicated patience and humble courage. With this reading of
The Sickness unto Death in which we focus on the relationship between paradox and the
self, we are therefore afforded another perspective on Christian existence that
Kierkegaard employs as part of his ethico-religious challenge to his Christendom
contemporaries.
For Chapter 4, I turn to the third of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, namely that associated with the God-man. In this chapter I
develop the following argument. As a response to the Christological accounts of his era,
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Kierkegaard develops his own view of the Incarnation by appealing to the notion of
paradox. In particular, Kierkegaard offers two variations on which we will focus: first, the
God-man as the dialectical unity of the eternal/temporal that transcends and challenges
the understanding; and, second, the God-man as the dialectical unity of
loftiness/lowliness that is the sign of contradiction and the possibility of offense. These
Christological accounts in turn carry significant implications for Christian existence. In
contrast to the loss of tension associated with either the indirect rejection of the
paradoxical God-man by turning to the Christendom expression of faith in its civic or
speculative forms, or the direct rejection of the paradoxical God-man that is offense,
embracing the paradox of Jesus Christ represents a form of sacred tension characterized
by passionate limitation, by holding on to security in insecurity as well as certainty in
uncertainty, by the perpetual annulment of offense, and by imitation—the fundamental
underlying virtue of which I argue is humble striving and which I argue is exemplified in
the concrete manner that both John the Baptist and the Apostle Peter relate to Christ. In
this respect, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s reflections on the paradox of the God-man
prove crucial to his overall ethico-religious task of (re)introducing Christianity into
Christendom.
In Chapter 5, I turn to the fourth and final expression of paradox we will consider,
namely that which Kierkegaard associates with Christian love. My focus here on
Kierkegaard’s foundational text Works of Love is meant to make a much needed
contribution to my overall project by drawing out in explicit terms the fundamental role
that love both for God and for human beings plays within Christian existence. My
argument can be summarized as follows. Kierkegaard employs the notion of paradox
both in a dialectic form in terms of dialectical vision and in an etymological form in
terms of the grounding of love. In contrast to the enervation and loss of tension that
Kierkegaard associates with improper forms of love, Christian love in its embrace of
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paradox is ushered into a state of sacred tension—what I identify in this chapter as loving
within the sacred tension, which is characterized by the lover who remains perpetually
engaged in loving relationships with God and with others. Moreover, central to such
loving within the sacred tension are the virtues of humility, courage, and hope. With such
a reconceptualization of Christian love, Kierkegaard thereby levels a radical challenge to
his Christendom contemporaries.
Finally, in the Conclusion I summarize the study as well as draw out in explicit
terms its particular significance. In addition, I hone in on one particular possibility for
future research regarding sacred tension and the issue of nihilism. Last of all, I conclude
with a final personal note.

A Cautionary Note
Having outlined the argument and structure of the study, I would like to end this
introduction with something of a cautionary note. In articulating an account of paradox
in Kierkegaard’s thought and writings, it is important to re-emphasize that I am in no
way attempting to explain paradox in the sense of objectifying it, that is, turning it into a
mere object of academic study. Instead, my hope and desire for what follows is that in
carrying out the necessary academic work I will nevertheless be challenged to remain
consistent with Climacus’ claim that “To explain the paradox would then be to
comprehend even more deeply what a paradox is and that the paradox is the paradox.”49
Of course, this hope and desire does not mean that the risk of doing violence to the
phenomenon of paradox within Kierkegaard is thereby overcome. To the contrary, such
risk will accompany us every step of the way. Does this thereby entail that we should
refrain from speaking or writing about paradox? In a word, no. Indeed, Kierkegaard’s

49

SKS 7, 201 / CUP, 220.
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ethico-religious purposes would be obscured and ill-served were we simply to adopt a
position of silence in relation to paradox.50 Instead, we are to speak and we are to write,
doing so all the while with the constant reminder that because the paradox always
remains in some sense elusive and ungraspable by human intellect and ability it cannot be
fully encompassed by our academic endeavor in this study. Thus, it is precisely in this
manner I suggest we proceed: in the spirit of fear and trembling as we oscillate between,
on the one hand, speaking and writing as an attempt to describe and to understand, and,
on the other hand, speaking and writing as an act of confession and repentance when we
have overstepped our bounds. One way in which to remain in this position of tension is
to ensure that this study is not undertaken alone. Rather, in moving forward it is crucial
that we carry along with us the cautionary voices of other scholars—scholars such as
Steven Shakespeare who, even if I do not agree with them on every point, can
nevertheless keep us honest by perpetually whispering in our ears Kierkegaard’s own
challenge to remember that the paradox is not a prize to be won or an object to be
explained, but something through which one is to live and to which one is to remain in a
perpetual relation of humility and striving.51

This would perhaps be akin to the response of the early Wittgenstein to the transcendence of
the understanding. See the seventh proposition in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractus Logico-Philosophicus, trans.
D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (New York, NY: Humanities Press, 1961).
51 Shakespeare’s statement in the last few lines in the conclusion of his book Kierkegaard and the
Refusal of Transcendence, for example, is of particular value for serving such a cautionary purpose. He writes,
“As soon as I identify this or that as the paradox, I have misidentified it. I have subjected it to a schema of
recognition. The time of the paradox is always that of coming into existence. In one sense, the paradox has
no motion. It does not progress. It does not slow down, nor does it accelerate. It has no measure. In
another sense, the paradox is the only principle of motion. It is the kinesis that makes every event possible
as an event, and impossible to grasp in the deceitfulness of its becoming. As repetition, it is the coming
into actuality of what is ideal. In one and the same movement, it is the unsurpassable contradiction
between the actual and the ideal. The paradox is faithless. It is love/hate. It betrays everything. Including
itself. But it never gives up on flesh and blood. The paradox refuses mediation. It is simple. It will not be
what you call it, or where you put it. It is the point of maximum antagonism in any system. There is no one
paradox. The paradox is not one.” See, Kierkegaard and the Refusal of Transcendence (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), 207.
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CHAPTER 1
KIERKEGAARD’S ETHICO-RELIGIOUS TASK IN CHRISTENDOM
AND THE NOTION OF SACRED TENSION
What is commonly called Christendom…has made Christianity into utter
nonsense.1
[W]hen the greatest possible restlessness [Uro] is brought about, in the
tension [Spændingen] there can arise within a person the intensity which
really can love God.2
Now if Christianity again rises up and regains its tension [Spændkraft],
this Christian-world will become furious…3

The overall aim of this chapter is to articulate and to argue for the particular
reading of Kierkegaard’s thought that will serve as the foundation upon which I build the
argument concerning paradox and Christian existence in Chapters 2-5. The reason such
preliminary interpretive work proves necessary is that the framework one employs in
approaching Kierkegaard significantly shapes what one focuses on within his vast corpus
as well as how one ultimately decides what, if anything, constitutes an appropriate
characterization of his authorial project. Indeed, Kierkegaard has been interpreted
through a diverse set of more or less appropriate lenses, and therefore it is important to
base my reading on a careful exposition of Kierkegaard’s writings.
The argument I put forward may be summarized in the following manner. In
response to the problem of his nominally Christian Danish culture (what Kierkegaard
identifies as Christendom), Kierkegaard takes upon himself the ethico-religious task of
introducing Christianity into Christendom with the goal of helping his contemporaries to
become authentic Christians.4 Becoming an authentic Christian for Kierkegaard,

SKS 23, 39, NB15:59 / JP 3, 3035.
SKS 26, 198, NB32:110 / JP 4, 4489.
3 SKS 22, 245, NB12:168 / JP 1, 510.
4 By employing the term ethico-religious I side with scholars who oppose the artificial dichotomy
that is often drawn between ethics and religion in Kierkegaard’s thought, and who rather see ethics and
religion as crucially intertwined. See, e.g., Julia Watkin, Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy
1
2
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however, does not mean that one attains a static state in which one ceases to develop or
to grow. To the contrary, this goal can be better understood as the restless process of
becoming characteristic of the existential stance I identify as living within the sacred tension.
With the notion of sacred tension, I suggest that Kierkegaard is not primarily asking his
readers to carry out specific moral actions or to perform specific religious practices, but
rather he is encouraging each one to adopt a general disposition where Christian faith can take
root and can be perpetually fostered.5 Furthermore, with respect to the overall project of the
dissertation in linking paradox and Christian existence in Kierkegaard’s thought, I make
the case that Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is deeply existential in nature. More
specifically, by modeling his account on that of Socrates and his “care for the soul,”
Kierkegaard likewise sees himself as undertaking a crucial existential task with the aim of
fostering existential transformation. One consequence of construing Kierkegaard’s task
in this fashion is that if we are able to show that paradox has a key role to play in such a
task, we then have good reason to believe that paradox will be an essential piece of a
Kierkegaardian account of Christian existence.
In order to develop this argument, I divide this chapter into four sections. In
Section 1.1, I outline Kierkegaard’s description of Christendom as well as the problems
associated with it that inform Kierkegaard’s response. In Section 1.2, I describe

(Lanham, MD and London: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 212: “[I]t is a mistake to see Kierkegaard separating
the ethical from the religious…as if one somehow lost ethics when one entered upon the essentially
religious life…” See also David J. Gouwens, “Kierkegaard on the Ethical Imagination,” The Journal of
Religious Ethics 10, no. 2 (1982), 216; Leslie Alison Howe, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Ethics, Dissertation
(Toronto, ON: University of Toronto, 1989), 163-4; C. Stephen Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality: A
Reading of Fear and Trembling,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling, ed. Robert L.
Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 9-27; Ronald L. Hall, “Kierkegaard and the
Paradoxical Logic of Worldly Faith,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995), 41, 50; Christopher Hamilton,
“Kierkegaard on Truth as Subjectivity: Christianity, Ethics and Asceticism,” Religious Studies 34, no. 1
(1998), 63-4; C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 59; C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco, TX: Baylor
University Press, 2006), 211, 213. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that Kierkegaard clearly sees
a difference between ethics and religion. This point, however, must be understood dialectically. On the one
hand, when it is assumed that faith can be reduced to ethics, Kierkegaard emphasizes their distinction (see,
e.g., Fear and Trembling). On the other hand, when it is assumed that ethics and religion have little to do
with one another, Kierkegaard emphasizes their contiguity (see, e.g., Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses).
5 This is not, however, to say that Kierkegaard entirely disregards such actions and practices.
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Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task by focusing briefly on the figure of Socrates and his
influence on Kierkegaard. In Section 1.3, I sketch out a preliminary account of the notion
of sacred tension as the broad and overarching telos of this task. I do so first by
introducing what Kierkegaard sees as the problems both of evasion of tension and of
destructive tension, in contrast to which I describe sacred tension by focusing on one of
Kierkegaard’s paradigmatic expressions of such tension, namely that associated with the
paradoxical dialectic of grace/works.6 In addition, I discuss the notion of restlessness as
well as Kierkegaard’s ontology of becoming underlying such restlessness—both of which
I argue are central to sacred tension. Finally, in Section 1.4, I summarize the chapter and
suggest how it sets up the argument concerning paradox and Christian existence that I
develop in Chapters 2-5.

1.1 - Kierkegaard on Christendom and Its Problems
The aim of this section is to outline Kierkegaard’s description of Christendom
and several of its significant problems in response to which Kierkegaard carries out his
ethico-religious task.7 Although Kierkegaard discusses Christendom in more or less detail
in several of his early writings, he affords extensive attention to Christendom in his
journals and papers from 1846 onwards as well as in his later writings, especially The Point
of View and The Moment. As such, I draw heavily on these texts for the following
discussion.8

This dialectic can also be construed as gift/task or gospel/law.
As J. Michael Tilley points out, Kierkegaard, as he approaches his death, becomes quite
pessimistic about the possibility of reforming Christendom. See “Christendom,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts:
Tome I: Absolute to Church, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 207, 210. Despite this, Kierkegaard’s more optimistic view that a response
to Christendom can in fact be formulated is consistent throughout nearly all of his life and in the majority
of the writings that we consider in this dissertation.
8 Some scholars see focusing on these later works, and especially The Point of View—a text in
which Kierkegaard attempts a retrospective survey of his entire authorship—as problematic in that these
scholars view Kierkegaard’s self-assessment to be largely suspect. See, e.g., Josiah Thompson, The Lonely
Labyrinth: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967);
6
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A General Characterization of Christendom
Throughout his writings, Kierkegaard describes “Christendom” (Christenhed)9 in
consistently negative terms. For Kierkegaard, Christendom represents the cultural
expression of Christianity in which authentic New Testament faith has been downgraded
or traded for a problematic and enervated human substitute. Although Christianity as an
established religion still exists in Kierkegaard’s 19th century Denmark in the form of
certain cultural religious practices or as a doctrine and a teaching, this conventional
expression of Christianity has replaced the expression that takes as its central emphasis
the task of existing in relation to the ideal picture of Christianity presented by Jesus and
the apostles.10 In more dramatic terms, the rise of Christendom means that genuine
Christianity has been entirely abolished.11 As Kierkegaard remarks, “What is commonly
called Christendom (these thousands and millions) has made Christianity into utter
nonsense. But, in addition, established Christendom’s orthodoxy has actually
transformed Christianity to paganism.”12

Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins, trans. George C. Schoolfield (New Haven, CT and
London: Yale University Press, 1980); Joakim Garff, “The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View and Points of
View on Kierkegaard’s Work as an Author,” in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, ed. Jonathan Rée and Jane
Chamberlain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 75-102. In contrast to such readings, see Niels Jørgen Cappelørn,
“The Retrospective Understanding of Søren Kierkegaard’s Total Production,” in Kierkegaard’s Resources and
Results, ed. Alastair McKinnon (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), 19-36; Sylvia Walsh,
“Reading Kierkegaard with Kierkegaard against Garff,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter 38 (1999): 4-8; Mark A.
Tietjen, “To Believe or Not to Believe: Toward a Hermeneutic of Trust,” in International Kierkegaard
Commentary: The Point of View, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2010), 78-103.
Although it is important to retain a healthy skepticism regarding Kierkegaard’s self-assessment, this does
not preclude us from adopting something like a “hermeneutic of trust” in relation to Kierkegaard. On this
point, see Tietjen, “To Believe or Not to Believe”; Mark A. Tietjen, Kierkegaard, Communication, and Virtue:
Authorship as Edification (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), 79-80.
9 This is in contrast to “Christendom,” the Danish term Kierkegaard employs to describe authentic
Christianity.
10 SKS 16, 112 / PV, 129-30.
11 This claim is what Kierkegaard calls his “one thesis”: simply stated, “The Christianity of the
New Testament does not exist at all.” See SKS 14, 169 / M, 39. See also SKS 22, 94-5, NB11:160 / JP 1,
383; SKS 22, 235-6 / JP 1, 385; SKS 14, 163, 174 / M, 35, 42-3. In addition, Kierkegaard claims that
Christendom has made authentic Christianity impossible. See SKS 13, 133 / M, 95.
12 SKS 23, 39, NB15:59 / JP 3, 3035. See also SKS 22, 316, NB13:70 / JP 1, 389; SKS 23, 81,
NB15:115 / JP 1, 390.
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What makes Christendom even more dangerous than paganism, however, is that
unlike the honest and clear-eyed world-view of someone like Socrates, Christendom
operates with the illusion or delusion that even though it has abolished Christianity it still
represents authentic faith.13 In The Point of View, Kierkegaard offers a stinging caricature
of this phenomenon:
What does it mean, after all, that all these thousands and thousands of a matter of
course call themselves Christians! These many, many people, of whom by far the
great majority, according to everything that can be discerned, have their lives in
entirely different categories, something one can ascertain by the simplest
observation! People who perhaps never once go to church, never think about
God, never name his name except when they curse! People to whom it has never
occurred that their lives should have some duty to God, people who either
maintain that a certain civil impunity is the highest or do not find even this to be
entirely necessary! Yet all these people, even those who insist that there is no god,
they all are Christians, call themselves Christians, are recognized as Christians by
the state, are buried as Christians by the Church, are discharged as Christians to
eternity!14
Such individuals caught up within the illusion of Christendom do not feel the need to
look to the New Testament or to the example of Christ to guide them in radical faith, but
rather they are deluded into conforming to the collective cultural currents coalescing
around them.15 Yet, in this they nevertheless expect to be counted among the long line of
Christian witnesses extending back to the apostles.16

Two Main Expressions of Christendom
The general picture Kierkegaard offers of Christendom is that it represents the
abolition of authentic New Testament Christianity in favor of the categories of secular
Danish culture. For Kierkegaard, however, Christendom is not monolithic in nature.

SKS 22, 316, NB13:70 / JP 1, 389; SKS 23, 81, NB15:115 / JP 1, 390.
SKS 16, 23-4 / PV, 41. See also SKS 10, 222 / CD, 214; SKS 23, 354, NB19:33 / JP 1, 395.
15 See SKS 23, 81, NB15:115 / JP 1, 390.
16 See, e.g., SKS 14, 123-5 / M, 3-8, and Kierkegaard’s attack upon Bishop Mynster.
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14

23
Rather, it is comprised of two main cultural forces, namely common Danish civility and
Danish speculative thought.
With respect to common Danish civility, Kierkegaard has in mind the perception
of the average Dane that merely being born within Denmark and carrying out one’s
Danish civic duty is sufficient for being a Christian. Characteristic of this expression of
Christendom is the conflation of the values of radically transformative Christianity with
the bourgeoisie values of the modern state. In Postscript, Climacus offers a humorous and
sarcastic depiction of precisely such a view by describing what could be the typical
response of a typical Danish wife to her typical Danish husband who has begun to have
doubts about his typical Danish Christian faith:
Hubby, darling, where did you ever pick up such a notion [that you are not a true
believer]? How can you not be a Christian? You are Danish, aren’t you? Doesn’t
the geography book say that the predominant religion in Demark is LutheranChristian? You aren’t a Jew, are you, or a Mohammedan? What else would you
be, then? It is a thousand years since paganism was superseded; so I know you
aren’t a pagan. Don’t you tend to your work in the office as a good civil servant;
aren’t you a good subject in a Christian nation, in a Lutheran-Christian state? So
of course you are a Christian.17
In this view, then, to be a Christian means merely to join everyone else in becoming an
upright citizen in an upright Christian nation.
With respect to Danish speculative thought, Kierkegaard intends primarily the
vogue Danish Hegelianism practiced by cultural elites of the Danish academy.18 In
Kierkegaard’s assessment, what is characteristic of this expression of Christendom is the
construal of Christianity as something objective, or rather as an object of knowledge to
which one can relate oneself objectively through speculation. As Kierkegaard remarks,

SKS 7, 55 / CUP1, 50-1.
Notable examples include Johan Heiberg and Hans Martensen. On this point, see Jon Stewart,
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 50-67. As Stewart
points out, it is important to keep in mind that Danish Hegelianism is neither a simple nor an entirely
unified school of thought.
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“The state of ‘Christendom’ is as follows: the point of view of Christianity and of what
Christianity is has been completely shifted, has been cast in terms of the objective, the
scholarly…”19 Similarly, in Christian Discourses Kierkegaard notes: “Christianity is regarded
as a sum of doctrines; lectures are given on it in the same way as on ancient philosophy,
Hebrew, or any branch of knowledge whatever…”20 As such, to be a Christian as
mediated through Danish speculative thought requires one merely to be an intellectual
(and perhaps even a professor21) within a Christian culture.
Although these two cultural forces represent vastly different perspectives in that
one is largely practical and the other is largely theoretical, in Kierkegaard’s view they both
converge on the same end, that is, an affirmation of Christendom culture to the
detriment of authentic New Testament faith. Or, to put it differently, common Danish
civility and Danish speculative thought represent merely two sides of the same coin.22
For Kierkegaard, this Christendom coin is deeply problematic regardless of which side it
displays. But what, exactly, are some of the specific problems Kierkegaard sees with
Christendom?

Kierkegaard on Several Specific Problems of Christendom
Because the specific problems Kierkegaard associates with Christendom are
numerous, we may limit ourselves to outlining briefly five of the more central issues he
raises.

SKS 24, 406, NB24:131 / JP 6, 6780.
SKS 10, 222-3 / CD, 214.
21 For some of Kierkegaard’s critical remarks on professors, see the Hongs’ collection in JP 3,
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3562-97.
See Merold Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996), 146; Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard and Hegel,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 114.
22

25
First, Christendom is problematic because it excises from faith what Kierkegaard
understands to be the most crucial notions and concepts associated with authentic
Christianity. For example, absent from Christendom is any significant emphasis on sin,23
the possibility of offense,24 the need for striving,25 notions such as conversion, rebirth,
imitation, dying to the world, renunciation, self-denial, horror, struggling, suffering,26 and,
most relevant for our discussion, paradox. With respect to the latter, Kierkegaard notes
in a journal entry, “By displacing the paradox Christendom has quite simply managed to
restore the old paganism—trimmed with Christian expressions and phrases.”27
Second, the absence of such notions means that faith within Christendom can be
both cheaply attained and easily preserved. As Kierkegaard whimsically notes, when faith
loses its danger and difficulty or when nobody struggles and suffers, it becomes “as
simple as pulling on one’s socks.”28 With faith available on such cheap conditions, people
who want to become Christians are not challenged, but rather they are coddled both into
and in their belief. The result of the cheapness and ease of faith is that although hordes
of people pour into the church, these people apparently experience no real
transformation. For Kierkegaard, however, the authentic Christian transformation
associated with genuine faith presupposes hard work,29 and this is precisely the reason
that within authentic Christianity “The way is narrow and the gate is strait that leads to
life, and few are who find it.”30
Third, with such cheap and easy faith, the believer no longer needs passion and
neither need he or she take any real risks. Of his present age, Kierkegaard remarks that it

SKS 12, 79-80 / PC, 67-8.
SKS 9, 197-8 / WL, 198-9; SKS 12, 142-3 / PC, 140-1.
25 SKS 14, 163 / M, 36; SKS 14, 179 / M, 47.
26 SKS 21, 158, NB8:30 / JP 1, 380; SKS 22, 94-5, NB11:160 / JP 1, 383; SKS 23, 476, NB20:158
/ JP 1, 397.
27 SKS 26, 251, NB33:8 / JP 3, 3101. See also SKS 7, 344-5 / CUP1, 379.
28 SKS 12, 49 / PC, 35.
29 See SKS 13, 151-3 / M, 109-11. This is not to downplay the role of grace in such
transformation. On this point see Section 1.3 below.
30 SKS 13, 152 / M, 110; Matthew 7:14.
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“is essentially a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in superficial, short-lived
enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in indolence.”31 To further explain this, Kierkegaard offers
a parable:
If the treasure every one covets lies far out on a very thin crust of ice, guarded by
the great danger to anyone venturing so far out, whereas…closer to shore the ice
is thick and solid—in a passionate age the crowd would loudly cheer the bold,
brave person who skates out on thin ice. They would shudder for him and with
him in his perilous decision, would grieve for him if he meets his death, and
would idealize him if he gets the treasure. The situation would be entirely
different in a reflective age devoid of passion. In mutual recognition of shared
prudence, they would sensibly agree that it certainly would not be worth the
trouble to skate out on such thin ice—in fact, it would be foolish and ridiculous.
Then an inspired venture would be transformed into an acrobatic stunt—in order to
do something, for “something has to be done.” They would go out and from
their safe vantage point appraise with the air of connoisseurs the expert skater
who can skate almost to the very edge (that is, as far out as the ice is still safe and
just short of being dangerous) and then turn back.32
As Kierkegaard suggests with this parable, in Christendom (as in modernity in general)
nobody risks everything for the treasure of authentic faith. Rather, they are satisfied
merely to gain hollow and short-lived social acclaim. Such a mentality of the aloof
spectator who remains safe, impassionate, and uncommitted is for Kierkegaard a far cry
from the faith of the New Testament.
Fourth, in transforming Christianity into an object of reflection and scholarship,
Christendom leaves the individual indifferent to Christianity. It does so primarily by
distorting the truth that Christianity is fundamentally an existence-communication
(Existents-Meddelelse) that demands an active response on the part of the believer.33 For
Kierkegaard, Christianity is essentially “praxis, a character-task [Charakteer-Opgave],”34 but
in making reflection an end in itself Christendom has elevated thinking over action with

SKS 8, 66 / TA, 68. The italics are in the original.
SKS 8, 69-70 / TA, 71-2 (the italicized emphasis is in the original). For a similar story, but
rather about a pearl, see SKS 7, 386-7 / CUP1, 425-6.
33 SKS 7, 345-6 / CUP1, 379-80.
34 SKS 25, 249, NB28:43 / JP 4, 3864.
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the ultimate result being that the latter is undermined altogether. Thus, the speculative
thread of Christendom has taken a drastically different turn from the deeply practical and
active nature of authentic Christian faith.35
Finally, one of the most fundamental problems of Christendom is that
individuals within it have lost touch with the ethical in the sense they have entirely
forgotten what it means to exist. As Kierkegaard notes, “No one boldly ventures, so to
speak, to leap existentially into the ethical,”36 but rather “the originality of the ethical” has
been traded for a “desiccated ruin, a narrow-hearted custom and practice.”37 Similarly,
Kierkegaard remarks that in Christendom “The medium for being a Christian has been
shifted away from existence and the ethical to the intellectual, the metaphysical, the
imaginational; a more or less theatrical relationship has been introduced between
thinking Christianity and being a Christian—and in this way has abolished being a
Christian.”38 Such a departure from ethical existence plays out in several ways such as in
downplaying notions of law and duty to God,39 in confusing the glittering virtues with
glittering vices,40 and through the abandonment of striving and imitation of Christ.41
Christendom, therefore, comes up significantly short of the existential nature of
authentic New Testament Christianity.

35 See, e.g., Matthew 22:39: “But the second commandment is like it: You shall love your
neighbor as yourself.” This verse is the basis for the first part of Kierkegaard’s magnum opus of Christian
ethics, Works of Love.
36 SKS 22, 236, NB12:148 / JP 1, 385.
37 SKS 8, 63 / TA, 65.
38 SKS 16, 112-13 / PV, 130. See also SKS 7, 221 / CUP1, 243; SKS 7, 282 / CUP1, 310.
39 See SKS 14, 179 / M, 47.
40 SKS 8, 82 / TA, 86. On the difference between what Kierkegaard calls the “glittering vices”
(glimrende Laster) of the pagans and the “glittering virtues” (glimrende Dyder) of Christianity, see, e.g., SKS 11,
161 / SUD, 46.
41 See SKS 14, 163 / M, 36. As John Elrod rightly perceives it, the failure of Christendom to
foster imitation serves as one of the central targets against which Kierkegaard as an ethical thinker directs
his attention. See Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 245.
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1.2 - Kierkegaard’s Ethico-Religious Task in Christendom
In this section, I outline Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task as it emerges in
response to the problem of Christendom described above. To begin, I briefly discuss the
question of Kierkegaard as a missionary, and I follow this by providing a characterization
of Kierkegaard’s task in relation to his understanding and appropriation of Socrates. As I
point out, what is of particular importance here is the manner by which Socrates helps to
sharpen Kierkegaard’s focus on Christian existence.

Kierkegaard as Missionary?
In describing Kierkegaard’s authorial task, a handful of scholars have identified
Kierkegaard as a missionary.42 On the one hand, it is correct that at certain places in his
writings Kierkegaard appears to adopt the status of missionary. For example, in The Point
of View Kierkegaard seems to link his own task of “introduc[ing] Christianity again—into
Christendom” with the work of a missionary.43 Furthermore, in an addendum to the
same text Kierkegaard also identifies one of his central notions “the single individual” as
“the missionary’s category” that “the missionary” will use when he arrives within
Christendom.44 On the other hand, Kierkegaard also takes significant strides to distance
himself from the status of missionary. In a journal entry Kierkegaard makes the following

See, e.g., Edward John Carnell, The Burden of Søren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1965), 32; C. Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard: A Misunderstood Reformer,” Christianity Today (21 September
1984), 27; Robert R. Cook, “Søren Kierkegaard: Missionary to Christendom,” Evangelical Quarterly 87, no. 4
(1987): 311-27; C. Stephen Evans, Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 66; C. Stephen Evans, “Søren Kierkegaard: Philosophical Fragments,” in Central
Works of Philosophy: The Nineteenth Century, ed. John Shand (Montreal and Kingston, London, Ithaca, NY:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 159-60; Andrew J. Burgess, “Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and
Martyrdom,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Without Authority, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press, 2006), 191; C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 1-2; C. Stephen Evans and Robert C. Roberts, “Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 223-4, 228.
43 SKS 16, 24 / PV, 42.
44 SKS 16, 98 / PV, 123-4. Cf. SKS 20, 280-2, NB3:77 / JP 2, 2004. It is not entirely clear that
Kierkegaard refers to himself with the title “the missionary.”
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important remark about his own task within Christendom: “I was bound to the idea of
trying to introduce Christianity into Christendom, albeit poetically and without authority
(namely, not making myself a missionary).”45 Similarly, in another entry entitled “My
Task: To Make Room,” Kierkegaard notes, “I am not an Apostle, who brings something
from God, and with authority. No, I serve God, but without authority.”46 In this respect,
insofar as the missionary is someone who proclaims the Christian truth to others with
divine authority such as the traditional Danish missionaries acting as emissaries to foreign
lands,47 Kierkegaard clearly does not desire to be assigned such a status. Despite this, he
nevertheless still retains a strong desire to see his contemporaries turn to authentic New
Testament Christianity and to use his life and literary talents towards this end.48 As such,
even if we refrain from characterizing Kierkegaard as a missionary, we are still warranted
in identifying his task as fundamentally religious in nature. However, in order to
differentiate himself from the missionaries and evangelists of Christendom who merely
add greater numbers of nominal Christians to the ranks of the millions already within
Denmark,49 Kierkegaard does not look around his Christendom culture for a model of
how to carry out his task. Neither does he look to the example set by the reformer
Martin Luther. Rather, he casts his gaze further back, deep into antiquity and onto the
figure of Socrates.

45 SKS 21, 289, NB10:60 / JP 6, 6356. This statement is consistent with other of Kierkegaard’s
claims that he is nothing more than a poetic genius in a market town. See SKS 16, 74 / PV, 95; SKS 21,
359, NB10:192 / JP 6, 6390; SKS 21, 367-8, NB10:200 / JP 6, 6391.
46 SKS 26, 416, NB36:11 / JP 6, 6936. Kierkegaard remarks repeatedly within his writings that he
is “without authority.” See, e.g., the essay “The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle” (SKS 11, 95111 / WA, 91-108).
47 Kierkegaard may have in mind the Danish Moravian missionaries serving abroad and dying for
their faith on the mission field. On Kierkegaard’s relation to the Moravian missionaries, see Burgess,
“Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and Martyrdom.”
48 See SKS 13, 410-11 / M, 346-7.
49 SKS 16, 105-6 / PV, 125-6. With respect to evangelists, Kierkegaard likely has in mind N.F.S.
Grundtvig and his followers.
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Kierkegaard on Socrates and the Socratic Ethico-Religious Task
Socrates makes numerous appearances in Kierkegaard’s writings,50 yet
undoubtedly the most significant role he plays for Kierkegaard is as an exemplar or
forerunner for Kierkegaard’s own engagement with his Christendom culture.51 But what,
exactly, does Kierkegaard understand to be the task of Socrates? To answer this question,
we may begin with Plato’s Apology.52
The Apology opens with Socrates facing a jury of his peers in order to defend
himself against the dual charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. As a central piece of
his defense, Socrates describes his specific task that he has carried out within Athens
over the course of his life as well as the method he has employed in attempting to fulfil
this task. To begin, Socrates points out that his work originates with the divine oracle at
Delphi in which he is declared to be the wisest of all human beings.53 In an attempt to
(dis)prove this claim, Socrates seeks out the learned and respected of Athens as dialogue
partners, but he quickly discovers that the claims to knowledge made by them are
ultimately hollow. Consequently, Socrates concludes that the oracle is in fact correct
because he, unlike all the others he meets, at least knows he is ignorant.
What concerns Socrates from his encounters with his contemporaries is not only
their lack of wisdom, but also that they are neither bothered by this lack nor do they feel
any need to remedy it. Rather, they are more than satisfied with their pursuit of wealth,
Over the span of Kierkegaard’s short intellectual career beginning with his dissertation and
ending with the final volume of The Moment, the figure of Socrates plays a hugely significant role in shaping
the passion, content, and direction of Kierkegaard’s thought. See, e.g., SKS 10, 247-8 / CD, 241; SKS 25,
225-7, NB28:15 / JP 6, 6839; SKS 13, 39 / FSE, 9. The number of entries from the journals and papers
alone that Kierkegaard dedicates to Socrates is staggering. See JP 7 Index, 88-9.
51 Some scholars have recognized this fact by assigning Kierkegaard the title of the “Danish
Socrates.” See, most notably, David F. Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, ed. Lillian Marvins Swenson
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1945), 34-69.
52 As Paul Muench argues, the Apology most certainly had a significant influence on Kierkegaard
and his view of Socrates. See “Apology: Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” in Kierkegaard and the Greek
World: Tome I: Socrates and Plato, ed. Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2010), 7-8.
53 Plato, Apology, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Plato: Compete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis,
IN and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 20d-21a.
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reputation, and honors.54 It is in response to this state of affairs that Socrates takes upon
himself the burden of becoming the gadfly that stings the sleeping horse of his fellow
citizens so as to awaken them from their slumber and to challenge them to trade the
trappings of their Athenian society for the pursuit of caring for their souls.55 Thus,
although the Athenians perceive Socrates as a nuisance or even as a traitor, he views his
task as nothing less than the response to a divine mandate for the purpose of the ethical
and existential transformation of his contemporaries.56
For Kierkegaard, what stands out most of all in this account is the ethicoreligious nature of Socrates’ task. In Kierkegaard’s view, the Socrates described in the
Apology represents the premier ethicist of human history in that he is concerned first and
foremost with the basic concrete question of how one ought to live—a question he
addresses directly to individuals and not to the crowd as a whole.57 In this, Socrates
continually pushes for the single individual to pursue the human ideal: “Socrates doubted
that one is a human being by birth; to become human or to learn what it means to be
human does not come that easily—what occupied Socrates, what he sought, was the
ideality of being human.”58 As such, Socrates is focused strictly on the existential and
thereby has no interest in articulating a philosophical system.59 Furthermore, Kierkegaard
views Socrates’ task as a “divine mission” (guddommelige Mission)60 that has required
Socrates, out of a sense of divine duty, to venture his life “in the service of the god
[Guden].”61 Such a task represents a certain respect for and worship of God. With regard

Plato, Apology, 29d-e.
Plato, Apology, 29e-31a.
56 Plato, Apology, 30e.
57 SKS 16, 102-3 / PV, 123-4. Kierkegaard also claims that Socrates invented the category of “the
single individual.” See SKS 16, 49 / PV, 68-9.
58 SKS 26, 363, NB35:2 / JP 2, 1767.
59 SKS 22, 377, NB14:55 / JP 4, 4275.
60 See SKS 1, 221 / CI, 173; SKS 1, 226 / CI, 179; SKS 1, 277 / CI, 236.
61 SKS 13, 39 / FSE, 9. See also SKS 4, 173 / FT, 83.
54
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to Socrates’ expression of ignorance associated with his elenctic method,62 Anti-Climacus
remarks in The Sickness unto Death, “let us never forget that Socrates’ ignorance was a kind
of fear and worship of God, that his ignorance was the Greek version of the Jewish
saying: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Let us never forget that it was
out of veneration for God that he was ignorant…”63 Although Kierkegaard does not
think that Socrates’ ethico-religious task is identical to his own in that Socrates is not
working with Christian categories and he is, Kierkegaard nevertheless thinks that his task
is analogous in important ways to that of Socrates.

Kierkegaard’s Appropriation of Socrates for His Own Ethico-Religious Aims
Kierkegaard claims numerous times in his writings that what is needed in his
Danish culture is a Socratic figure that can do for Christendom what Socrates did for
Athens.64 In his own assessment, Kierkegaard views his life as an author as serving
precisely such a Socratic role.65 As he remarks near the end of his life, “The only analogy
I have [for my task] before me is Socrates…”66 But what exactly is it about Socrates that
Kierkegaard appropriates for his own aims?

With this method, Socrates begins with a profession of ignorance concerning some specific
matter such as the nature of piety, after which he moves through a series of questions aimed at overcoming
falsity and thereby advancing in wisdom. Kierkegaard was clearly enamored with this method. See, e.g.,
SKS 10, 226-7 / CD, 218-19.
63 SKS 11, 211 / SUD, 99.
64 See, e.g., SKS 20, 318, NB4:65 / JP 1, 373; SKS 25, 272, NB28:70 / JP 4, 4296; SKS 11, 205 /
SUD, 92.
65 SKS 16, 12 / PV, 24; SKS 13, 404-11 / M, 340-7.
66 SKS 13, 405 / M, 341. On this point, see Muench, “Apology: Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of
View,” 6 (cf. Paul Muench, “Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara
Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 390); Benjamin Daise,
Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), vii. It is important to note, however,
that by looking to Socrates in this strong manner, Kierkegaard is not returning to a pre-Christendom form
of paganism. To the contrary, he remains firmly within Christianity and Christian categories. As
Kierkegaard notes in The Point of View, “formally I can very well call Socrates my teacher—whereas I have
believed and believe in only one, the Lord Jesus Christ.” See SKS 16, 36 / PV, 55.
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The most important thing Kierkegaard appropriates from Socrates for his own
project is the latter’s emphasis on existence.67 Just as the Athenians had become
distracted in the trappings of materialistic life and thereby had abandoned the question of
what it means to exist, Kierkegaard believes the Danes of his time have become
distracted by the trappings of Christendom culture and have similarly lost sight of the
question of what it means to exist as a Christian. Harold Sarf makes this point well when
he notes,
Kierkegaard saw himself as a Christianized analogue of Socrates, caring for souls
and doing battle with the sophists—whether in the guises of educators,
theologians, politicians, or philosophers—who falsely claimed to import genuine
virtue and understanding within their domains. For Kierkegaard, a “gadfly” in the
spiritual lineage of Socrates was required to sting people into perceiving the
negative consequences of their indolence and hypocrisy, of their superficial
materialism and misguided values, and to reveal their ignorance about how to
fashion the best possible lives…68
For Kierkegaard, appropriating such a Socratic emphasis on existence means presenting
Christianity in its full ideality. As he remarks in “Armed Neutrality,” “what I have wanted
and want to achieve through my work, what I also regard as the most important, is first of

67 SKS 18, 298, JJ:477 / JP 4, 4265; Muench, “Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” 398. See also
Harold Sarf, “Reflections on Kierkegaard’s Socrates,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 2 (1983), 256.
There are, of course, other aspects of Socrates that Kierkegaard appropriates such as, for example,
Socrates’ method of ignorance. Just as Socrates pronounces himself ignorant in relation to what others
claim to know, Kierkegaard assumes a similar stance in which he claims not to have the faith that others in
Christendom claim to have (see Carnell, The Burden of Søren Kierkegaard, 28; Muench, “Apology: Kierkegaard’s
Socratic Point of View,” 13; Tilley, “Christendom,” 209). Thus, in the essay “My Task,” Kierkegaard
remarks rather Socratically, “‘I do not call myself a Christian; I do not speak of myself as a Christian.’ It is
this that I must continually repeat; anyone who wants to understand my very special task must concentrate
on being able to hold this firm” (SKS 13, 404 / M, 340; see also SKS 16, 116-20 / PV, 15, 134-8).
Kierkegaard’s purpose in assuming this Socratic stance is to level an ironic challenge against his
Christendom contemporaries who all claim to be genuine Christians. More specifically, he intends this
method as a nonjudgmental way to challenge his contemporaries to examine themselves so as to draw
closer to authentic faith. Kierkegaard describes this missionary aspect of his authorship nicely in Christian
Discourses: “It is not at all our intention to judge Christendom or any single person in Christendom; we are
doing our best to come as close as possible to ourselves, the best way to keep us from coming judgingly
too close to others. But it is indeed our intention to give the listener occasion to become aware of where he
is, to test himself, his life, his Christianity.” See SKS 10, 223 / CD, 215. This is also the reason Kierkegaard
employs the method of indirect communication. On this point, see Matthew T. Nowachek, “Kierkegaard
as Pedagogue: Some Insights for Teaching Introductory Philosophy Courses,” Teaching Philosophy 37, no. 3
(2014), 349-53.
68 Sarf, “Reflections on Kierkegaard’s Socrates,” 260.

34
all to make clear what is involved in being a Christian, to present the picture of a
Christian in all its ideal, that is true form, worked out to every true limit…”69
Kierkegaard’s hope is that presenting the ideal in this fashion would lead to a return to
the question of existence in a way that inspires striving.
In the end, the Socratic aim Kierkegaard appropriates can be summarized in a
single word: simplicity. For Kierkegaard, the overall purpose of his authorship is to help
people traverse the narrow path that leads out of the complex confusion of Christendom
and back to the simple truths of authentic New Testament Christianity. In genuinely
Socratic fashion, Kierkegaard claims that precisely this is what it means “to reach, to arrive
at simplicity”70: “Christianly, one does not proceed from the simple in order then to
become interesting, witty, profound, a poet, a philosopher, etc. No, it is just the opposite;
here one begins and then becomes more and more simple, arrives at the simple. This, in
‘Christendom,’ is Christianly the movement of reflection; one does not reflect oneself into
Christianity but reflects oneself out of something else and becomes more and more
simple, a Christian.”71 One may be tempted to conclude here, insofar as Kierkegaard
employs the language of reaching and arriving, that Kierkegaard views Christian
simplicity as something static. To the contrary, Kierkegaard is clear throughout his
authorship that his goal has always been the dynamic movement of becoming a
Christian.72 In the next section we may provide a more detailed picture of how this
dynamic telos of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task looks, and to do so we may introduce
the notion of sacred tension.

SKS 16, 111 / PV, 129.
SKS 13, 13 / PV, 7.
71 SKS 13, 13 / PV, 7.
72 As Kierkegaard remarks in a journal entry, Christian simplicity involves movement “in the
direction of existing, of existentially expressing the essentially Christian. The simplicity is simply to exist.”
See SKS 23, 480, NB20:162 / JP 3, 3095. Interestingly, Kierkegaard here connects Christian simplicity to
the notion of paradox.
69
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1.3 - Sacred Tension as the Telos of Kierkegaard’s Ethico-Religious Task
Tension (Spænding)73 is an important concept for Kierkegaard, and it shows up in
several places and in several forms within his writings. The purpose of this section is
primarily to offer a preliminary description of sacred tension as a constructive form of
tension that I claim serves as the broad and overarching telos of Kierkegaard’s ethicoreligious task. This preliminary account will be nuanced and filled out in greater depth in
later chapters as we move through several of Kierkegaard writings, both with respect to
showing how sacred tension is manifested in various ways within Kierkegaard’s thought
and with respect to providing specific characterizations of such sacred tension. This
introductory discussion, therefore, proves useful for outlining an initial account upon
which we can later expand. To begin, we may touch upon two antitheses to constructive
tension in contrast to which Kierkegaard develops the notion of sacred tension.

Two Antitheses to Constructive Tension
The first antithesis is simply the evasion of tension. Such evasion assumes two
forms which coincide with each of the two main expressions of Christendom described
above, namely Danish civility and Danish speculative thought.
For Danish civility, evasion of tension comes in the form of the pursuit of
comfort and security. In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard describes this evasion by
employing the metaphor of a weakened spring: “Ah, there is so much in the ordinary
course of life that will lull a person to sleep, teach him to say ‘peace and no
danger’…Even that which in itself is awakening—thoughts, reflections, ideas—can
completely lose meaning through the force of habit and monotony, just as a spring can lose

73

Kierkegaard also employs several linguistic variations of this term in his writings.
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the tension [Spændstigheden] by which alone it really is what it is.”74 In Christendom, the average
Dane “is unwilling to venture out into the dangers and decisions where faith comes into
existence” and he or she “is not willing to risk everything,” but would rather pursue a life
of habitual comfort.75 Although the Danish state church is one place in which tension
should be encouraged, for Kierkegaard it is especially implicated in the problem of
evasion characteristic of the pursuit of comfort and security:
[I]n God’s house, in the magnificent house of God when the pastor preaches—
for tranquilization [Beroligelse]! Especially if he is trying to satisfy the human
demands or what are called the demands of the times. While people in these
times are becoming more and more timorous, more and more afraid of
personally experiencing in actuality the terror implicit in the power of
circumstances, they on the other hand are becoming more and more fastidious in
craving the trumpery of eloquence. They do not want to hear in earnest anything
about the terror; they want to play at it, much as soldiers in peacetime, or rather
nonsoldiers, play war…76
In the end, both average Danish citizens and Danish clergy are guilty of a certain kind of
willful blindness in which they turn away from the tension that they know they ought to
pursue, and instead pursue the comfort and security of mere social trivialities and
aesthetic experiences.
In a similar fashion as with Danish civility, the proponents of speculative thought
evade tension by retreating into the comforts both of scholarship and tidy philosophical
systems. For Kierkegaard, such an evasion is characteristic of the “professors” and their
scholarly exercises:
From generation to generation these hundreds and again hundreds of
professors—in Christendom, consequently Christians, no doubt, to say nothing
of their being professors in theology. They write books and then books about
books, and books to give synopses of the books—periodicals arose merely to
write about them, and book publishers flourish, and many, many thousands have

SKS 10, 177 / CD, 165 (the italicized emphasis is my own).
SKS 10, 251 / CD, 245. See also SKS 7, 52-3 / CUP1, 47; SKS 7, 311 / CUP1, 340; SKS 7, 331
/ CUP1, 364.
76 SKS 10, 176-7 / CD, 164-5.
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jobs— — —and not a single one of these hired hands even remotely resembled
in his life a truly Christian existence…77
This scholarly evasion of tension is also intimately tied to the philosophical method
employed by the speculative thinkers, especially in their reliance on Hegel’s notion of
mediation. With mediation, one can always find harmony, balance, and resolution
through the philosophical system and thereby keep a safe distance from the existential
difficulties, demands, and ultimately tensions of authentic Christianity. As Merold
Westphal insightfully puts it, in mediation the “tension disappears! Just as Christendom is
a Sittlichkeit of relaxation, so the triumph of speculation over dialectic in Hegelian
mediation means that all tensions, oppositions, and contradictions are overcome. Every
dissonance is resolved, and we have reached the point in the story where ‘they lived
happily ever after.’”78 In short, then, speculation allows the professor to adopt the guise
of objectivity so as to evade the tensions associated with concrete subjective existence,
and particularly existence tied to authentic Christianity.
The second antithesis to sacred tension is a type of tension, but tension that is
fundamentally destructive in nature. In Two Ages, Kierkegaard identifies this in two
different forms, namely as “an enervating tension” (en afmattende Spænding) and as “the
tension of reflection” (Reflexions Spænding).79 With these two phrases, Kierkegaard
nevertheless refers to the same phenomenon, that is, a type of misrelation between
individuals within Christendom: “[T]he relation [between individuals]…is on its last legs
inasmuch as they do not relate to each other in the relation, but the relation itself has
become a problem in which the parties like rivals in a game watch each other in the
relation, but like rivals in a game watch each other instead of relating to each other…as a

SKS 23, 200, NB17:59 / JP 3, 3568.
Westphal, “Becoming a Self,” 154. See also Frederick Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003), 104.
79 SKS 8, 74 / TA, 77; SKS 8, 77 / TA, 80; SKS 8, 78 / TA, 81.
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78

38
substitute for mutual giving in the relation.”80 Unlike an empowering form of tension
that “strains every nerve to the point of denouement,”81 such tension enervates life in
that it keeps the relation between parties intact, but only to undermine the vitality of
those parties. The result of this destructive tension, then, is the destruction of the entire
relationship:
The coiled springs of life-relationships, which are what they are only because of
qualitatively distinguishing passion, lose their resilience [Elasticiteten]; the
qualitative expression of difference between opposites is no longer the law for
the relation of inwardness to each other in the relation. Inwardness is lacking,
and to that extent the relation does not exist or the relation is an inert cohesion.
The negative law is: they cannot do without each other and they cannot stay
together; the positive law: they can do without each other and they can stay
together, or more positively, they cannot do without each other because of the
mutual bond. Instead of the relation of inwardness another relation supervenes:
the opposites do not relate to each other but stand, as it were, and carefully watch
each other, and this tension [Spænding] is actually the termination of the relation.82
What is especially relevant about this passage is how it reveals that for Kierkegaard not
all tension is constructive in nature. This is especially true of tension in which the
dialectical elements that are being related to one another are ultimately unable to be held
together without destroying one another and thereby the entire relation.83 It is in contrast
to such destructive tension as well as to the evasion of tension that we may characterize
Kierkegaard’s constructive account.

80 SKS 8, 76 / TA, 79. Such a misrelation between individuals is what Kierkegaard diagnoses as
envy (Misundelse), and which he notes emerges in the absence of passion and inwardness.
81 SKS 8, 76 / TA, 80.
82 SKS 8, 76 / TA, 78. For a good discussion on this point see Howard N. Tuttle, The Crowd is
Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y
Gasset (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2005).
83 Such tension, insofar as it is self-destructive, is therefore not a tension that can be perpetually
sustained.
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Constructive Tension and Sacred Tension
Kierkegaard expresses the notion of constructive tension in several ways within
his writings.84 Yet, common to all of these expressions is that they avoid the existential
slackness exhibited in the antitheses to tension described above while at the same time
preserving a certain type of existential vitality. Again, the metaphor of a tightened spring
is appropriate: just as the tension in a spring acts as the driving force in a machine such
as a clock that allows the machine to function properly, so also does constructive tension
serve as the existential driving force for human beings. In this sense, then, such tension
for Kierkegaard is fundamentally positive and productive.
As I have remarked above, the central form of constructive tension I identify in
Kierkegaard’s thought is what I call sacred tension.85 It is important to note that by
employing the qualifier “sacred” I am pointing to the constructive tension Kierkegaard
explicitly connects to Christian categories. More specifically, this is a tension that takes
form fundamentally in relation to God86 and with God as its grounding (i Grunden).87 As
Kierkegaard notes in a journal entry from 1854, it is precisely within such tension (i.e.,
Spændingen) that there “can arise within a person the intensity which really can love
God.”88 Indeed, if such tension were lost or diminished, this would mean that one has
left Christianity for other religious or even pagan categories.89 Furthermore, it is such

These include the “tension of actuality” (Virkelighedens Spænding), the “tension of the inner
being” (Inderlighedens Spændkraft), “the tension of life” (Livets Spænding), “dialectical tension(s)” (dialektiske
Spændinger or den dialektiske Spænding), and “the tension of eternity” (Evighedens Spændkraft).
85 Whereas the term “sacred tension” does not occur in Kierkegaard’s writings, my claim is that
the concept certainly does.
86 As such, although Judge Williams suggests that marriage represents the harmonized tension
between freedom and necessity, insofar as such marriage is not essentially related to God it does not
qualify as sacred tension. See Sheridan Hough, Kierkegaard’s Dancing Tax Collector: Faith, Finitude, and Silence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 70.
87 With this point, Kierkegaard does not intend the type of foundationalism presented by
Descartes in the Meditations, that is, God is not meant to be the rational basis on which a philosophical
system is constructed. Rather, God allows the individual to overcome a certain form of nihilism precisely
so that human existence can be meaningful. Cf. SKS 13, 26 / PV, 19-20.
88 SKS 26, 198, NB32:110 / JP 4, 4489.
89 For example, as Kierkegaard points out in SKS 26, 166-7, NB32:67 / JP 3, 2554, any attempt to
resolve the tension of life within this life is not Christianity, but rather a form of Judaism. See also SKS 23,
84

40
tension that allows one to live properly as a Christian, and in this manner to receive true
blessedness (Salighed) and true blessing (Velsignelse).90
In order to describe the notion of sacred tension in more detail, we may begin by
focusing on what I suggest is the paradigmatic expression of such tension in
Kierkegaard’s thought, namely that associated with the paradoxical dialectic of
grace/works. This discussion proves important because, as we will see in Chapters 2-5, the
specific descriptions of sacred tension that emerge in relation to the various expressions
of paradox are in one way or another developments or reflections of this paradigmatic
form. Let us begin, then, with the notions of grace and works.

The Grace/Works Dialectic and Sacred Tension
Throughout his authorship Kierkegaard stresses the importance of conceiving of
the notions of grace and works in a dialectical fashion.91 For example, in his journals and
papers Kierkegaard writes, “Christianity requires everything, and when you have done
this, it requires that you shall understand that you are nevertheless saved simply and
solely by grace.”92 In another entry, he stresses that the dialectic emerges in a proper
relation to God where God pays “the earnest money of grace,” but yet still demands of
the Christian believer “genuine earnestness” in her works.93 Thus, for Kierkegaard, the
grace/works dialectic is at the very heart of Christianity.
400, NB20:17 / JP 2, 1479. In addition, the tension associated with exertion (i.e., Anstrængelsens Spænding),
such as that characteristic of Sartrean existentialism, does not qualify as sacred tension precisely because it
lacks the condition of “divine guidance” (guddommelig Veiledning). See SKS 8, 349 / UD, 250.
90 See, e.g., SKS 10, 249 / CD, 243. For Kierkegaard, the concepts of Salighed and Velsignelse are
both inherently theological.
91 Portions of this section are reproduced verbatim from Matthew T. Nowachek, “Living within
the Sacred Tension of Faith: Kierkegaard’s Climacean Works as a Guide for Christian Existence,” Heythrop
Journal 55, no. 5 (2014): 883-902, especially Section 2 entitled “The Theological and Polemical Background
to Christian Existence as Tension.” Permission for reuse of this material has been granted by the publisher.
For a good definition of dialectic in Kierkegaard, see Alejandro Cavallazzi Sánchez, “Dialectic,” in
Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome II: Classicism to Enthusiasm, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and
Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 165-9.
92 SKS 23, 444, NB20:93 / JP 2, 1480.
93 SKS 22, 383, NB14:65 / JP 2, 1475.
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Furthermore, in Kierkegaard’s view the grace/works dialectic also serves as an
important polemical tool for identifying and assessing the problematic tendency to slide
to one side of the dialectic to the exclusion of the other.94 In his first essay from For SelfExamination, Kierkegaard describes this tendency in a concrete fashion by offering
something of a genealogy of grace and works in the western Christian tradition from the
medieval times up to his present time. In Medieval Christianity, “[e]verything had
become works”95 in the sense that Medieval Christians made the mistake of emphasizing
works to the exclusion of grace. The result of this movement was that works were not
only “tortured, laborious, and unpleasant” but also shot through with “hypocrisy, the
conceitedness of merit, [and] idleness.”96 In response to these excesses, Luther entered
the scene, preaching the Reformation message of sola fide. Because the situation was so
dire, however, Luther pushed Christianity to the opposite dialectical extreme in which
grace thereby became emphasized to the detriment of works—even up to the point that
Luther, to Kierkegaard’s amazement, rejects the book of James.97 In Kierkegaard’s view,
the theological trajectory initiated by Luther leads in an unbroken line directly to the
cheap grace mentality of the present age of Christendom:
There is always a secular mentality that no doubt wants to have the name of
being Christian but wants to become Christian as cheaply as possible. This
secular mentality became aware of Luther. It listened; for safety’s sake it listened
once again lest it should have heard wrongly; thereupon it said, “Excellent! This
is something for us. Luther says: It depends on faith alone. He himself does not
say that his life expresses works, and since he is now dead it is no longer an
actuality. So we take his words, his doctrine—and we are free from all works—
long live Luther!”98

94 This tendency is not as pronounced in the eastern orthodox tradition as in the Western
tradition in that the former is far more at home with paradox.
95 SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15.
96 SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15.
97 SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 16. See also SKS 7, 33-4 / CUP1, 26.
98 SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 16. On the Christendom misappropriation of Luther’s message of grace, see
also SKS 23, 400, NB20:17 / JP 2, 1479; SKS 24, 190-2, NB22:159 / JP 2, 1482.
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In this manner, the pendulum of Christianity had swung from one extreme to the other
with the Lutheran view now representing a modern anti-works perversion of the
understanding of grace.
It is important to note that the issue Kierkegaard has with the Medieval and
Lutheran understandings of grace and works is not simply that the Medieval Christians
emphasized works and that Luther emphasized grace, but rather that in doing so both
sides missed the necessary dialectical relationship at play between grace and works. This
criticism is especially clear in Kierkegaard’s assessment of Luther. Although Kierkegaard
has some positive things to say about Luther,99 at many places in his writings he attacks
Luther for being undialectical and only seeing “one side of the matter.”100 In
Kierkegaard’s view, Luther was certainly correct to emphasize grace in response to the
abuses of Medieval Catholicism, but he should also have emphasized that the life of the
spirit is at the same time extremely strenuous.101 In other words, Luther ought to have
done everything in his power to remove self-righteousness from works, while leaving
such works standing as a radical demand upon the Christian individual.102 The point for
Kierkegaard, therefore, is not to react to one exaggeration with the opposite
exaggeration, as if one’s view is incessantly swinging between dialectical extremes, but
rather to oppose the hypertension (Overspændthed)103 of the Medieval and Lutheran views
by pursuing a proper tension (Spænding) that holds both together in a dialectical

99 See, e.g., the Hongs’ collection of journal entries: JP 3, 2461, 2465, 2468, 2472, 2475, 2485,
2488, 2491, 2492, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2503, 2505, 2506, 2510, 2511, 2518; See also SKS 13, 24 / PV, 17.
100 SKS 24, 414, NB24:141 / JP 3, 2541. See also SKS 23, 367-8, NB19:57 / JP 3, 2521.
Kierkegaard’s critique, however, is not without ambiguity: at times he places the blame directly on Luther
and at other times he blames the Christendom appropriation of Luther’s view. With respect to the latter,
see, e.g., SKS 16, 240 / JFY, 194; SKS 23, 152, NB16:86 / JP 3, 2513; SKS 23, 323, NB18:101 / JP 3, 2518.
101 See SKS 21, 296-7, NB10:76 / JP 3, 2481; SKS 22, 203, NB12:108 / JP 3, 2502; SKS 23, 152-3,
NB16:87 / JP 3, 2514.
102 SKS 23, 368, NB19:57b / JP 3, 2522.
103 This point does not come out very clearly in the Hong’s translation. In JP 3, 2484 the Hongs
translate the word overspændte with “exaggeration.” Although this is a decent enough rendering, it masks the
etymological connection to the notion of tension, a connection which appears to be relevant in this passage
given its context.
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relationship.104 For Kierkegaard, this latter task is what it means to have a
“comprehensive view” of Christianity105—something both Luther and the Medieval
Christians failed to achieve.106
As Kierkegaard sees it, the absence of the dialectical tension between grace and
works is a reflection of a certain lethargy and deficiency of passion as well as a certain
human cunning. With respect to the former, the person drifting either to works or to
grace to the exclusion of the other is like the drunken peasant who, when helped up onto
one side of his horse, merely falls off the other side.107 With respect to the latter,
Kierkegaard draws attention to the crafty manner by which human beings attempt to
skirt around the tension of the grace/works dialectic:
[I]n every human being there is an inclination either to want to be meritorious
when it comes to works or, when faith and grace are to be emphasized, also to
want to be free from works as far as possible. Indeed, “man,” this rational
creation of God, certainly does not let himself be fooled…“No, it’s one or the
other,” says man. “If it is to be works—fine, but then I must also ask for the
legitimate yield I have coming from my works, so that they are meritorious. If it
is to be grace—fine, but then I must also ask to be free from works—otherwise it
surely is not grace.”108
This cunning mentality is nothing less than an expression of human selfishness
Kierkegaard sees at work in his Christendom culture.109 It is precisely because of his
opposition to such selfishness that Kierkegaard rejects this specific either/or employed
by the cunning person in favor of the both/and of tension.110 To return to the image of
See, e.g., SKS 14, 44 / FSE, 15. As J. Michael Tilley points out, for Kierkegaard the corrective
to a flawed position must not itself then become the new problematic norm, but rather it must at all times
keep an “eye toward altering the whole.” See “Corrective,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome II: Classicism to
Enthusiasm, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2014), 84.
105 SKS 25, 401, NB30:22 / JP 3, 2550.
106 For Kierkegaard, had Socrates engaged this issue, he most certainly would have assumed a
properly dialectical position. See SKS 23, 152-3, NB16:87 / JP 3, 2514.
107 SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. This is an image that Kierkegaard attributes to Luther.
108 SKS 13, 45-6 / FSE, 16-17.
109 On this point, see the following relevant journal entries: SKS 22, 311, NB13:63 / JP 1, 763;
SKS 23, 400, NB20:17 / JP 2, 1479.
110 This statement may strike readers as odd given that Kierkegaard is known as the champion of
the either/or. Kierkegaard is, of course, committed to the either/or in response to what he sees as the
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the peasant and the horse, we may therefore say that in Kierkegaard’s view the proper
relation of grace and works in contrast to lethargy and human cunning is best
represented by the person who remains tensely positioned in the saddle while riding with
vigor and fury. In order to prevent misunderstanding, however, it is important to note
here that sacred tension construed in this fashion at the same time represents a radical
challenge to human self-sufficiency. More specifically, Kierkegaard’s insistence upon
grace entails that one’s striving alone is insufficient, and that such striving must be paired
with humble receptivity to divine provision. To put it in another way, one cannot remain
in sacred tension by virtue of one’s own efforts, but rather such tension is fundamentally
a divine-human cooperation.
Sacred tension as it emerges in relation to the dialectic of grace/works therefore
serves for Kierkegaard as a representation of what it means to exist properly as a
Christian. In this respect, Kierkegaard is asking his readers to adopt such sacred tension
as something of a disposition and an existential stance, that is, to learn how to live in
such a way that one affirms, preserves, and fosters the tension. As M. Jamie Ferreira
rightly notes about tension in general, and which is especially applicable to the notion of
sacred tension, for Kierkegaard “the task is not to erase the tension (even if we could),
but to sustain it at the highest pitch possible.”111 Closely conceptually tied to sacred
tension as a lived existential stance and that which has a crucial role to play in how sacred
tension is to be understood is Kierkegaard’s notion of restlessness (Uro) as well as
Kierkegaard’s ontology of becoming underlying such restlessness. In order, then, to fill

mediating project of the Danish Hegelians, but he is at the same time critical of the either/or when it is
used to deny central aspects of Christian faith and existence. As such, with respect to grace and works,
Kierkegaard rather adopts a both/and view in which he holds firmly to both grace and works. For a good
account of Kierkegaard’s use of either/or and both/and, see Jakub Marek, “Contradiction,” in Kierkegaard’s
Concepts: Tome II: Classicism to Enthusiasm, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart
(Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 73-80; M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination
and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 94-5.
111 Transforming Vision, 5.
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out our description of sacred tension, we may conclude this section by briefly focusing
on these concepts.

Sacred Tension: Restlessness and Becoming in Relation to God
With restlessness, Kierkegaard does not simply imply the destructive notions one
might typically associate with it such as worry, anxiety or boredom, but rather he also
employs the concept in a constructive fashion.112 For example, in an 1854 entry from his
journals and papers entitled “Restlessness [Uroen]” Kierkegaard writes about how God
employs restlessness as a necessary aspect of the Christian life meant to counteract
worldly rest (Ro) and security (Tryghed):
Christianity is the greatest, the most intense, the most powerful restlessness [Uro]
imaginable; it disturbs [urolige] human existence at its deepest level (such, in fact,
was the effect of Christ’s life), it explodes everything, bursts everything. So it is
that God uses restlessness [Uro]—he utilizes unrest [Uro] to hunt men who will
love him. But…God does not use restlessness [Uro] to capture all the more, does
not use it for the sake of numbers, but for the sake of intensity—that is, when
the greatest possible restlessness [Uro] is brought about, in the tension
[Spændingen] there can arise within a person the intensity which really can love
God. But man loves rest [Ro], security [Tryghed]. However, it is certain that in
security [Tryghed], at rest [Ro], no one can become a Christian, and it is no less
certain that no Christian can remain in security [Tryghed] and at rest [Ro]. If one is
to become a Christian, there must be restlessness [Uro], and if one has become a
Christian, restlessness [Uro] continues.113
In a similar fashion, in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits Kierkegaard identifies
restlessness as centrally tied to authentic Christian faith as such faith manifests itself in
discipleship and the task of following Christ: “Faith expressly signifies the deep, strong,
blessed restlessness [den dybe, stærke, salige Uro] that drives the believer so that he cannot
settle down at rest [Ro] in this world, and therefore the person who has settled down

For an interesting discussion on the restlessness of faith in relation to spiritual trial, see Simon
D. Podmore, Struggling with God: Kierkegaard and the Temptation of Spiritual Trial (Cambridge: James Clarke &
Co., 2013), 204-9.
113 SKS 26, 198, NB32:110 / JP 4, 4489.
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completely at rest [Ro] has also ceased to be a believer, because a believer cannot sit still
[stille] as one sits with a pilgrim’s staff in one’s hand—a believer travels forward.”114 It is
precisely because such restlessness stands in opposition to the categories of comfort,
rest, and security as defined by the world that Kierkegaard calls it “Christian restlessness”
(christelig Uro)115 and identifies it with the Christian notion of spirit.116
To connect this discussion of restlessness back to our discussion of grace/works
above, we may point out that in the first essay to For Self-Examination Kierkegaard
develops the notion of restlessness specifically in terms of the dialectical tension between
grace and works. As he notes in several places in the essay, “faith is a restless thing”
(Troen er en urolig Ting).117 In this context, restlessness functions for Kierkegaard as a type
of “health” (Sundhed), which is “stronger and more violent than the most burning fever”
and which acts as the “pulse” of one’s life.118 In addition, restlessness represents an
inward deepening and the vitality of existence119 that Kierkegaard contrasts with a kind of
existential disorder he calls “the stillness of death, a dying out” (Dødsstilheden,
Uddøetheden)120 that is characteristic of the spiritlessness and lifelessness of Christianity
when it has fallen into one dialectical extreme of grace or works to the exclusion of the
other.121 Whereas this disorder, similar to the two evasions of tension associated with
common Danish civility and Danish speculative thought described above, is a form of

SKS 8, 320 / UD, 218.
SKS 24, 189, NB22:157 / JP 6, 6717.
116 See, SKS 27, 650, Papir 546 / JP 4, 4361: “Spirit is restlessness [Uro]; Christianity is the most
profound restlessness [Uro] of existence—so it is in the New Testament. In Christendom Christianity is
tranquilization [Beroligelse] ‘so that we can really enjoy life.’”; SKS 27, 630, Papir 512 / JP 4, 4362: “Man
desire tranquility [Ro] so that he may enjoy (hil beatum nisis quietum—Epicurus). God (according to
Christianity does not want men to have tranquility [Ro]—spirit is restlessness [Uro]. Here alone there is an
irregularity in Protestantism inasmuch as it tends exclusively towards tranquilizing [at berolige].”
117 SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17.
118 SKS 13, 47 / FSE, 18.
119 Although Kierkegaard identifies two distinct forms of Christian restlessness, one that he
associates with Christian witnesses and their attempts to bring about reform and one with inward
deepening, it is the latter on which Kierkegaard focuses his philosophical attention in For Self-Examination.
See SKS 13, 50 / FSE, 21; SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24.
120 SKS 13, 49 / FSE, 20.
121 SKS 25, 400, NB30:22 / JP 3, 2550: “But soon the restlessness [Uroen] is diminished in
‘Christendom’, this dead mass devoid of spirit [denne døde aandløse Masse].”
114
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superficial soothing rest that results in the cessation of all significant change and growth,
restlessness is rather a continuous movement of existential development.122 In the end,
such restlessness may look slightly different in different contexts,123 but the uniform idea
is that of remaining in perpetual motion despite the straining and demanding nature of
such motion.
Although Kierkegaard identifies restlessness as central to the life of faith, we
should point out that he nevertheless also associates faith with a certain kind of rest.124
For example, Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity writes an entire reflection on
Matthew 11:28 in which Christ invites all who labor and are burdened to come to him in
order to find rest (Hvile).125 Furthermore, in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits,
Kierkegaard connects proper rest explicitly to obedience to God: “On the whole there is
only one way in which rest [Hvile] is to be found: to let God rule in everything…”126 In
describing this type of rest, however, Kierkegaard is careful to distinguish it from the
destructive form of rest outlined above. Whereas the latter is the type of rest that is

SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. Compare this to SKS 16, 119 / PV, 137: “But the ideality with regard to
being a Christian is a continual inward deepening.”
123 For example, restlessness may take the form of the anguished conscience which turns to a
savior for the forgiveness of sin (SKS 25, 399-401, NB30:22 / JP 3, 2550) or it may take the form of
witnessing, sacrificing, suffering persecution, self-denial, and renunciation (SKS 13, 47 / FSE, 18).
124 In describing this rest, Kierkegaard employs two different words, namely Ro (which carries
connotations of peace or calm) and Hvile (which carries connotations of physical repose), though he draws
heavily on the latter in his description of the characteristically Christian rest. Although these distinctions
hold generally, the Ordbog over det Danske Sprog notes that they can in certain contexts also be used
interchangeably.
125 See, e.g., SKS 12, 21-33 / PC, 11-22.
126 SKS 8, 356 / UD, 258. See also SKS 8, 356-7 / UD, 258-9: “That there is reconciliation for the
person who is brokenhearted—there is rest [Hvile] in that, but he cannot find rest [Hvile] in this eternal
thought if he does not first find rest [hviler] in the thought of obedience: that God must rule in everything,
because reconciliation is indeed God’s plan for the salvation of humankind. That satisfaction has been
made for guilt—there is rest [Hvile] for the penitent in that, but he cannot find rest [Hvile] in this eternal
thought if he does not first rest [hviler] in this: to let God rule in everything, because making satisfaction in
indeed God’s plan from eternity. That God will forgive you—there is rest [Hvile] in that, but you cannot
find rest [Hvile] in this eternal thought if you do not rest [hviler] in the thought that God is to rule in
everything. Otherwise God’s grace would become your merit, and it would not be God who gives both to
will and to do, gives the growth and gives the completion, something that all your own effort cannot
achieve…[I]n relation to God and the eternal the appropriation is obedience, and in obedience there is rest
[Hvile]. There is rest [Hvile] in the eternal. This is the eternal truth, but the eternal can rest [hvile] in
obedience—this is the eternal truth for you.” In contrast, then, Kierkegaard associates disobedience with
unrest (Uro). See SKS 8, 357 / UD, 259.
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grounded in sources other than God, and is achieved by repressing or attempting to
overcome tension, the former is the kind of rest that, although never perfectly achieved
in existence,127 is grounded entirely on God. As Kierkegaard remarks, “Wherever the
eternal is, there is rest [Ro]; but there is unrest [Uro] where the eternal is not present.
There is unrest [Uro] in the world, but above all there is unrest [Uro] in a person’s soul
when the eternal is not present in it and he is only ‘full of unrest [mættes med Uro]’.”128 In
this respect, we can say that even though Kierkegaard associates faith with a certain kind
of rest, such rest is not that which leads to the “stillness of death” precisely because it
rests in God and thereby fundamentally upholds and encourages the tension associated
with faith as the believer perpetually strives to become more Christ-like.129 As
Kierkegaard puts it in Works of Love, “the person who relates himself to God’s love…is
bound to have an unforgettable fear and trembling, even though he rests [hviler] in God’s
love.”130 It is precisely this dialectical sense of the concept of rest that allows Kierkegaard
to make the paradoxical claim that the Christian is to find rest in the eternal while all the
while retaining a “blessed restlessness” (salige Uro) that does not allow one to settle down
in comfort but rather pushes one in restlessness to travel forward.131

To achieve such rest perfectly within existence would presuppose that one has subjected
oneself in perfect (fuldkommen) and unconditional (ubetinget) obedience to God (see SKS 8, 356 / UD,
258)—something that Kierkegaard does not view as humanly possible. It is noteworthy, however, that
Kierkegaard appears to believe that perfect rest is nevertheless possible in eternity. Consider, for example,
the hymn by Hans Adolf Brorson that Kierkegaard selects as the text for his gravestone: “In yet a little
while / I shall have won; / Then the whole fight / Will all at once be done. / Then I may rest [saa kan jeg
hvile mig] / In bowers of roses / And perpetually [uafladelig] / Speak with my Jesus.” Quoted in Christopher
B. Barnett, “Hans Adolph Brorson: Danish Pietism’s Greatest Hymn Writer and His Relation to
Kierkegaard” in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: Tome II: Theology, ed. Jon Stewart
(Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 63 (I have made a slight revision to the translation).
128 SKS 8, 356 / UD, 258. The quotation is a reference to Job 7:4.
129 There is an important dialectical point to be made here concerning Kierkegaard’s account of
rest. The rest of faith plays out in a dialectical fashion: on the one hand, if one has settled down in worldly
comforts and refuses to follow Christ and carry his or her cross, then there is no rest offered (see SKS 8,
320 / UD, 218); on the other hand, if one is faithfully following Christ and thereby is burdened, then rest is
offered (see SKS 8, 355-7 / UD, 258-9).
130 SKS 9, 378 / WL, 386.
131 SKS 8, 320 / UD, 218. This discussion provides additional support for why the tension I
describe above warrants the title “sacred”: such tension is possible only through a relationship with God,
and, as I argue in Chapter 4, through a relationship with Christ as the paradoxical God-man.
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Underlying the restlessness of faith outlined above as well as sacred tension in
general, is Kierkegaard’s commitment to an ontology of becoming.132 Within his writings,
Kierkegaard draws an important distinction between being (Væren) as a description of
that which is and becoming (Vorden) as a description of that which is in process.133
Claudine Davidshofer describes this distinction nicely in relation to the concepts of
eternity and temporality:
For Kierkegaard, the metaphysical whole is split into two realms, the realm of
eternal being (God) and the realm of temporal becoming (the earthly). God is
transcendent, eternal, pure being. He is the only being that is full being and is not
mixed with becoming. Temporal being is the immanent, concrete, earthly realm
in which humans have their daily existence. Temporal becoming is unfinished
and continually changing. The two realms are not completely separate, however.
The Incarnation, the absolute paradox of Christianity, affirms that eternal being
freely descended into temporal becoming in the form of a human being, Christ.
Kierkegaard believes that the realms of eternal being and temporal becoming are
connected through the composite nature of human being.134
As Davidshofer suggests here, one of the reasons the distinction between being and
becoming is important is because of what it entails for human persons. For Kierkegaard,
insofar as the human being exists (være til, existere),135 she is necessarily tied to the realm of

132 See Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2005). Cf. George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth
Century: The Paradox and the “Point of Contact” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 218:
“Kierkegaard’s world is a world of perpetual motion…”
133 For Kierkegaard, humans participate in being, but being as informed by temporality and
spatiality. As the Hongs put it in a helpful endnote to Philosophical Fragments, “The Danish blev til (as well as
tilblive, Tilblivelse, være til, and Tilværelse) refers to temporal and spatial modes of becoming and being. The
eternal as timeless being does not come into being but comes into time and space as a specific embodiment
of the eternal. The moment, therefore, is an atom of eternity and has a significance qualitatively different
from that of transient instants of time. Existence is a mode of being, but not all being is existence.” See PF,
280n25.
134 “Being/Becoming,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome I: Absolute to Church, ed. Steven M.
Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 138. See
also Anton Hügli, “The Principle of Contradiction,” in Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard, ed. Marie
Mikulová Thulstrup (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1980), 276.
135 Watkin’s explanation of the various forms of existence in Kierkegaard proves helpful here. See
Watkin, Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, 80: “Kierkegaard uses the word existence (Tilværelsen) of
the world as the sphere of human activity. In this sense it parallels the term actuality. Existence can also,
however, refer to the fact of a person’s ethical-religious striving and personal development in life (where
‘to exist’ is expressed by the Danish word ‘existere’) as opposed to the fact of a person’s concrete physical
existence in the world, where to say that a person exists simply means she or he is there in the world (in
Danish this is expressed by the verb ‘være til’).”
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becoming.136 As Climacus puts it in Postscript, “Since the existing subject is existing…he is
indeed in the process of becoming.”137 Or, as he remarks a few pages later, “One who is
existing is continually in the process of becoming…The perpetual process of becoming is
the uncertainty of earthy life, in which everything is uncertain.”138 For the human being
in this state of continuous becoming and continuous uncertainty, the focus of life cannot
therefore be the tranquility (Ro) that leads to the stillness of death, but rather it must be
the restlessness (Uro) of the movement of perpetual striving.139 Such striving does not
merely seek a finite end that one can easily achieve, but rather it is a striving after an
infinite goal that will never be perfectly fulfilled within existence.
The significance of such a view of persons for the authentic Christian should be
unmistakable in that the same ontology applies to both.140 Again, to quote Davidshofer,
Christianity is not a settled state, not something that the individual simply is once
and for all. Being a Christian is always becoming a Christian. The individual must,
at every moment, continually renew and repeat the double movement of
Christianity. He does not become in the sense of moving on, of going beyond
Christianity, but in the sense of continually re-enacting the decision and the task
of being a Christian.141
This description of Christianity is precisely what is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s repeated
claim in his authorship that the fundamental task of every individual human being is that
of “becoming a Christian.”142 To become such a Christian, however, and a Christian

For Climacus, in contrast, God does not “exist” until he enters time in the Incarnation. See,
e.g., SKS 4, 222 / PF, 13; SKS 7, 303 / CUP1, 332.
137 SKS 7, 80 / CUP1, 80. Cf. Kierkegaard’s description of existence as motion in SKS 7, 284 /
CUP1, 312.
138 SKS 7, 85 / CUP1, 86.
139 As Carlisle notes, it is this aspect of his ontology of becoming that gives Kierkegaard the feel
of an existentialist: “The ‘existentialist’ perspective that Kierkegaard brings to the spheres of philosophy
and faith accentuates the priority of becoming over being: the priority of freedom and action (‘the ethical’)
over reflection and knowledge (‘the aesthetic’).” See Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming, 3.
140 This does not mean that becoming a human being and becoming a Christian occur in the same
manner or that the latter can be collapsed into the former. To assume so would be to slide back into the
categories of Christendom. See SKS 7, 546 / CUP1, 602: “it is…a deceitful device to want to identify
becoming a Christian as closely as possible with becoming a human being and to want to make someone
believe that one becomes that decisively in childhood.”
141 “Being/Becoming,” 142.
142 See, e.g., SKS 16, 11, 72-3 / PV 8, 23, 93-4.
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whose existence is characterized fundamentally by the sacred tension of faith, means that
one must step out of the categories of Danish civility and speculative thought insofar as
these categories represent a static view of existence, and instead embrace the dynamic
categories of restlessness and becoming in relation to God. In the end, therefore, because
all people are constantly in motion and becoming, the important question for
Kierkegaard is whether one is moving away from God in the despairing attempt to find
peace and security in sources other than God, or whether one is moving towards God by
recognizing and fostering one’s grounding in God.143
In conclusion we may reiterate that for Kierkegaard the restless becoming central
to sacred tension, what he also identifies in certain places as fear and trembling,144 is
precisely that which characterizes authentic Christian existence. It is important, however,
to keep in mind an important dialectical point, namely that such existence of restless
becoming is not simply self-created, self-motivated or self-achieved.145 Rather, it plays out
in relation to the God who, from his position of divine stability, pushes and draws
individuals to himself and thereby enables the entire process of restless becoming
comprising the sacred tension of faith.146 It is therefore this aspect of the tension—that it

This is essentially the definition of faith that Anti-Climacus develops in SKS 11, 242 / SUD,
131: “in relating to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently [grunder Selvet gjennemsigtigt] in
the power that established it.”
144 This phrase originates with the Apostle Paul’s paradoxical command concerning grace and
works in Philippians 2:12-13 to “work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at
work in you, both to will and to work for His good pleasure.” For Kierkegaard, fear and trembling assumes
several forms: it is the “dialectical hovering” (dialektiske Svæven) one experiences when one does not have
certainty about faith, but yet one continues to believe despite such uncertainty (SKS 20, 382, NB5:30 / JP
1, 255); it is the state of vigilant wakefulness in which one remains in perpetual readiness to obey and to
follow God (SKS 10, 220 / CD, 212; SKS 17, 273, DD:185 / JP 3, 3369); it means that one is constantly
relating to God in a tense state equidistant from security and despair (SKS 10, 219 / CD, 211), yet at the
same time paradoxically resting (hviler) in God’s love and blessing (SKS 9, 378 / WL, 386). But most
importantly for the discussion of this chapter, fear and trembling is fundamentally a movement of
becoming. As Anti-Climacus notes, “Fear and trembling signify that we are in the process of becoming
[Vorden]; and every single individual, likewise the generation, is and should be aware of being in the process
of becoming [Vorden]” (SKS 12, 97 / PC, 88).
145 As Climacus notes in SKS 7, 394 / CUP1, 433: “the individual is unable to transform himself
[or, alternatively, “to recreate himself”: skabe sig selv om].” See also SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 13-14.
146 See Kierkegaard’s essay “The Changelessness of God” in SKS 13, 321-39 / M, 263-81. With
respect to God pushing and drawing individuals, see, e.g., SKS 12, 21-33 / PC, 11-22.
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plays out before God, is in relation to God, and is predicated upon divine provision,
which is precisely that which reveals it in fact to be sacred tension.

1.4 - Concluding Remarks: Kierkegaard’s Ethico-Religious Task and the
Possibilities for Paradox

In this chapter, I have argued for and articulated a particular reading of
Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to which I develop the argument in Chapters 2-5.
Towards this end, I have outlined Kierkegaard’s view of the problem of Christendom,
followed by his Socratic response to this problem in the form of his ethico-religious task
to introduce Christianity into Christendom. I have also introduced the broad and
overarching telos towards which Kierkegaard directs his task, namely that of guiding his
contemporaries into the existential stance of living within the sacred tension of faith
characterized by restlessness and becoming in relation to God, which I have illustrated
with reference to the tension Kierkegaard associates with the dialectic of grace/works. In
short, then, I have set up the problem informing Kierkegaard’s authorship, outlined
Kierkegaard’s response, and given an introductory description of the general goal
towards which Kierkegaard is aiming. What this discussion leaves largely untouched,
however, is the specific means Kierkegaard employs for fulfilling his ethico-religious task.
As such, the suggestion with which I conclude this chapter, and that on which I focus in
Chapters 2-5, is that Kierkegaard intends paradox to serve as precisely such a means.
As I have remarked in the introduction to the dissertation, paradox is clearly a
central notion for Kierkegaard and for his view of Christianity. In light of the discussion
developed within this chapter, we are now at a place where we may suggest an initial
response to the question of why exactly paradox proves so crucial to Kierkegaard’s
thought. Simply stated, paradox is Kierkegaard’s foremost instrument in his ethico-
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religious task as that with which he requires his contemporaries to engage if they are to
be properly situated in the ongoing process of becoming authentic Christians. Put
differently, paradox plays a crucial role both in helping people to live within the sacred
tension of faith and in helping to clarify the nature of sacred tension itself. As I have
remarked elsewhere, “It is because of [his] account of Christian existence [as sacred
tension] that Kierkegaard makes continual reference in his writings to notions such as
paradox, and he employs these notions in order to combat the philosophical and cultural
tendency within his 19th century Danish context to reduce faith to something
understandable, manageable, and ultimately, devoid of dialectic.”147 In this sense, if we
are to take into consideration the earnestness with which Kierkegaard undertakes his
ethico-religious task, then we will certainly need to assign paradox a central role within
this task. As we will see in the chapters that follow, paradox carries significant
implications for the project of articulating a robust and detailed account of what
Kierkegaard understands as essential to Christian existence, particularly as it is construed
in terms of sacred tension.
In order to bring this section and this chapter to a close, we may return to the
essay “Armed Neutrality” and Kierkegaard’s description of his ethico-religious task. As
Kierkegaard remarks, “I do not say of myself that I am a remarkable Christian…But I do
maintain that I know with uncommon clarity and definiteness what Christianity is, what
can be required of the Christian, what it means to be a Christian.”148 To counteract the
destructive influence of Christendom, Kierkegaard believes that it is crucial to get clear
about the concepts that are central to Christianity. Paradox, for Kierkegaard, is certainly
one of the more important of these concepts. Therefore, in order to continue the
argument we have begun in this chapter, it is imperative to undertake a close analysis of
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Nowachek, “Living within the Sacred Tension,” 884.
SKS 16, 119 / PV, 138.
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the notion of paradox as it appears in its various expressions within Kierkegaard’s
thought and writings and to draw out the significance of this for Christian existence. This
undertaking will serve as the focus of the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
PARADOX AND FAITH:
ON ABRAHAM, ETHICS, AND CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE
Let us then either cancel out Abraham or learn to be horrified by the
prodigious paradox that is the meaning of his life, so that we may
understand that our age, like every other age, can rejoice if it has faith.1
The tragic hero…finds rest [Hvile] in the universal; the knight of faith is
constantly kept in tension [Spænding].2
[C]ontinue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is
God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good
purpose.3

In this chapter we may consider the first of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, the expression that is identified with the faith of Abraham in the
pseudonymous work Fear and Trembling,4 and begin to draw out its significance for
Christian existence. There are at least two important reasons for engaging with Fear and
Trembling. First, this text is central to Kierkegaard’s corpus and it has been read and
studied by scholars perhaps more than any other of Kierkegaard’s writings. As such, a
proper investigation of paradox and Christian existence, especially as this study relates to
the secondary discussion, will need to afford this text significant attention. Second, Fear
and Trembling is one of several of Kierkegaard’s works in which both the term and the
concept of paradox make significant appearances, and therefore it serves as a good
resource for engaging with the notions of paradox and Christian existence as well as for
articulating the relationship between them.
The argument I put forward can be summarized as follows. The notion of
paradox in Fear and Trembling plays an important role in de silentio’s challenge to

SKS 4, 146 / FT, 52-3.
SKS 4, 170 / FT, 79.
3 Philippians 2:12-13 (NIV).
4 The form of the pseudonym I employ hereafter is Johannes de silentio. In this chapter I have
changed any variations of the name in quotations for the sake of consistency.
1
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Christendom and its characterization of ethics, and, in addition, paradox in both its
etymological and dialectical forms is that which underlies and informs Abraham’s
existential stance as one living within the sacred tension. I claim, therefore, that Abraham
can serve as an exemplar for the person of faith, particularly with respect to the specific
virtues he displays within the sacred tension. As such, we may say that Fear and Trembling
and its discussion of paradox as tied to Abraham’s faith offers valuable insight into the
nature of ethics as well as into the manner by which ethics and Christian existence are
related to one another.
In developing my argument I divide this chapter into five sections. In Section 2.1,
I make a few preliminary remarks on Fear and Trembling. For Section 2.2, I outline the
notion of paradox, which I follow in Section 2.3 with a discussion of the notion of sacred
tension as this is manifested in the text and is related to paradox. In Section 2.4, I turn to
Abraham as a concrete figure living within the sacred tension, and I discuss the manner
by which he serves as an exemplar for Christian existence. Towards this end, I touch
upon the implications that Fear and Trembling carries for ethics. In Section 2.5, I bring the
chapter to a close with a few concluding remarks.

2.1 - Preliminary Remarks on Fear and Trembling
On a general reading, Fear and Trembling deals with the story of the Akedah in
which one follows Abraham on his journey from receiving a command from God to
sacrifice his son Isaac up to the point on Mount Moriah where God intervenes (via a
messenger) in order to prevent the sacrifice.5 In the course of tracing out this account, de
silentio raises several important questions concerning the nature of faith as well as the

5

See Genesis 22 and Hebrews 11.
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relation between faith and ethics/social morality.6 A closer reading of the text, however,
begins to reveal its complexity, and scholars have offered a wide range of interpretations
varying from seeing the text as an expression of crass fideism or irrationalism7 to seeing
the text as an allegory or a vehicle for communicating hidden messages.8 In light of such
interpretive diversity, how should we move forward in our reading of the text?
A good place to begin is with de silentio’s own commentary on how to read the
Christian scriptures. For de silentio, it is important to avoid reading in a way that trivializes
or dilutes the text by turning it into an object of mere aesthetic enjoyment or by tinkering
with the words in such a fashion that their force is undermined.9 This latter point is
precisely what lies behind his critique of the slick exegete who tries to explain away the
text, or at least to protect himself from taking it at face-value in all its difficulty.10 Rather,
de silentio recommends the words of the text be read and understood seriously, just as they
are written (i.e., “forstaaes lige efter Ordene”).11 As Ryan Kemp puts it in his argument for a
straightforward reading of Fear and Trembling, “interpreters should be considerably more
open to the possibility that Fear and Trembling means what it (explicitly) says. After all, it
wouldn’t be so odd if it turned out that Kierkegaard intends Fear and Trembling to be read
in the same way de silentio recommends we read [scripture]…”12 Thus, although it is
important to read Fear and Trembling in a nuanced manner that avoids hasty conclusions

With respect to these concepts, Kierkegaard employs several Danish terms including det Ethiske
and det Sædelige.
7 On this view see Jerome I. Gellman, “Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,” Man and World 23
(1990), 295; Andrew A. Cross, “Faith and the Suspension of the Ethical in Fear and Trembling,” Inquiry 46,
no. 1 (2003), 11; Ryan Kemp, “In Defense of a Straightforward Reading of Fear and Trembling,” in
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2013, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and New
York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 49.
8 See, e.g., Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (University Park: The University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 290; Ronald M. Green, “Deciphering ‘Fear and Trembling’s’ Secret Message,”
Religious Studies 22, no. 1 (1986): 65-111; Jerome I. Gellman, Abraham! Abraham! Kierkegaard and the Hasidim
on the Binding of Isaac (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).
9 For a parallel point, see Kierkegaard’s essay “What is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with
True Blessing in the Mirror of the Word?” in SKS 13, 37-76 / FSE, 7-51.
10 SKS 4, 164 / FT, 72-3; cf. SKS 13, 62 / FSE, 35.
11 SKS 4, 165 / FT, 73. For a discussion on this Danish phrase, see Kemp, “In Defense,” 67.
12 “In Defense,” 70.
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and to be sensitive to the multiple levels that may be at work in the text,13 it is also
important to give due consideration to the text’s apparent and explicit meaning. Again, to
quote Kemp, “the person who earns her spiritual bread isn’t the one who cracks de
silentio’s rhetorical code…but rather she is the one who…dares to see Abraham’s story as
addressing herself…”14 With the goal of reading Fear and Trembling in this manner—a
manner which justifies raising the question of the implications that the text carries for
Christian existence—we may therefore begin with de silentio’s own description of two
problems informing his polemic within the text.
Just as Christendom operates as the broad polemical context for Kierkegaard’s
ethico-religious task, Christendom serves as the background with which de silentio, himself
a character embedded within Danish society, engages in Fear and Trembling. Specifically, de
silentio describes the issues of Danish civility and Danish speculative thought in relation
to two central problems. First, de silentio notes that his age has thoroughly devalued faith.
In the preface to Fear and Trembling, he makes this point by leading off with economic
imagery infused with biting sarcasm: “Not only in the business world but also in the
world of ideas, our age stages ein wirklicher Ausverkauf. Everything can be had at such a
bargain price that it becomes a question whether there is finally anyone who will make a
bid.”15 To conclude his text, de silentio employs another economic image of Dutch
merchants who, facing falling prices, sink a few ships in order to jack up the value of
their cargo. In relation to this, he asks, “Do we not need something similar in the world
of spirit?”16 De silentio’s point here is simply that since faith has become so cheap and easy
nobody views it as something for which one should work or struggle.17 People in

13 See Ronald M. Green, “‘Developing’ Fear and Trembling,” in Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard,
ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 257-81.
14 “In Defense,” 69. See SKS 4, 123-4 / FT, 27.
15 SKS 4, 101 / FT, 5.
16 SKS 4, 208 / FT, 121.
17 SKS 4, 124 / FT, 28.
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Christendom therefore no longer take the time “to walk slowly alongside Abraham” on
the long path to Mount Moriah, but rather they “mount a winged horse” and are taken
directly to the end of the story where everyone lives happily ever after.18 In making this
move, however, something has gone awry, for, as de silentio sees it, faith cannot be
obtained easily or at a bargain price.19
Second, de silentio points out that within Christendom people are not satisfied to
remain with what they perceive to be a naïve form of faith, and therefore they
impatiently attempt to go further to an improved expression of Christianity. This issue is
especially prominent with the Hegelian speculative thinkers and their method of
Aufhebung.20 Thus, as de silentio sarcastically remarks, “To go beyond Hegel is a miraculous
achievement, but to go beyond Abraham is the easiest of all.”21 The problem, though,
with going further while all the while claiming to remain a Christian, is that in such a
process one undermines precisely what one is attempting to improve. For de silentio, this
is equivalent to being dissatisfied with the miracle of turning water into wine and thus
instead going further by turning wine into water,22 or to Cratylus’ attempt to improve his
master’s philosophy, which results in undermining altogether the Heraclitean position.23
Faith as practiced by Abraham, however, is not something that one simply goes beyond.
As de silentio emphatically remarks concerning the father of faith, “In 130 years you got
no further than faith.”24

SKS 4, 145-6 / FT, 52.
See SKS 4, 171 / FT, 80-1.
20 As Jon Stewart argues, much of Kierkegaard’s critique is levelled specifically at Danish
Hegelians such as J.L. Heiberg and H.L. Martensen. On this point, see Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to
Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Merold Westphal convincingly argues
that focus on specific Danish Hegelians does not preclude that Kierkegaard also attacks Hegel. See
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 20-1. As such, we may be better served
to characterize Kierkegaard’s target as Hegel and the (Danish) Hegelians.
21 SKS 4, 128 / FT, 33.
22 SKS 4, 132 / FT, 37.
23 See SKS 4, 210 / FT, 123.
24 SKS 4, 119 / FT, 23.
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It is in relation to the two problems outlined above that we can understand de
silentio’s broad polemical task in Fear and Trembling. Because Christendom represents a
challenge to the view of faith represented by Abraham, de silentio dedicates his attention
to a re-characterization of such faith. In response to the first problem, he accentuates the
difficulty and anxiety of faith,25 and in response to the second problem, he emphasizes
the importance of remaining and dwelling with faith. As he remarks in numerous places
within the text, the point for the person of faith is not to leave behind faith and to run
off in pursuit of something that appears greater, but rather one is to remain with faith
and to treat it as “a task for a whole lifetime.”26 Underlying both points here is de silentio’s
overall task to level a radical challenge against his Christendom contemporaries by
demanding an honest ongoing engagement with Christianity. This challenge is
encompassed well in what we may identify as the great disjunction at the heart of the
text. For de silentio, those engaging with the story of Abraham and his faith are offered
only two options: either cancel out Abraham and thereby cease to recognize him as the
father of faith, or embrace the horror and difficulty of his situation in order that “we may
understand that our age, like every other age, can rejoice if it has faith.”27 Central to de
silentio’s challenge described here, and that which provides it with its force, is the notion
of paradox. To this we may now turn.

2.2 - Paradox in Fear and Trembling
Paradox is a central notion in Fear and Trembling. Not only is the term employed
in the text eighty-four times in various forms,28 but the concept also makes an important

See, e.g., SKS 4, 146 / FT, 52; SKS 4, 156-9 / FT, 63-6; SKS 4, 167 / FT, 75.
SKS 4, 102 / FT, 6.
27 SKS 4, 146 / FT, 53. For various formulations of this either/or, see SKS 4, 146 / FT, 52-3; SKS
4, 159 / FT, 66; SKS 4, 201 / FT, 113; SKS 4, 207 / FT, 120.
28 The breakdown of the word paradox in its various forms in Fear and Trembling can be
summarized as follows: Preliminary Expectoration: 11 occurrences (Paradox: 8; Paradoxet: 1; paradoxe: 2).
25
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appearance. In this section I survey and analyze several of Johannes de silentio’s key uses
of paradox, first as they occur in the “problemata” and second as they occur in the
section entitled “Preliminary Expectoration.”29

Paradox in the Problemata
The majority of the uses of the term paradox and its various forms in Fear and
Trembling occurs in the section of the text that de silentio entitles “Problemata” and that he
divides into three problems.30 As de silentio notes in the introduction to this section, his
purpose with these problems is to elucidate in a specific manner the paradox at work in
the Abraham account:
In order to perceive the prodigious paradox of faith, a paradox that makes a
murder into a holy and God-pleasing act, a paradox that gives Isaac back to
Abraham again, which no thought can grasp, because faith begins precisely where
thought stops—in order to perceive this, it is now my intention to draw out in
the form of problemata the dialectical aspects implicit in the story of Abraham.31
But what exactly do the problemata reveal concerning the nature and function of
paradox? To answer this, we may begin with the problemata themselves.
Each of the three problemata is framed around a distinct question, and as such
each offers a slightly different perspective on the notion of paradox. To lead off the
problemata, de silentio engages with the question of the first problema, “Is there a Teleological
Suspension of the Ethical?” by offering a succinct characterization of faith in terms of
paradox:

Problema I: 23 occurrences (Paradox: 10; Paradoxet: 9; Paradoxets: 1; paradoxe: 3). Problema II: 23
occurrences (Paradox: 12; Paradoxet: 8; Paradoxets: 1; paradoxe: 2). Problema III: 27 occurrences (Paradox: 6;
Paradoxet: 20; Modparadoxet: 1).
29 I follow the Hong’s translation of “Preliminary Expectoration” here, though Alastair Hannay’s
“Preamble from the Heart” or Sylvia Walsh’s “A Preliminary Outpouring from the Heart” better captures
the spirit of the section.
30 In the three problemata, the term paradox in its various forms occurs a total of 73 times.
31 SKS 4, 147 / FT, 53.
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Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the
universal—yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so
that after having been in the universal he as the single individual isolates himself
as higher than the universal. If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost, then faith
has never existed in the world precisely because it has always existed.32
With respect to the question of the second problema, “Is there an Absolute Duty to God?” de
silentio writes, “The paradox of faith is that there is an interiority that is incommensurable
with exteriority [i.e., that there is an absolute relation to God], an interiority that is not
identical, please note, with the first but is a new interiority.”33 Finally, in the third
problema de silentio takes a slightly different turn by characterizing paradox in relation to
hiddenness. Thus, in response to the question “Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham to
Conceal His Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?” he remarks concerning
Abraham, “But if there is such a hiddenness, then we face the paradox, which cannot be
mediated, since it is based precisely on this: the single individual as the single individual is
higher than the universal…”34
Despite the apparent differences in these descriptions of paradox, the same
fundamental issue is at work in all three, namely the relation between faith and what de
silentio calls “the ethical” or “the universal,” and more specifically, what it would mean to
talk about faith being higher than the ethical/universal. This is made especially clear in de
silentio’s discussion of what it means to relate to the absolute: “The paradox of faith, then,
is this: that the single individual is higher than the universal, that the single individual—to
recall a distinction in dogmatics rather rare these days—determines his relation to the
universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to
the universal.”35 In order to understand this statement, however, it is important to focus

SKS 4, 149 / FT, 55. See also SKS 4, 149-50 / FT, 55-6; SKS 4, 150 / FT, 56; SKS 4, 155 / FT,
62; SKS 4, 159 / FT, 66.
33 SKS 4, 161 / FT, 69. See also SKS 4, 163 / FT, 71.
34 SKS 4, 172 / FT, 82. See also SKS 4, 183 / FT, 93.
35 SKS 4, 162 / FT, 70.
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briefly on the particular nature of the target against which the paradox described here is
specifically directed.
As I suggested in the preliminary remarks above, one of the major targets for de
silentio’s polemic is Hegel and the Danish Hegelians, and it is quite clear that paradox in
the problemata has been conscripted in this fight. More specifically, de silentio takes on the
Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit. In developing his social and moral philosophy, Hegel is
critical of Kant’s account and what he views as its overly abstract and formal nature.
Thus, in Philosophy of Right Hegel draws a close connection between morality and the
concrete customs and institutions of a concrete culture such those embodied by the
family and the state. As he notes, “But if it is simply identical with the actuality of
individuals, the ethical [das Sittliche], as their general mode of behavior, appears as custom
[Sitte]; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the
original and purely natural will and is the all pervading soul, significance, and actuality of
individual existence [Dasein].”36 For Hegel, then, a proper account of morality requires a
continuous overcoming of the individual’s inner will and intentions (what Hegel
identifies as Moralität) in favor of a public expression of morality in which the individual
brings his or her will into conformity with the norms of the culture (what Hegel
identifies as Sittlichkeit).37 This account, when absorbed into the Danish context by
thinkers such as J.L. Heiberg and H.L. Martensen, becomes the perfect basis for
Christendom. To be a good Christian in Denmark, therefore, means that one moves
beyond “naïve idiosyncratic” faith into “enlightened” Christianity by adopting the
categories of enlightened Danish society.

Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), §151; discussed in Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, 311.
37 See John Lippitt, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling (London and
New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 86.
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It is in relation to this target that de silentio introduces the distinction in the
problemata between what he calls the tragic hero and the knight of faith. Although de
silentio offers three examples of the tragic hero, he dedicates the greatest attention to the
figure of Agamemnon.38 Agamemnon, as the king of Greece, has set sail in war against
his enemy Troy only to become stranded without wind on a remote island. In order to
bring back the wind Agamemnon is commanded to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia to
Artemis, which he does with both great sorrow and great pride. For de silentio,
Agamemnon is a tragic hero in that although he overrides his fatherly duty in sacrificing
his daughter, he nevertheless fulfills a higher duty to the state. In doing so, Agamemnon
remains fully within the norms of his Greek society and is therefore understood and
lauded by his contemporaries. In contrast, Abraham as the knight of faith has no higher
duty within his social structure in relation to which he offers Isaac.39 For the knight of
faith, his duty goes beyond the ethical, and in this sense Abraham suspends the ethical in
his obedience to God. The paradox here, then, is precisely that Abraham relates to God
absolutely and directly without being mediated through his social structure. For de silentio
the challenge of this account of paradox to his Christendom culture, and that which
informs the great disjunction of Fear and Trembling is clear: “During the time before the
result [i.e., Isaac being returned], either Abraham was a murderer every minute or we
stand before a paradox that is higher than all mediations.”40
This discussion of the tragic hero and knight of faith provides good insight into
the general function of paradox within the problemata. It is a paradox when the ethical
categories of social morality are suspended for a higher duty; it is a paradox when one
stands in a direct and absolute relation to God that is unmediated through one’s society;
and it is a paradox when one remains publicly silent despite the moral demand that one
See Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis (New York, NY: Start Publishing, 2012).
SKS 4, 152-3 / FT, 59.
40 SKS 4, 159 / FT, 66.
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speak. Running through all of these descriptions of paradox is the unified point that faith
is ultimately irreducible to human categories, and that paradox therefore operates here in
its etymological sense as a limitation.41 This is entirely consistent with an earlier remark
made by de silentio: “I am constantly repelled [by Abraham’s account], and, despite all its
passion, my thought cannot penetrate it, cannot get ahead by a hairsbreadth. I stretch
every muscle to get a perspective, and at the very same instant I become paralyzed…I
cannot think myself into Abraham; when I reach that eminence, I sink down, for what is
offered me is a paradox.”42 Furthermore, paradox here is not only beyond human
understanding, but it also stands in the path of any ideology that threatens to disrupt the
proper ordering of faith and reason by claiming that a person of faith needs to relate to
God through finitude rather than to everything finite through a relation with the infinite
God. We can therefore agree with Merold Westphal that de silentio employs paradox
“because he wants his readers to notice the deep incompatibility between [reason’s]
explicit or implicit hegemony (Hegel and Christendom, respectively) and biblical faith.”43
In the end, this account of paradox is precisely what allows de silentio to conclude that
“either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the single individual stands in an
absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost.”44

There is, nevertheless, also a dialectal aspect of paradox at work in the problemata. This is
associated with the position Abraham assumes as the knight of faith in contrast to the tragic hero, that is,
that he both respects the ethical and at the same time suspends it in the service of an absolute relation to
God. This stance is moreover that which is responsible for the anxiety and distress that Abraham most
certainly experiences, and it is that which differentiates Abraham from the immoral aesthetes or what de
silentio calls “fly-by-nights and itinerant geniuses” (SKS 4, 167 / FT, 75). Whereas figures in the latter
category such as Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov in the beginning of Crime and Punishment or Johannes the
seducer from Either/Or I violate the Sittlichkeit of their society without apparent problem, Abraham, in
both suspending and valuing the ethical, enters into the realm of the paradoxical. As de silentio notes, the
knight of faith “knows that it is glorious to belong to the universal…But he also knows that up higher
there winds a lonesome trail, steep and narrow” (SKS 4, 167 / FT, 75-6).
42 SKS 4, 128 / FT, 33.
43 Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 95.
44 SKS 4, 207 / FT, 120.
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Paradox in the Preliminary Expectoration
Although the term paradox is used far less in the “Preliminary Expectoration”
than in the problemata,45 the concept of paradox nevertheless plays a crucial role in the
argument of the section. But what is the general purpose of the “Preliminary
Expectoration”? Briefly put, de silentio undertakes the task of offering a heartfelt
introduction to Abraham as the father of faith which goes further than the adoration of
the preceding “Eulogy on Abraham”46 and attempts to circle around faith by providing
several concrete characterizations of it.47 In recognizing this purpose, it is important not
to succumb to the temptation of overemphasizing “preliminary” and thereby relegating
the content of the section to a secondary place behind that of the “more philosophical”
problemata.48 This would be improper because Kierkegaard not only regularly employs
introductory remarks to make significant points, but also because, if we return to the
quote from above introducing the problemata, de silentio appears to present us with two
different but nevertheless important types of paradox that he relegates to each of the
different sections: for the problemata he focuses on the “paradox that makes a murder
into a holy and God-pleasing act” and for the “Preliminary Expectoration” he focuses on
the “paradox that gives Isaac back to Abraham again…”49 As such, de silentio does not set
up a hierarchy between the two accounts so much as he provides two different
perspectives on the same general phenomenon.
With these remarks in mind, let us turn to the description of paradox in the
“Preliminary Expectoration.” What stands out immediately is that although de silentio
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The term paradox in its various forms occurs in the “Preliminary Expectoration” a total of 11

times.
SKS 4, 112-19 / FT, 15-23.
Because he does not understand faith, de silentio’s reflections are necessarily limited. This,
however, does not entail that they lack all value.
48 See, e.g., Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 69-70. In claiming this, it is important to note
that other scholars such as Mooney, Davenport or Krishek may very well make too much of the
“Preliminary Expectoration” at the expense of the problemata.
49 SKS 4, 147 / FT, 53.
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does employ paradox at certain places to signify something beyond human
comprehension,50 he is far more interested in drawing on the notion of paradox in order
to describe Abraham’s life and experience throughout his testing. As he notes early on, “I
am constantly aware of the prodigious paradox that is the content of Abraham’s life…”51 Or
later, he remarks, “Let us either cancel out Abraham or learn to be horrified by the
prodigious paradox that is the meaning of his life…”52 Furthermore, de silentio writes in terms
of the “paradox of existence” (Tilværelsens Paradox)53 and he ties this to Abraham’s ability
to embrace the realm of temporality,54 which he also identifies as the “paradoxical
movement of faith.”55 What de silentio sees as the unifying element running through all of
these references is that they describe the paradox of Abraham’s faith as this relates
specifically to receiving Isaac,56 or, more accurately stated, as Abraham both resigns Isaac
and receives Isaac back again. At work here, then, are two movements, and it is precisely
this “double-movement”57 that comprises the paradox. As such, to understand
adequately the nature of paradox in the “Preliminary Expectoration” it is important to
clarify what de silentio means with each of these movements and how he understands
them to relate to one another.
The first movement is what de silentio calls the movement of infinite resignation,
which, appropriately so, is characteristic of the figure he identifies as the knight of
infinite resignation. To explain this movement, de silentio offers the example of a lad who
falls in love with a princess even though it remains impossible for this love to be realized.
In response to this problem, the lad, without abandoning his identity as the lover of the

See, e.g., SKS 4, 128 / FT, 33.
SKS 4, 128 / FT, 33 (the italicized emphasis is my own).
52 SKS 4, 146 / FT, 52-3 (the italicized emphasis is my own).
53 SKS 4, 141 / FT, 47.
54 SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49.
55 SKS 4, 145 / FT, 51.
56 SKS 4, 147 / FT, 53.
57 The terms de silentio employs for this construction is Dobbelt-Bevægelse or Dobbeltbevægelsen. See
SKS 4, 131 / FT, 36; SKS 4, 206 / FT, 119.
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princess,58 undertakes an infinite movement by unequivocally resigning the possibility of
tangibly realizing this love while nevertheless keeping it alive and young by “expressing it
spiritually.”59 With this movement, the concrete person of the princess fades out of the
picture precisely because the idea of the love has been made eternal in the movement
itself. It is for this reason that de silentio remarks that “[f]rom the moment [the lad] has
made the movement, the princess is lost.”60 Indeed, because the resignation requires a
total commitment that draws on all of one’s strength and because such resignation is
complete, the knight of infinite resignation is unable to reclaim what has been resigned.61
Although this movement is deeply painful not least of all because one resigns precisely
what one in a certain sense does not want to resign,62 the knight nevertheless finds
meaning in his effort of resignation and he is entirely at home in it. As de silentio notes, “I
can resign everything by my own strength and find peace and rest in the pain…find joy
and peace and rest in my pain…”63
The second movement is characterized fundamentally by the reception of what is
resigned.64 Whereas the first movement is the movement of infinity, de silentio explicitly
identifies this second movement as that of finitude in the sense that Abraham’s
movement is not an expression of other-worldly faith or some general belief that all
SKS 4, 138 / FT, 43. As de silentio notes, “Only the lower natures forget themselves and become
something new.”
59 SKS 4, 138 / FT, 44.
60 SKS 4, 138 / FT, 44.
61 Indeed, the knight of infinite resignation, were he to be placed in the position of Abraham,
would find it “awkward” to receive back Isaac. See SKS 4, 130 / FT, 35.
62 As Sharon Krishek insightfully points out, this fact means that the movement of infinite
resignation is itself in some sense already paradoxical. See Kierkegaard on Faith and Love (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 89-90.
63 SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49. We should point out in agreement with Clare Carlisle that this movement
is made continually by the knight of infinite resignation; however, as this quote makes clear, Carlisle is not
entirely correct in noting that this “endless striving” is one that “never finds a resting-place.” See
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Reader’s Guide (London and New York, NY: Continuum, 2010), 82.
64 Insofar as de silentio describes infinite resignation as the “last stage to pass from [Abraham’s]
view” and that which he goes beyond in coming to faith (SKS 4, 132 / FT, 37), it may be tempting to see
resignation as something that is abandoned in faith. However, as several scholars correctly emphasize in
their studies of Fear and Trembling, resignation has a crucial constructive role to play in faith. See John J.
Davenport, “Faith as Eschatological Trust in Fear and Trembling,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed.
Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 227; Krishek,
Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, 88; Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 93-4.
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things will work out for the good in the end,65 but rather it is the declaration that faith is
fulfilled now, in this world, and in the concrete. As de silentio remarks, “Abraham had
faith and had faith for this life. In fact, if his faith had been only for a life to come, he
certainly would have more readily discarded everything in order to rush out of a world to
which he did not belong. But Abraham’s faith was not of this sort…Abraham had faith
specifically for this life…”66 Moreover, whereas the first movement of resignation is one
that the individual can carry out on her own strength, the second movement of
reception, although something the individual must strive for by retaining a certain
disposition of openness, depends in part, as Edward Mooney puts it, “on powers beyond
our ken or control.”67 It is for this reason that the language of gift is certainly appropriate
to describe the second movement.68 Still, receptivity requires that one welcome and
embrace the gift, just as the knight of faith, after making the movement of infinity, must
be perfectly willing and able to embrace the finite.69 Receptivity, then, need not preclude
an active embracing.
When taken individually, these the two movements described here do not
comprise the paradox, but rather, as we have noted above, the paradox emerges only
when these two movements are held in tandem as the double-movement of both
resigning and receiving. As such, the paradoxical aspect of Abraham is not merely that he
goes up the mountain or that he comes down again, but rather that he makes the entire
journey. Or similarly, just as the wonder of the ballet dancer is not merely that she leaps
well or lands well, but that she both leaps and lands in such a way that she continues to

See, e.g., Davenport, “Faith as Eschatological Trust.”
SKS 4, 116 / FT, 20. See also SKS 4, 131 / FT, 36.
67 Edward F. Mooney, Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 131.
68 See Lippitt, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook, 51; Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 7, 83.
69 SKS 4, 133-4 / FT, 38-9. In this respect, the knight of faith is externally indistinguishable from
the average individual who has not made the movement of infinity. On this point, see SKS 4, 133-5 / FT,
38-40.
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move forward.70 Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that within faith the two
movements of resignation and reception occur simultaneously and continuously, with
both perpetually present in their complete fullness. As de silentio remarks, the movement
of faith “must continually be made [bestandig gjøres]”71 and the knight of faith “has made
and at every moment [hvert Øieblik] is making the movement of infinity…[and] is
continually making [gjør bestandig] the movement of infinity…”72 Near the end of Fear and
Trembling he also notes that “Abraham makes two movements. He makes the infinite
movement of resignation and gives up Isaac…but next, at every moment [i ethvert
Moment], he makes the movement of faith.”73 Several scholars have picked up on this
point,74 and Sharon Krishek’s commentary is especially lucid:
Faith, it is important to remember, is defined by Johannes as a double
movement—in spite of being very different from resignation, it necessarily
includes resignation as an essential part of it. Resignation is a permanent component
within faith. Accordingly, the knight of faith also makes the movement of
resignation—but in contrast with the other knight he believes in receiving back
his renounced princess. This is the paradox of faith: the knight of faith
undertakes the movement of resignation and another, simultaneous movement,
that seems to contradict it.75
In summary, then, the paradoxical double-movement entails that resignation and
reception in their fullness are both essential to faith and must therefore be perpetually

SKS 4, 136 / FT, 41. Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 86-8.
SKS 4, 132 / FT, 37.
72 SKS 4, 135 / FT, 40-1.
73 SKS 4, 203 / FT, 115.
74 See, e.g., Mark C. Taylor, “Journeys to Moriah: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard,” The Harvard Theological
Review 70, no. 3 (1977), 324; Seung-Goo Lee, “The Antithesis between the Religious View of Ethics and
the Rationalistic View of Ethics in Fear and Trembling,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and
Trembling and Repetition, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 122; Carlisle,
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 93-4.
75 Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, 76 (the italicized emphasis is in the original). In response to this
characterization of the double-movement, one could nevertheless object that it is crucial to retain the
temporal aspect of the movement: first one resigns and then one receives. Indeed, this appears to be what
de silentio intends with the dancer metaphor, in that the dancer must first leap before landing. In response,
we may say simply that the temporal presentation of the movements is due to de silentio’s use of narrative
imagery (e.g., going up and going down the mountain; leaping and landing), but that de silentio is clear that
in the life of the believer the movements happen contemporaneously and continuously, and not as discrete
phases.
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held together in an un-tempered dialectical relation. Anything less than this would fail to
qualify as paradox.76
To conclude this investigation of paradox in the “Preliminary Expectoration,” we
may note that paradox functions here overwhelmingly in the dialectical sense as the joint
reciprocal relation between opposites.77 Again, to recall our discussion from the
introductory chapter, paradox as dialectic signifies, in Westphal’s description, “a structure
of opposition in which divergent elements are in unresolved tension with each other,”78
and this is precisely the sense in which de silentio presents the double-movement of faith.
In faith, both of the divergent movements of resignation and reception are held together
without undermining the other, and for de silentio it is precisely this dynamic that underlies
the power of Abraham’s faith as a lived existential stance.

The understanding of the double-movement in terms of paradox presented here reveals where
certain interpreters run the risk of falling short in their readings. Consider two examples. First, in contrast
to Andrew Cross, we may note that it is not the case that Abraham only believes that Isaac will die, if this
means that Abraham really only makes the first movement of resignation. More fundamentally, however,
Cross’ one-sided conclusion, which is a consequence of his desire to avoid a logical contradiction (i.e.,
Abraham believes that Isaac will die and that he will not die) is itself unnecessary in that it construes the
double-movement in a manner that is foreign to de silentio (see “Fear and Trembling’s Unorthodox Ideal,”
Philosophical Topics 27, no. 2 (1999): 227-53). Rather, for de silentio the paradox of the double-movement
centers on the dialectical opposing beliefs of Abraham that he will sacrifice Isaac and at the same time that
God will (miraculously) fulfill his promises to Abraham through Isaac. Krishek describes this dynamic well
when she writes, “[I]t is important to note that the paradox [in the “Preliminary Expectoration”] does not
amount to a logical impossibility. Abraham does not believe that Isaac will be both dead and alive at the same
time. Rather, he believes that Isaac will live in accordance with God’s promise to him, despite being unable
to understand (or predict) the way in which this will happen. In other words, Abraham believes in the
fulfillment of God’s promise even while acting in a way that contradicts this promise. As far as his human
understanding is concerned, Abraham is well aware that he is about to kill Isaac; nevertheless he continues
to believe in the fulfillment of God’s word to him. His faith is therefore paradoxical in the sense that there
is an irresolvable tension between the different aspects of his faith” (Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, 80).
Second, in contrast to Ronald M. Hall and John Lippitt, we have good reason to believe that Abraham’s
belief concerning the sacrifice of Isaac is more than an “annulled possibility” if by this phrase is meant that
Abraham never fully resigns Isaac (see Hall, The Human Embrace: The Love of Philosophy and the Philosophy of
Love: Kierkegaard, Cavell, Nussbaum (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2000; Lippitt,
Routledge Philosophy Guide). Recalling a point made above, for de silentio infinite resignation is only possible if
carried out completely; in other words, there are no shortcuts around this movement.
77 There are, nevertheless, some elements of the etymological sense of paradox at work in the
double-movement. For example, when de silentio remarks that “Abraham withstood the temptation, kept
the faith, and, contrary to expectation [mod Forventning], got a son a second time” (SKS 4, 105 / FT, 9) or
when he notes that the double-movement of faith is that “which no thought can grasp” (SKS 4, 147 / FT,
53), he is clearly alluding to the fact that even the dialectical expression of paradox eludes human
understanding. This point, however, need not take away from our claim that the main description of
paradox in the “Preliminary Expectoration” is that of the dialectical account.
78 Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 220.
76
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2.3 - Sacred Tension in Fear and Trembling
In this section, I make the case for understanding the notion of sacred tension to
be at work within Fear and Trembling, and particularly as it emerges in relation to the
accounts of paradox outlined above. The connection between paradox and sacred
tension proves crucial for Section 2.4 in which I suggest that Abraham’s concrete task of
becoming a person who lives within such sacred tension carries significant implications
for both ethics and Christian existence.

Heroes, Knights, and Evasion of Tension
Before we articulate an account of sacred tension with reference to Abraham, we
may begin by discussing the notion of tension in general in relation to the figures of the
tragic hero and the knight of infinite resignation. Although these figures represent two
different substitutes (Surrogater) for faith, they are nevertheless similar in the sense that
each is involved in the evasion of tension.
The tragic hero evades tension by seeking comfort and security in the social
standards and the Sittlichkeit of his culture. This point becomes clear when we return to de
silentio’s example of Agamemnon. In sacrificing his daughter, Agamemnon still submits to
a higher duty that remains within the ethical, and it is precisely for this reason that de
silentio identifies the tragic hero as “ethics’ beloved son in whom it is well pleased.”79 With
such an identification, de silentio alludes to the gospel account where the spirit of the Lord
descends on Jesus following his baptism,80 and with this allusion he makes a clear point:
for the tragic hero, the universal is divinized and thus the tragic hero finds security and
comfort in it without the fear and trembling that is required if he were, like Abraham, to

79
80

SKS 4, 177 / FT, 87. See also SKS 4, 177 / FT, 88.
See Mark 1:9-11; Matthew 3:13-17; Luke 3:21-2.

73
stand alone before the living God. In this respect, his flight to the socially recognized
universal is at the same time a flight away from tension.
The knight of infinite resignation also takes significant steps to evade tension, but
rather than turning to his society, he seeks security and comfort in the pain of his
resignation, in the eternal, and ultimately, in his own strength. If we recall our discussion
above, to resign is to resign everything completely and unequivocally. Thus, the lad must
entirely reconcile himself with the impossibility of realizing his love for the princess81—a
movement that Ronald Hall describes as disengagement from the concrete world via
absolute commitments to something else.82 These other commitments are to the eternal,
which makes this movement akin to an escape to the monastery where one finds rest
(Hvile).83 De silentio describes this dynamic by pointing to the case of the lad and the
princess:
[The lad’s] love for the princess would become for him the expression of an
eternal love, would assume a religious character, would be transfigured into a love
of the eternal being, which true enough denied the fulfillment but nevertheless
did reconcile him once more in the eternal consciousness of its validity in an
eternal form that no actuality can take away from him.84
The issue at stake here is ultimately one of protection in the sense that one gives up the
finite that would put one at risk. To explain this, de silentio employs a metaphor: “Infinite
resignation is that shirt mentioned in an old legend. The thread is spun with tears,
bleached with tears; the shirt is sewn in tears—but then it also gives protection better
than iron or steel.”85 Ultimately, this evasion is to fall back into self-sufficiency. As de
silentio remarks, “This movement I make all by myself, and what I gain thereby is my

81 In this sense, the lover and the beloved no longer interact directly with one another, but rather,
as is the case with Leibniz’s monads, they move in unison with, as de silentio notes, “a rhythmic harmonia
præstabilita.” See SKS 4, 139 / FT, 45.
82 The Human Embrace, 43.
83 See SKS 4, 189-90 / FT, 100-1. Hall, The Human Embrace, 70.
84 SKS 4, 138 / FT, 43-4.
85 SKS 4, 140 / FT, 45. See Cross, “Fear and Trembling’s Unorthodox Ideal,” 249.
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eternal consciousness in blessed harmony [i salig Forstaaelse] with my love for the eternal
being.”86
When we assume as our lens the notion of rest (i.e., Ro, Hvile) discussed in
Chapter 1, the specific nature of these two evasions becomes more apparent. With respect
to the tragic hero de silentio notes that he “finds rest [Hvile] in the universal”87 in that the
universal “rests [hviler] immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its  but
is itself the  for everything outside itself…”88 More specifically, de silentio remarks
that “Agamemnon gives up Iphigenia and thereby finds rest [Hvile] in the universal, and
now he proceeds to sacrifice her”—an act in which those within Agamemnon’s society
can likewise rest.89 As de silentio puts it in reference to Abraham but in making a point
about the tragic hero, “[Abraham] knew that it is kingly to sacrifice a son…to the
universal; he himself would have found rest therein [Hvile deri], and everyone would have
rested [hvilet] approvingly in his deed, as the vowel rests [hviler] in its quiescent letter
[Hvilebogstav].”90 Regarding the knight of infinite resignation de silentio notes,
In infinite resignation there is peace and rest [Fred og Hvile]; every person who
wills it, who has not debased himself by self-disdain—which is still more dreadful
than being too proud—can discipline himself to make this movement, which in
its pain reconciles one to existence…In infinite resignation there is peace and rest
and comfort [Fred og Hvile og Trøst] in the pain…91
Or later, in identifying himself with the knight of infinite resignation, de silentio claims “I
can resign everything by my own strength and find peace and rest [Fred og Hvile] in the
pain…find joy and peace and rest [Glæde og Fred og Hvile] in my pain…”92
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89 SKS 4, 170 / FT, 79.
90 SKS 4, 168 / FT, 77. See also SKS 4, 154 / FT, 60: “the tragic hero gives up the certain for the
even more certain, and the observer’s eye views him with confidence [hviler trygt paa ham].”
91 SKS 4, 140 / FT, 45.
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The overall idea de silentio presents here in relation both to the tragic hero and
the knight of infinite resignation is evident. The rest attained by both figures is a rest by
which one avoids risk and seeks comfort—even comfort within the pain of sacrifice or
resignation. As de silentio himself seems to recognize, this rest is merely a substitute
(Surrogatet) for faith in that it moves in a trajectory away from an intimate relationship
with God.93 In this respect, it fails to qualify as sacred tension.

Abraham as the Knight of Faith and Sacred Tension
The claim I would like to develop in what follows is that Abraham’s lived
existential stance, in contrast to that of the tragic hero and the knight of infinite
resignation, represents a lucid example of what it means to live within sacred tension. But
what exactly does such sacred tension look like? De silentio provides a few hints in this
direction when he describes Abraham as “the first to know that supreme passion, the
holy, pure, and humble expression for the divine madness that was admired by the
pagans,”94 or when he later distinguishes Abraham from the tragic hero with respect to
how each relates to what he calls “passionate concentration”:
Most men live in adherence to an ethical obligation in such a way that they let
each day have its cares, but then they never attain this passionate concentration,
this intense consciousness. In achieving this, the tragic hero may find the
universal helpful in one sense, but the knight of faith is alone in everything. The
tragic hero does it and finds rest [Hvile] in the universal; the knight of faith is
constantly kept in tension [Spænding].95
Furthermore, de silentio never describes Abraham as growing old or moving towards the
stasis and stillness of death, but rather he notes that in his faith Abraham preserves an
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“eternal youth.”96 This is in stark contrast to the false Abraham de silentio describes in the
second vignette of the “Exordium” who becomes an old man with darkened eyes,
thoroughly devoid of any joy.97
A central part of what allows Abraham to preserve his passion and vibrancy is
that he does not seek security or rest in any human foundation—whether cultural or
philosophical. As de silentio remarks, Abraham “has no stronghold [Tilhold] in the
universal”98 even though he knows fully well that it is good to be able to “rejoice in the
security [Tryghed] of the universal.”99 Thus, in contrast to the tragic hero and the knight of
infinite resignation who find peace and harmony by fleeing tension, Abraham rather
embraces tension and allows his entire lived existential stance to be saturated by it in
such a manner that gives energy and driving force to his life. This is precisely what it
means for Abraham to be in the midst of terror and anxiety, and yet to find in this state
both hope and joy. In de silentio’s terms, “…to live happily every moment this way by
virtue of the absurd, every moment to see the sword hanging over the beloved’s head,
and yet not to find rest [Hvile] in the pain of resignation but to find joy by virtue of the
absurd—this is wonderful.”100
Another way of describing sacred tension in Abraham’s case is to say that
Abraham, in his relation to God, remains in perpetual vigilant motion. As de silentio puts
it, “The tragic hero is soon finished, and his struggles are soon over; he makes the
infinite movement and is now secure in the universal. The knight of faith, however, is
kept in a state of sleeplessness [holdes søvnløs]…”101 Such a state requires an “endearing
earnestness” (den elskelige Alvor) in which one remains with faith and does not attempt to
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go further.102 It is precisely for this reason that de silentio repeatedly identifies Abraham
with the phrase “blive staaende ved Troen.”103 To describe in a deprecating manner one who
is tempted to stop growing and developing in faith, de silentio employs “blive staaende ved”
negatively to mean something akin to “coming to a standstill”—a stance which he
vehemently opposes.104 However, for the one attempting to go further than faith, de
silentio employs “blive staande ved” in a positive sense. For example, he asks, “Would it not
be best [for the one going further than faith] to remain standing at [blev staaende ved] faith
and for him who stands to see to it that he does not fall…”105 As the Hongs note, this
statement, as used here, is an allusion to 1 Corinthians where the Apostle Paul writes
“So, if you think you are standing firm, be careful that you don’t fall.”106 The phrase thus
connotes a state of watchful vigilance, much like that which is in stark contrast to the
foolish bridesmaids who slumber unprepared while awaiting the arrival of the
bridegroom.107 Ultimately, then, this standing has nothing to do with becoming static, but
rather it represents a continuous movement carried out by the person of faith.
Although de silentio distances Abraham from the security and comfort sought by
the tragic hero and the knight of infinite resignation, he nevertheless still associates
Abraham with a particular kind of peace and rest. For example, as he writes in the
“Preliminary Expectoration,” “Here [in the world of spirit] it holds true that only the one
who works gets bread, that only the one who was in anxiety finds rest [Hvile]…”108 Or, in
problema III he notes regarding the knight of faith’s absolute relation to God, “as far as I
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can see, he would also be able to find inner peace [Hvile] therein” even though “his noble
silence would always be disturbed [uroliges] by the demands of the ethical.”109 Perhaps
most significantly, de silentio describes the knight of faith as having “an equanimity [Ro i
Tilværelsen]” in the sense that even though he is at every moment making the movement
of infinity, he is nevertheless related to God in such a way that he can reclaim the finite
world in peace (Ro).110 Interestingly, such peace acts as a perfect cover for sacred tension
in that to lack it would be a sign that one is in fact not a knight of faith, but rather a
knight of infinite resignation who is unable to embrace the temporal.111 The ambiguity of
faith, then, is that the specific equanimity the knight of faith experiences and displays is
what allows for the possibility of proper restlessness. With respect to sacred tension,
then, the important question therefore concerns, ultimately, what one’s restlessness is
grounded upon.112 To conclude this section we may briefly touch upon this issue.

The Apex on Which Abraham Stands: The Relation between Paradox and Sacred Tension
Near the middle of problema I, de silentio writes the following: “How did
Abraham exist? He had faith. This is the paradox by which he remains at the apex [ved hvilket
han bliver paa Spidsen]…”113 This description of Abraham in his precarious position is in
direct contrast to the false Abraham who, as Kierkegaard describes him in a journal
entry, “had not been able to keep himself in suspenso at the apex [Spidse] of faith until the
end”114 as well as to the “sleepwalker” who safely and securely crosses the abyss under
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the peak (Spidse) of Mount Moriah where Abraham stands.115 With this overt connection
between paradox and Abraham’s mode of existence “at the apex” as my point of
departure, I would like to bring this section to a close by drawing out in explicit terms the
relation between paradox and sacred tension. My claim is a simple one: paradox in Fear
and Trembling is precisely that which provides the condition for the possibility of
Abraham’s lived existential stance. Put in a metaphorical manner, without paradox “in
the ground,”116 as it were, sacred tension would have no place to find its footing. Indeed,
this claim holds true for both forms of paradox at work in Fear and Trembling outlined
above.
In the problemata, paradox in its limiting function is that which challenges the
hegemony of human and social categories, especially when one attempts to give a
complete account of reality strictly in relation to these categories. As such, not only does
paradox disallow a certain kind of existential foundation comprised of cultural norms or
speculative thought, but it also undercuts the possibility of the individual of faith from
resting in such a foundation. This is seen most clearly in that the paradox pushes the
individual away from Hegelian Sittlichkeit as well as the Hegelian system, and rather
towards interiority, isolation, hiddenness, but most importantly, towards complete
vulnerability before God. Paradox in the problemata, therefore, plays a crucial negative
role in clearing out existential stances that evade tension such as those of the knight of
infinite resignation and the tragic hero so as thereby to open the possibility for the life of
sacred tension.
In the “Preliminary Expectoration,” paradox in its dialectical function provides
precisely the constructive condition and structure by which one enters into and remains
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within sacred tension. As we have pointed out above, it is impossible to live within
sacred tension without the perpetual practice and presence of both dialectical movements
of resignation and reception. For example, the false Abraham in the “Eulogy on
Abraham” who, rather than trusting God, thrusts the knife into his own breast, does not
even make the first movement,117 and the knight of infinite resignation makes only the first
movement. Neither of these figures engages with the paradox and in this respect both
fall outside of sacred tension. Abraham, in contrast, embraces the paradox that he, in the
practice of his faith, is to undertake the double-movement of resigning and receiving, and
it is precisely the reality of this dialectic that allows Abraham to live in the manner he
does, without any human foundation on which to stand while tensely positioned in
relation to the divine.
In conclusion, then, we may say that without paradox both in its limitation and
dialectical forms, Abraham would be no different than the surrogates of faith, but it is
precisely because of paradox and Abraham’s relation to it that he enters into and lives
within sacred tension.

2.4 - Abraham within the Sacred Tension: Some Concrete Insights for Christian
Existence

In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we outlined how paradox entails that Abraham finds
himself within sacred tension. The purpose of this section is now to articulate in a more
concrete sense some of the particular virtues associated with Abraham’s lived existential
stance in Fear and Trembling, and towards this end I approach Abraham as an exemplar
for Christian existence. As such, I argue that despite de silentio’s attack on ethics, ethics of
a certain kind still have an important role to play in a paradox-informed account of the
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Christian life. Before taking up Abraham as an exemplar, we should, however, begin by
briefly discussing the issue of ethics in Fear and Trembling.

On the Limitations and Possibilities of Ethics in Fear and Trembling
In the last half-century, there has been a great deal of disagreement within the
secondary discussion concerning how ethics should be understood in Fear and Trembling
both with respect to what de silentio means by “the ethical” (det Ethiske118) and with respect
to what the text entails for the possibilities of articulating a constructive account of
ethics. These two issues are intimately connected in the sense that many scholars have
understood Fear and Trembling as rejecting ethics and the ethical in the direction either of
moral nihilism or of faith.119 There is certainly something to be said for such readings in
that Kierkegaard does in fact employ Fear and Trembling to critique and to reject a certain
conception of ethics that he believes ought not to be associated with Christian existence.
This conception undoubtedly carries both Hegelian and Kantian connotations.120 Thus,
for example, with his notion of the “teleological suspension of the ethical,” de silentio

Cf. det Sædelige.
The common thread underlying the moral nihilism readings is the assertion both that
Kierkegaard uses Fear and Trembling to make substantial claims about ethics and that his view is ultimately
morally bankrupt. See, e.g., Brand Blanshard, “Kierkegaard on Faith,” in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry H.
Gill (Minneapolis, MN: Burgess, 1969), 116. The answer to this, argues Blanshard, is simple: we ought to
recognize that Kierkegaard leads to moral nihilism, and therefore we ought to abandon his thought
altogether. In reacting to such readings several scholars have claimed that Fear and Trembling really has
nothing substantial to say about ethics. For example, C. Stephen Evans has argued that “Fear and Trembling
is not a book about ethics; it is a book about faith” (“Introduction” in Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and
Trembling, trans. Sylvia Wash (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xxii). Ronald M. Green is
even more explicit than Evans in his rejection of ethical readings of Fear and Trembling. In a string of
writings, one of which carries the unambiguous title “Enough is Enough! Fear and Trembling Is Not about
Ethics,” Green argues that ethics within the text serves merely as a surface discussion for Kierkegaard’s
deeper soteriological concerns meant to demonstrate the pre-eminence of grace over works. As he notes,
Fear and Trembling “is a tribute to the one who first adopted the stance to which all his spiritual descendants
are called: the stance of living ‘beyond ethics’ in absolute dependency on God’s grace” (“Enough is
Enough! ‘Fear and Trembling’ is Not about Ethics,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 21, no. 2 (1993), 204). In
the end, although Green admits that Fear and Trembling might be able to function as a beginning to a study
in ethics in that it points to some ethical concerns, he is adamant that such concerns are marginal at best.
120 For a good account of scholars who have argued this view, see Seung-Goo Lee, Kierkegaard on
Becoming and Being a Christian: The Relation of Christianity to the Ethical Sphere of Existence in the Thought of Søren
Kierkegaard (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema, 2004), 44-5n76.
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attacks the Hegelian account of Sittlichkeit that would reduce ethics to social morality.121
Furthermore, with his important nod to the notions of sin and repentance in problema
III, de silentio likely takes a jab at Kantian ethics, but one could also say any ethics that
attempts to bring ideality into actuality while failing to take into full account the central
role played by God in the ethical life.122 The underlying point in both of de silentio’s
critiques is that in articulating an account of Christian existence Kierkegaard ultimately
rejects ethical frameworks that either make God secondary (as in the case of idealistic
ethics devoid of the notions of sin and repentance) or simply makes God unnecessary (as
in the case of social morality)—in short, any secular account of ethics.123
De silentio’s critical engagement with secular ethics in Fear and Trembling, however,
does not entail a rejection of all forms of ethics.124 In other words, the conception of
ethics criticized by de silentio in the problemata need not be the only characterization of
ethics at work in Fear and Trembling.125 To develop this point, it may be helpful to outline

See, in particular, SKS 4, 148-59 / FT, 54-67.
On this point, see, e.g., SKS 4, 323-4 / CA, 16. As de silentio puts it in Fear and Trembling, “An
ethics that ignores sin is a completely futile discipline…” (SKS 4, 188 / FT, 98-9) and “As soon as sin
emerges, ethics founders [da gaaer Ethiken til Grunde] precisely on repentance…” (SKS 4, 188n / FT, 98n).
In The Concept of Anxiety, Vigilius Haufniensis also includes in this category ancient virtue ethics: “As all
ancient knowledge and speculation was based on the presupposition that thought has reality, so all ancient
ethics was based on the presupposition that virtue can be realized. Sin’s skepticism is altogether foreign to
paganism.” See SKS 4, 326 / CA, 19.
123 On this point, see Philip L. Quinn, “Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics” in The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 349.
124 Thus, in response to Evans we may say that although he is certainly correct to recognize a text
such as Works of Love as central to a Kierkegaardian ethics, such recognition need not preclude us from also
reading Fear and Trembling in the same manner. Furthermore, in response to Green, we may not only say
that his one-sided emphasis on grace is problematic given the importance de silentio places on works, but
that his reading of the text presupposes far too narrow a view of ethics. As Green has argued in various
writings, the ethical in Fear and Trembling is strictly a Kantian notion, and therefore we ought to think of de
silentio as employing this account merely to point out that such ethics cannot be fulfilled through human
effort. Apart from the problem that it is not entirely clear that de silentio does in fact intend the notion of
“the ethical” in Fear and Trembling to be understand strictly in Kantian terms, we also have no good reason
to restrict the ethical conceptions at work in the text to those of action-based moralities centered on divine
commands, duties, rules, and laws. As Jung H. Lee has nicely put it, “what Green designates as ‘the moral
life in its most comprehensive sense’ seems to be just one particular version of the moral life and not the moral
life per se. Put differently, the interpretations which Green considers and ultimately rejects all seem to
share certain characteristics which point towards a distinct picture of morality, a picture which Green
seems to assume in his understanding of ‘the ethical’” (“Abraham in a Different Voice: Rereading ‘Fear
and Trembling’ with Care,” Religious Studies 36, no. 4 (2000), 381).
125 Indeed, several interpreters have pointed to constructive ethical insights that one can glean
from Fear and Trembling. For example, Mooney has argued that Fear and Trembling represents a call to
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briefly the distinction drawn by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis in The
Concept of Anxiety between first ethics and second ethics. For Haufniensis, first ethics are
those that see ideality as a task that all are able to achieve, and thereby their movement is
that from ideality to actuality. It is these ethics, however, that, due to their ideal starting
point, are ultimately “shipwrecked” on sin.126 As Haufniensis remarks, “If ethics is to
include sin, its ideality comes to an end.”127 In contrast, second ethics begins with
actuality and moves from there to ideality. Beginning with actuality, for Haufniensis
means a recognition of the reality of sin: “This ethics does not ignore sin, and it does not
have its ideality in making ideal demands; rather, it has its ideality in the penetrating
consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin…”128 In addition, he notes on the same
page that “The new ethics presuppose dogmatics, and by means of hereditary sin it
explains the sin of the single individual, while at the same time it sets ideality as a task,
not by a movement from above and downward but from below and upward.”129 As such,
second ethics “belongs to a different order of things.”130 As Arne Grøn nicely puts it in
Subjektivitet og Negativitet,
the “second” ethic [etik] is a transformation of ethics [etikken] in that it assumes
as its starting point the reality of sin. This transformation of ethics is the
conversion of “all ethical conceptualizations”…The opposition sin-faith
[presented by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death] endows all ethical
concepts with a further expression, just as a musical piece played on an organ
receives another sense by being provided with yet another expression.131

selfhood in the midst of a dilemmatic struggle where one affirms and asserts one’s deepest loves and cares
(Knights of Faith and Resignation); Lee has developed a care ethics reading of the text in which he argues for
focusing on the caring stance Abraham assumes as a commitment to sustain and to foster his relationship
with God (“Abraham in a Different Voice”); and J. Aaron Simmons has argued for understanding
Abraham’s relation to Isaac as inscribed in his relation to God and thus an example of “responsible
subjectivity” (“What about Isaac? Rereading Fear and Trembling and Rethinking Kierkegaardian Ethics,” The
Journal of Religious Ethics 35, no. 2 (2007), 319, 322).
126 SKS 4, 324 / CA, 17; SKS 4, 328 / CA, 20.
127 SKS 4, 324-5 / CA, 17-18.
128 SKS 4, 328 / CA, 20.
129 SKS 4, 328 / CA, 20.
130 SKS 4, 328 / CA, 20.
131 Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet: Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997), 282. See, also,
Arne Grøn, Begrebet Angst hos Søren Kierkegaard (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1994), 131-2.
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In the end, we may say that the most crucial point to take away from Haufniensis’
distinction between first and second ethics in The Concept of Anxiety as well as from de
silentio’s discussion of sin in Fear and Trembling is that any properly Christian account of
ethics must necessarily be predicated upon and entirely infused with divine assistance.132
In short, such an ethics only plays out in a direct and intimate God-relation in which
God, through the continual provision of grace, overcomes human limitation and sin, and
in which human beings humbly embrace such grace.
When we return to Abraham, we begin to see how he is able to provide us with
a constructive ethical account that carries implications for Christian existence. Although
de silentio points out that Abraham as “a righteous man, God’s chosen one”133 does not
become the single individual in relation to God by means of sin and in this respect his
relation to God is not identical to the sinful Christian individual,134 it is nevertheless still
the case that the virtues he displays within the sacred tension as both continually striving
and turning to God in dependence so as to overcome the temptation and despair to fall
away from God are entirely consistent with the spirit of second ethics. As such, I argue
in what follows that we may see Abraham as an exemplar for Christian existence. Before
developing this argument, we may first consider and respond to an objection.

132 On this point, see C. Stephen Evans, “Faith as the Telos of Morality: A Reading of Fear and
Trembling,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 26; Thomas P. Miles, The Ethical Project Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche Share: Illustrating, Analyzing, and Evaluating Different Ways of Life (Austin, TX: University of Austin,
2006), 58; Thomas P. Miles, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the Best Way of Life: A New Method of Ethics (New
York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 53; Roe Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard’s Double Movement of Faith and
Kant’s Moral Faith,” Religious Studies 48, no. 2 (2012), 209.
133 SKS 4, 188 / FT, 99.
134 However, given Haufniensis’ claim that all individuals after Adam are faced with the reality of
original sin and Anti-Climacus’ claim that despair is a universal human condition, we need not consider
Abraham sinless and perfect in the same manner as Kierkegaard would consider the God-man Jesus Christ.

85
Abraham as Exemplar: An Objection and Reply
In attempting to articulate an account of Abraham as an exemplar for Christian
existence we run immediately into an objection. Simply stated, it is impossible to discern
any normative value in Abraham or to glean any guidance from him in that insofar as he
represents a singular expression of individuality he cannot, by nature, be emulated. This
objection certainly carries weight in one sense: insofar as Abraham responds to a specific
call from God, his specific response cannot be treated simply as a general rule to follow
in all cases. However, the problem with this point as a blanket rejection of Abraham as
an exemplar is that it presupposes normativity in Fear and Trembling is primarily or merely
expressed in the actions carried out by Abraham. Nevertheless, if in raising the question
of how one ought to live we move away from a restrictive action-based approach to a
broader person-centered account we are thereby able to avoid the objection, for it
remains altogether possible that Abraham’s overall manner of existing can in fact serve as
a source for emulation.135 This approach to Abraham, then, is entirely consistent with de
silentio’s challenge to his readers that they continually measure themselves against
Abraham in order to gain a lucid picture of how they are living and how they ought to
live.136 But if Abraham is to play the role of an exemplar, what exactly is it about him that
is to be emulated?137 To answer this question, we may focus more concretely on
Abraham’s character and its associated virtues.

135 On this point, see George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Montreal and Kingston,
London, Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 111.
136 SKS 4, 117 / See, e.g., FT, 21. As Pattison notes, “What Johannes holds up to us then is not a
paradigm of how exceptional individuals are entitled to act but how all individuals should act: that is, with
the seriousness, earnestness, anguish and hope of an Abraham.” See The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, 111.
137 Significantly, de silentio also mentions Mary the mother of Jesus as exemplar. See SKS 4, 157-8 /
FT, 64-5. For an excellent discussion on this point, see Claire Carlisle, “Humble Courage: Kierkegaard on
Abraham and Mary,” Literature and Theology (2014): 1-15.
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Abraham as Exemplar for Christian Existence: Living Virtuously within the Sacred Tension
For Abraham to live within the sacred tension that we have described above
requires, in addition to an earnest striving, also a character that is shaped by total
dependence on God as this dependence plays out through an intimate God-relation. As
Andrew A. Cross puts it in slightly different terms, “for [Abraham], complete reliance on
God (on all things being possible) is paramount—not as a special kind of reason, but as
the dispositional ground upon which he does all that he does.”138 Such dependence is
precisely what lies behind Abraham’s simple, cheerful, and confident response to the call
of God: “Here am I.”139 What makes this character possible and that which substantiates
it, however, are the concrete virtues that Abraham’s practices. For the remainder of this
subsection we may therefore briefly touch upon a few of the virtues central to Abraham’s
lived existential stance.
First, Abraham practices the virtue of courage (Mod).140 Moreover, it is not an
exaggeration to say that courage is one of the most important virtues in de silentio’s text.
As Clare Carlisle rightly notes, “Given the ‘fear and trembling,’ or anxiety, that Johannes
de silentio emphasizes in his interpretation of Abraham, it should not be surprising that
courage plays a central role in his account of Abraham’s heroism.”141 It is important to
note that Abraham’s courage, however, as courage carried out within the sacred tension
is categorically different from other expressions of courage. As de silentio notes, “I know
very well that even though I advance toward [faith] courageously, my courage is still not
the courage of faith and is not something to be compared with it.”142 It is for this reason

“Faith and the Suspension of the Ethical in Fear and Trembling,” Inquiry 46, no. 1 (2003), 23.
SKS 4, 117 / FT, 21.
140 For a good description of courage from Kierkegaard’s signed writings, see his 1844 discourse
“Against Cowardliness” in SKS 5, 335-60 / EUD, 347-75.
141 Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 193. It is striking that Carlisle ends her book with a discussion
on humble courage. See also Carlisle, “Humble Courage: Kierkegaard on Abraham and Mary.”
142 SKS 4, 129 / FT, 33-4.
138
139
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that de silentio identifies Abraham’s courage as “a paradoxical and humble courage” as
opposed to the “purely human courage” practiced by the knight of infinite resignation.143
But what exactly does such courage consist in? Although de silentio notes generally that it
is courage “to grasp the whole temporal realm now by virtue of the absurd,”144 we may
follow Carlisle in adding that such courage is to accept suffering, to be loved by God, to
become vulnerable, to respond to risk and uncertainty, and to confront and to accept
transience.145 Described in this manner, we may say that such courage is impossible to
practice if one flees to the comfort and security of mere human and social categories, and
therefore it represents a token characteristic of the life within sacred tension.
Second, closely tied to the virtue of courage is the virtue of trust (Tillid). Put
differently, in courageously stepping forth in faith Abraham is also practicing and
expressing a deep sense of trust in God, what Cross calls “trustful reliance upon God.”146
As Lee rightly points out, the practice of trust in God is precisely what defines and
shapes Abraham’s moral framework, for it is through this trust that Abraham “reveals his
confidence in the goodwill and competence of God to take care of Isaac”—which in
turn means that Abraham is not a murder and is not lost.147 Moreover, such trust is
grounded on a relationship and a history that Abraham has with God. By the time
Abraham offers Isaac on Mount Moriah, he has already walked a long road with God—

143 SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49. This is the difference between what Lauren Greenspan identifies as
“heroic courage” and “religious courage.” See “Courage,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome II: Classicism to
Enthusiasm, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2014), 89. On the courage of the knight of infinite resignation, see Edward F. Mooney,
“Understanding Abraham: Care, Faith, and the Absurd,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical
Appraisals (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1981), 102. Indeed, as Mooney points out,
this courage is certainly a noble sort of courage; however, this alone does not make it equivalent to the
courage of Abraham.
144 SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49.
145 See Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 81, 193, 196. Similarly, Kjell Johansen remarks that “Ethical
courage in Fear and Trembling…is that [Abraham] dares to stand alone before God.” See “Fear and
Trembling—The Problem of Justification,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002), 275.
Or, as Greenspan lucidly puts it, “religious courage…is typified in one’s resolution to exist before God.
This requires the decisive condition of submitting to and depending on a faith that offers no certainty.” See
“Courage,” 91.
146 “Faith and the Suspension of the Ethical,” 19.
147 “Abraham in a Different Voice,” 392-3.
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an important point to which de silentio affords particular attention: “By faith Abraham
emigrated from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the promised land…By
faith he was an alien in the promised land…By faith Abraham received the promise that
in his seed all the generations of the earth would be blessed.”148 Regarding this point, C.
Stephen Evans proves insightful:
Abraham enjoyed a direct, special relationship with God. Abraham knows God
as an individual; he knows God is good, and he loves and trusts God. Although
he does not understand God’s command in the sense that he understands why
God has asked him to [offer Isaac] or what purpose it will serve, he does
understand that it is indeed God who has asked him to do this. As a result of this
special relationship, Abraham’s trust in God is supreme.149
It is noteworthy, however, that such trust as it plays out in the sacred tension is never
devoid of restlessness and difficulty, as if it ushers one into a harmonious state akin to
that of stoic detachment. Rather, it is trust in the midst of the discomfort of knowing
that one has left oneself open to significant loss and harm. As Cross remarks, such
“maximum of trustfulness” entails that Abraham must relinquish self-reliance by “leaving
his fate ‘in God’s hands” rather than taking the protective strategy of becoming a knight
of resignation.150 To place one’s trust in something other than God such as the norms of
one’s society (as is the case with the tragic hero) or on some abstract notion of the
eternal or even oneself (as is the case with the knight of infinite resignation) would
ultimately not be to trust in the manner of Abraham as one within the sacred tension.
Third, at the heart of Abraham’s character is the virtue of humility (Ydmyghed).
This virtue is closely tied to the virtue of courage in the sense that the practice of

SKS 4, 113-14 / FT, 17. On this point, see Evans, “Introduction,” xviii; Murray A. Rae, “The
Risk of Obedience: A Consideration of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,” International Journal of Systematic
Theology 1, no. 3 (1999), 308, 319.
149 “Is the Concept,” 145.
150 “Fear and Trembling’s Unorthodox Ideal,” 243.
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humility is at the same time the practice of courage.151 It is precisely for this reason that de
silentio remarks concerning the person who is contemplating the task of pursuing faith,
“honest he must be, and he must not speak of this lack of courage as humility, since, on
the contrary, it is pride, whereas the courage of faith is the one and only humble
courage.”152 Humility for Abraham, therefore, means to relinquish his desire for selfdetermination and control over his life and situation and to become entirely vulnerable
before God—something neither the tragic hero nor the knight of infinite resignation is
capable of doing. Furthermore, humility plays out in Abraham’s expectation of and
insistence upon the best. As de silentio describes it, “Faith is convinced that God is
concerned about the smallest things. I am satisfied with a left-handed marriage in this
life; faith is humble enough to insist on the right hand, for I do not deny that this is
humility and will never deny it.”153 Interestingly, in settling for something less than the
best, which in de silentio’s case means not making the movement of faith in receiving Isaac
back, de silentio expresses a form of pride that is not that dissimilar from the lowly daylaborer described in The Sickness Unto Death who is unable to accept the gift of marriage
to the Emperor’s daughter because he lacks the “humble courage” (ydmygt Mod) not to be
offended and thereby to believe the invitation.154 In the end, it is precisely because de
silentio lacks the humility of Abraham that he is unable, like Abraham, to live within the
sacred tension.155
On this point, see Greenspan, “Courage,” 91; Carlisle, “Humble Courage: Kierkegaard on
Abraham and Mary.”
152 SKS 4, 164 / FT, 73. Such identification of improper humility with improper pride and proper
humility with proper pride is reflected well in Kierkegaard’s claim from Works of Love that “humility before
God is true pride.” See SKS 9, 269 / WL, 271.
153 SKS 4, 129 / FT, 34. This is specifically a reference to the tradition in marriage when a king or
noble would marry a commoner. In this case, he would offer his left hand, which symbolized that the
commoner would not be able to partake in his inheritance. Thus, a left-handed marriage would be a lesser
type than the right-handed marriage that is practiced between those from the same social class. (I would
like to thank Susanne Rimstad for her help with this point.)
154 See SKS 11, 199 / SUD, 84-5.
155 It is here that we face a potential problem. As Mooney points out, virtue requires an active
striving and commitment, but can we talk about humility (or thankfulness or receptivity) as something we
can pursue? As he notes, “Becoming a self is a task we undertake. Yet the enablement that gets us through
appears finally as a gift, as power bequeathed. Perhaps faith is like the action of keeping still, cousin to a
151
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Finally, Abraham’s character centers on the practice of the two closely related
virtues of love (Kjærlighed) and joy (Glæde).156 With respect to love, de silentio is clear that
Abraham remains thoroughly loving throughout his trial, and in this fashion he loves
both God and Isaac. As he notes in problema II in the context of a passage from the
Gospels in which Jesus remarks, “If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and
mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters—yes, even their own life—such a person
cannot be my disciple,”157
the absolute duty can lead one to do what ethics would forbid, but it can never
lead the knight of faith to stop loving. Abraham demonstrates this. In the
moment he is about to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical [i.e., Sittlichkeit] expression for
what he is doing is: he hates Isaac. But if he actually hates Isaac, he can rest
assured that God does not demand this of him, for Cain and Abraham are not
identical. He must love Isaac with his whole soul. Since God claims Isaac, he
must, if possible, love him even more, and only then can he sacrifice him, for it is
indeed this love for Isaac that makes his act a sacrifice by its paradoxical contrast
to his love for God.158
What we see clearly here is the outplaying of the two great commandments in which one
is called first to love God with all one’s heart, soul, and mind, and then to love one’s
neighbor as oneself.159 As Cross points out, Abraham’s love for God is an absolute love
that cannot be mediated and as such this love is also intimately tied to the virtue of trust
as absolute dependence upon God.160 Far from representing a hatred for Isaac, such love
for God is also to love Isaac properly in the sense that it serves as a reminder that
Abraham as well as Isaac belong wholly to God,161 and in this respect the two forms of

stunned and quiet submission, an alert but yielding immobility” (Knights of Faith and Resignation, 104). I agree
with this claim if we take stillness, submission, and immobility to be the antithesis to the hubristic
movements of going beyond faith, and so long as we understand these notions not as the static stillness of
death, but rather as the vigilant standing characteristic of sacred tension.
156 Some interpreters such as Lee prefer to talk about care rather than love.
157 Luke 14:26 (NIV).
158 SKS 4, 165 / FT, 74.
159 See Matthew 22:36-40; Deuteronomy 6:5; Leviticus 19:18. This account and ordering of love
to God and love to the neighbor is also clearly the framework that Kierkegaard employs in Works of Love.
See, e.g., SKS 9, 27 / WL, 19.
160 “Faith and the Suspension of the Ethical,” 22.
161 Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 80.
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love are intimately connected. As J. Aaron Simmons puts it, “Abraham’s love for God as
his love for Isaac are never isolated from one another. Rather, it is in the tension between
the two claims upon Abraham that constitutes the drama of his responsibility to both.”162
In loving Isaac in this fashion, Abraham is thereby able to experience the profound joy
of faith, in comparison to which all other expressions of joy appear unhappy.163 Abraham
receives Isaac back in joy, but not only this, he lives his entire life in joy as he joyfully
receives all things as a provision from God. Thus, despite the difficulty and the horror of
faith, Abraham nevertheless preserves his joyful disposition. As James Kellenberger
appropriately puts it, “Abraham, even in his trial, even in his anxiety, is joyful!”164 In
another text Kellenberger makes a similar important point:
For Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, it is joy that distinguishes a trusting faith in
God from “infinite resignation”…Infinite resignation is attainable by a great
exertion of will and brings rest but no joy. Faith, on the other hand, is joyful in its
trust in God’s goodness in this life. For Kierkegaard, then, the kind of
relationship to which God calls us, the relationship of faith, is imbued with joy
for this life.165
We may therefore say that de silentio intimates the crucial paradox articulated by the
Apostle Paul: simply stated, “sorrowful, yet always rejoicing.”166 In the end, then, joy as
described here is a virtue that perfectly characterizes one living within the sacred tension.

“What about Isaac?” 336.
SKS 4, 129 / FT, 34.
164 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Faith and Eternal Acceptance (London and New York, NY: Macmillan
and St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 19.
165 Relational Morality (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 132.
166 2 Corinthians 6:10 (NIV).
162
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Two Concluding Questions
To conclude this section, we may address two important questions: why call the
characteristics of Abraham described above virtues, and why identify such characteristics
as distinctively religious?
In response to the first question, we may simply note that insofar as we define
the virtues, following Robert C. Roberts, as, for example, “enduring traits or qualities not
merely of our bodies…but of us as persons,” traits that make up “a determinate way of
being human,” or “dispositions to passive or quasi-passive episodic states of the subject
such as emotions, perceptions, and thoughts,”167 we may say that Abraham is certainly
practicing virtues in his lived existential stance. Courage, trust, humility, joy, and love are
not simply fleeting emotions or experiences that Abraham sporadically undergoes.
Rather, they are deeply embedded and enduring dispositional characteristics that
Abraham perpetually fosters and reinforces through concrete practice and that he
continuously reaffirms throughout his life from the point of leaving Ur through his trial
on Mount Moriah. It is precisely the incorporation of such characteristics into his
existence that allows Abraham to continue in his task in obeying God’s command
without wavering and with bold confidence (Frimodighed), and it is precisely the holism in
this account which allows him to flourish as a knight of faith.
In response to the second question, it is crucially important to note that the
virtues Abraham practices are not based on any notion of self-realization or selfactualization as is the case with classical virtue theory. Such an account of virtue ethics
articulated, for example, by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, is precisely what de silentio

“The Virtue of Hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourse,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary:
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2003), 187. See
also Anthony Rudd, “Kierkegaard on Patience and the Temporality of the Self: The Virtue of a Being in
Time,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 3 (2008), 493.
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suggests in Fear and Trembling is a futile discipline so long as it ignores sin.168 In this
respect, Bruce Kirmmse is entirely correct to point to the conflict between Kierkegaard
and the classical virtue account,169 just as scholars such as Mark Tietjen and Roberts are
correct to point out that when virtue is recast in terms of the recognition of sin as well as
in the grammar of faith, it is entirely possible to retain the broad conceptual schema of
the virtues in approaching Kierkegaard.170 Tietjen’s definition of the virtues as “qualities to
be achieved by works that we must strive to do in response to God’s grace, with the help of God’s
grace,”171 is thus entirely applicable to the case of Abraham as described in Fear and
Trembling. Such recognition of the direct link back to God of Abraham’s virtues of
courage, trust, humility, love, and joy entail that these virtues are thoroughly religious in
nature, which means that it is only possible to practice them for one living within the
sacred tension. As such they provide a perfect window into the concrete content of this
lived existential stance as it plays out in the life of Abraham and thereby they prove
crucial for an account of Christian existence.

2.5 - Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have made the argument that the notion of paradox in Fear and
Trembling is that which underlies Abraham’s existential stance as one who lives within the
sacred tension. Furthermore, I have argued that Abraham therefore serves as something
of an exemplar for Christian existence, especially with respect to his character and to the
specific virtues he practices. Of course, this view alone does not provide a complete
SKS 4, 188 / FT, 98. Cf. SKS 4, 326-8 / CA, 19-20; SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 82.
“Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on
Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open
Court, 2001), 191-210.
170 Robert C. Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of ‘Virtue Ethics’,” in
Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed. Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal (Bloomington and Indianapolis,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 151; Mark A. Tietjen, Kierkegaard’s Practice of Edification: Indirect
Communication, the Virtues, and Christianity, Dissertation (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2006), 26-7.
171 Kierkegaard’s Practice of Edification, 26-7.
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picture of Christian existence, and for this reason it will be important to look to other
expressions of paradox in the following chapters.
As a final word, I find it fitting to return to the very first words of de silentio’s text,
the title “Fear and Trembling.” As I argued in Chapter 1, perhaps the most paradigmatic
expression of sacred tension is that which emerges in relation to the paradoxical dialectic
of grace and works and that which plays out in the response to the divine call to live in
such a way that one continuously affirms both realities. In the title we see the very same
dynamic implied in its allusion to the Apostle Paul’s epistle to the Philippians. As Paul
writes in Philippians 2:12-13, “continue to work out your salvation with fear and
trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good
purpose.”172 With Paul’s words here we have the two notions of works and grace fully
present: on the one hand, it is the believer who is to work, and, on the other hand, it is
God who is working. When approaching Fear and Trembling it is therefore imperative to
keep this passage in focus in order to avoid the mistake of claiming either that the text is
only about the anxiety and horror of Abraham’s deed,173 or that the text is only about the
grace of God.174 Insofar as de silentio follows Paul’s lead, he undoubtedly intends for his
book to be read as dealing with both realities: Abraham, as an exemplar for Christian
existence within the sacred tension works out his faith in responding to the command of
God, but at the same time he is also fully receptive to the grace of God that is necessary
for him to continue in working out his faith within the sacred tension. In the end, then,
by offering de silentio’s text to his Christendom contemporaries under the title Fear and

NIV.
See, e.g., Daniel M. Johnson, “Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard’s Supposed Irrationalism: A
Reading of Fear and Trembling,” in Kierkegaard Yearbook Studies 2011, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl
Verstrynge (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 70.
174 With respect to the former, see e.g., Johnson, “Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Kierkegaard’s
Supposed Irrationalism,” 70. With respect to the latter, see e.g., Green, “Enough is Enough!” 200-1 and
Green, “Deciphering,” 272. In contrast to these views, Carlisle has the right idea: “Paul’s message
combines a call to responsibility with a denial of human self-sufficiency: the spiritual life is ‘enabled’ by
God’s work, but each member of the community is urged to ‘live your life in the manner worthy of the
gospel of Christ,’ to ‘stand firm in the Lord’…” See Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 3.
172
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Trembling, Kierkegaard’s hope is that the example set by Abraham, the example of
walking the tension-filled path of works and grace on which one refuses to rest in any
human foundation, but rather perpetually resigns and perpetually receives, will inspire
these contemporaries to follow suit and to enter, by means of paradox, into the
existential stance of sacred tension.
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CHAPTER 3
PARADOX AND THE SELF:
ON SELFHOOD, DESPAIR/SIN, AND CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis.1
[P]aradox, faith, and dogma—these three constituents have an agreement
and an alliance that are the surest solidarity and bulwark against all
pagan wisdom.2
In the life of the spirit there is no standing still [Stilstand] (really no state
[Tilstand], either; everything is actuation)…3

In this chapter I take up the second of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, the expression associated with the nature of the self and the task
of selfhood as presented in the pseudonymous work The Sickness unto Death. Furthermore,
I narrow in on the concrete implications this expression of paradox carries for Christian
existence. Regarding the overall argument of the dissertation, The Sickness unto Death is
significant not only because it offers a robustly Christian perspective on the notion of
paradox, but also because it is here that we find perhaps the most developed
anthropology underlying Christian existence in Kierkegaard’s writings. As such, a careful
and thorough consideration of the text can prove quite promising.
My argument can be summarized as follows. Anti-Climacus employs the notion
of paradox in its dialectical and etymological forms in order to provide an account of
what it means to become a self that is both properly related to itself and properly related
to God.4 Moreover, in contrast to the loss of tension associated with despair and sin, this
SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13.
SKS 11, 209 / SUD, 96-7.
3 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 94.
4 Although Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death is not as explicit about the role played by
human others in his account of faith, and although many of his comments concerning such others are
negative in nature (see, e.g., some of the remarks he makes about “the crowd” (Mængden): SKS 11, 149 /
SUD, 33-4; SKS 11, 229-34 / SUD, 117-23), we should nevertheless note that proper relation to oneself
and to God also includes proper relation to others. This is implied in Anti-Climacus’ discussion of the
dialectic of recognition (see SKS 11, 193-4 / SUD, 79-80; Jon Stewart, “Kierkegaard’s Phenomenology of
1
2
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account functions as an expression of sacred tension that can be described in a concrete
fashion in terms of the virtues of dedicated patience and humble courage. With this
reading of The Sickness unto Death in which we focus on the relationship between paradox
and the self, we are therefore afforded another perspective on Christian existence that
Kierkegaard employs as part of his ethico-religious challenge to his Christendom culture.
In order to develop this argument, I proceed in six sections. In Section 3.1, I begin with
several preliminary remarks on The Sickness unto Death. For Section 3.2, I outline the
various ways in which paradox is manifested within the text in both its dialectical and
etymological forms. In Section 3.3, I discuss despair and sin as negative responses to
paradox, which I associate with loss of tension. For Section 3.4, I describe the positive
response to paradox that I identify as the sacred tension of faith. In Section 3.5, I focus on
the self within such tension and two central virtues of this self, namely dedicated patience
and humble courage. In Section 3.6, I conclude with a few brief remarks.

3.1 - Preliminary Remarks on The Sickness unto Death
In broad terms, The Sickness unto Death is an investigation into the nature of the
self and the various ways in which the self falls short of full selfhood. From the
introduction it becomes clear that the focus of the book is not physical sickness, but
rather the sickness of spirit that the Christian understands to be “the most appalling

Despair in The Sickness Unto Death,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and
Herman Deuser (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 131-2; Arne Grøn, “The Dialectic
of Recognition in Works of Love, in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1998, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and
Herman Deuser together with Jon Stewart and Christian Tolstrup (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de
Gruyter, 1998), 147-8). In this respect, I suggest that Anti-Climacus’ account is entirely consistent with the
social view Kierkegaard develops earlier in Works of Love. Several scholars have made a similar argument
concerning the social implications of Anti-Climacus’ account. See, e.g., Sharon Krishek, “The Moral
Implications of Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Despair,” Religious Studies 52, no. 1 (2016), 25-43; Gregory R.
Beabout and Brad Frazier, “A Challenge to the ‘Solitary Self’ Interpretation of Kierkegaard,” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 17, no. 1 (2000), 82-5; Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet: Kierkegaard (Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1997), 348-51; C. Stephen Evans, “Who is the Other in Sickness Unto Death? God and Human
Relations in the Constitution of the Self,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn
and Herman Deuser (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 1-15.
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danger.”5 Much as a doctor would diagnose an ill patient, the work unfolds in an
algebraic fashion as it walks through various spiritual diagnoses, covering along the way
themes such as despair, sin, and faith. Although the latter of these is afforded little explicit
attention, it is still crucial to the argument of the book. As Anti-Climacus writes, faith is
that by which he steers throughout the entire work “as by a trustworthy navigation
guide” (det sikkre Sømærke).6 Moreover, Anti-Climacus serves as a kind of superlative
Christian who is deeply concerned with faith.7 It is for this reason, among others, that
Kierkegaard sees Anti-Climacus’ text as “extremely valuable.”8
With respect to the structure of the book, Anti-Climacus divides his argument
into two parts entitled “The Sickness unto Death is Despair” and “Despair is Sin.” At
first glance, these parts seem quite different in that the former appears to deal with the
phenomenon of despair and the latter with the dogmatic issue of sin. Although it is
correct to note that the two parts have distinct emphases, it is important not thereby to
draw too sharp of a distinction between them. As Anti-Climacus remarks on the final
page, the specific contrast sin/faith is what “has been advanced throughout this entire
book,”9 which means that although sin does not come into focus until Part Two, it is
nevertheless implied in the notion of despair. In this respect, we have good reason to see
the two parts of The Sickness unto Death not as atomistic investigations, but rather as two
faces of the same coin.10 In Arne Grøn’s assessment, this line of argument ought to help

SKS 11, 125 / SUD, 9.
SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 82.
7 SKS 22, 130, NB11:209 / JP 6, 6433. Even though Kierkegaard decides not to release The
Sickness unto Death under his own name due to the radically high nature of its content and what he sees as
his inability to live up to it, he still attaches his name as editor in order to signal that he endorses AntiClimacus’ view. See SKS 22, 151, NB12:9 / JP 6, 6446.
8 SKS 21, 293-4, NB10:69 / JP 6, 6361.
9 SKS 11, 242 / SUD, 131.
10 On this point, see, e.g., Louis Mackey, “Deconstructing the Self: Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto
Death,” Anglican Theological Review 71, no. 2 (1989), 159-60; Gregory R. Beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses:
Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1996), 81; Arne Grøn, “The
Relation Between Part One and Part Two of The Sickness Unto Death,” trans. Noel S. Adams, in Kierkegaard
Studies Yearbook 1997, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Herman Deuser (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter
de Gruyter, 1997), 37, 44, 45; Kristen K. Deede, “The Infinite Qualitative Difference: Sin, the Self, and
5
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us to avoid focusing on one part to the exclusion of the other as well as to see that the
first part is revealing not only for anthropology, but also for theology.11 I agree with
Grøn on this latter point, and I would like to suggest that the converse is also true,
namely that the second part of The Sickness unto Death can be revealing not only for
theology, but also for anthropology.
The Sickness unto Death has a definite polemical edge to it, and Anti-Climacus is
explicit that the target of his attack is Christendom in both its civic and speculative
forms.12 For example, with respect to the former Anti-Climacus offers the following
biting description of the common Danish citizen in Christendom: “In Christendom he is
also a Christian, he goes to church every Sunday, listens to and understands the pastor,
indeed, they have a mutual understanding; he dies, the pastor ushers him into eternity for
ten rix-dollars—but a self he was not, and a self he did not become.”13 With respect to the latter,
Anti-Climacus argues that speculation with its hubristic pursuit of knowledge stands in
the way of the pursuit of authentic Christianity. It is with this in mind he remarks,
I consider it an outright ethical task, perhaps requiring not a little self-denial in
these very speculative times, when all “the others” are busy comprehending, to
admit that one is neither able nor obliged to comprehend [Christianity].
Precisely this is no doubt what our age, what Christendom needs: a little Socratic
ignorance with respect to Christianity…14
Anti-Climacus here clearly has the Hegelian system as his target and particularly the
manner by which it threatens to do away with the radical call to the individual to stand as

Revelation in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53, no. 1
(2003), 37.
11 Grøn, “The Relation,” 40.
12 See, e.g., SKS 11, 214 / SUD, 102.
13 SKS 11, 168 / SUD, 52 (the italicized emphasis is my own). One of the central problems AntiClimacus addresses in this critique is that in Christendom people cease striving to become single
individuals before God, but rather they settle merely with living as one among the crowd. See, e.g., SKS 11,
229 / SUD, 118; SKS 11, 231-3 / SUD, 120-2.
14 SKS 11, 211 / SUD, 99.
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a self before God in passionate pursuit of faith.15 Ultimately, then, Anti-Climacus’
criticisms of both expressions of Christendom revolve around the same central issue,
namely that Christendom hinders people from becoming full selves, which is to say that
it is complicit in leading people into despair and sin.
In response to the problem of Christendom, Anti-Climacus not only offers a
diagnosis of the sickness unto death, but in doing so he also sketches out a constructive
view of the self. For Anti-Climacus, all human beings possess “primitivity” (Primitivitet) in
the sense that each one is created to become a self that embraces his or her “name
divinely understood.”16 As he remarks, “Despairing narrowness is to lack primitivity or to
have robbed oneself of one’s primitivity, to have emasculated oneself in a spiritual sense.
Every human being is primitively intended to be a self, destined to be himself…”17 The
constructive task of drawing out this positive aspect of the human being is implied in the
subtitle of the text, A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening.
Awakening has to do with becoming aware of one’s existential situation, and upbuilding
has to do with overcoming the sickness unto death towards spiritual vitality. Thus, we
may say that Anti-Climacus offers the reader “theory for the sake of therapy” by which
he elucidates the phenomena of despair and sin for the purpose of edification.18 In
support of his critical and constructive aims, Anti-Climacus affords the notion of
paradox a significant role. To this notion we may now direct our attention.

15 SKS 11, 158-9 / SUD, 43-4; SKS 11, 231 / SUD, 120. On this point, see Merold Westphal,
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 237fn9; Deede, “The Infinite Qualitative
Difference,” 27.
16 SKS 11, 149 / SUD, 33-4.
17 SKS 11, 149 / SUD, 33.
18 Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard’s Psychology and Unconscious Despair,” in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1987), 40.
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3.2 - Paradox and the Self in The Sickness unto Death
Although the term paradox in its various forms occurs relatively few times in The
Sickness unto Death compared to some of Kierkegaard’s others works,19 paradox
nevertheless still has a crucial function in the text, particularly with regards to AntiClimacus’ account of the self. My claim in this section is that the occurrences of the
concept in Part One, which fall under the notions of relation and synthesis in Anti-Climacus’
development of his anthropology, represent an expression of the dialectical form of
paradox, and that the significant occurrences of the term in Part Two, which are closely
linked to the self as before God, represent expressions of the etymological form.20

The Self as Self-Relating Relation: The Dialectical Form of Paradox
To begin, we may narrow in on the account of the self presented in Part One. In
the first lines of the first section, Anti-Climacus leads off with a general description of
the structure of the self that serves as the foundation for the discussion of despair and
sin in the remainder of the book.21 He writes,
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self?
The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to
itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself
to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the
temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. A
synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still
The word occurs 17 times in The Sickness unto Death. There are two occurrences of et Paradox in
Part One. Part Two contains fifteen occurrences of the term (et Paradox: 1 time; paradox: 1 time; Paradoxet: 8
times; Paradoxerne: 2 times; det Paradoxe: 3 times). In contrast, for example, the term occurs 308 times in
Postscript, 103 times in Fragments, and 84 times in Fear and Trembling. See Leroy Seat, The Meaning of
“Paradox”: A Study of the Use of the Word “Paradox” in Contemporary Theological and Philosophical Writings with
Special Reference to Søren Kierkegaard, Dissertation (Louisville, KY: The Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 1967), 89.
20 It is important to point out here that the etymological and dialectical aspects of paradox as they
occur in The Sickness unto Death are fundamentally intertwined and even inseparable. As such, we should be
careful in our analysis not to overemphasize their distinction. At the same time, however, it proves to be a
helpful heuristic tool for characterizing Anti-Climacus’ account of paradox in this work to take into
account the slightly different nuances with which he is working, not least of all because these nuances carry
slightly different implications for articulating an account of Christian existence.
21 Beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses, 84.
19
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not a self. In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative
unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus
under the qualification of the psychical the relation between the psychical and
the physical is a relation. If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this
relation is the positive third, and this is the self.22
What is immediately striking about this passage is Anti-Climacus’ employment of the
language of “relation” (Forhold) and “synthesis” (Synthese) to describe the human being.
But what does it mean to identify the human being with a relation and a synthesis, or one
could even say a relational synthesis?
With his particular use of the language of relation Anti-Climacus offers a critical
alternative to the reductionist tendency within Western philosophy to identify the human
being and the self with a single higher faculty or some fundamental substance.23 For
Anti-Climacus, the self is essentially a dynamic relationship, which is to say that it is at
the same time both infinite and finite, both eternal and temporal, both freedom and necessity,
both psychical and physical,24 with neither of these dialectical pairs undermining or taking
precedence over the other, but rather standing in a reciprocal relation to one another. As
Westphal writes, “It is not that the self [for Anti-Climacus] is a perishable substance to
which one set of predicates applies and an imperishable substance to which the opposing
predicates apply. The self is a single individual to which both sets of predicates apply,

22 SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13. Kierkegaard earlier presented a similar account of the human being
through the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis. See SKS 4, 388 / CA, 85.
23 Two examples of such reductionism are the views of Plato and Descartes. For Plato, the
human being is essentially identified with the soul, which is itself comprised of one part associated with
reason and another part associated with the desires (see, e.g., Phaedrus 246a-254e.). These parts are in
relation to one another, but for Plato this is fundamentally a hierarchical relation in which the former is
meant to master the latter. For Descartes, the human individual is comprised of two substances, extended
substance (res extensa) and thinking substance (res cogitans), but he argues that the self is essentially identified
with thought and first-person subjectivity, which he expresses in the phrase “cogito ergo sum” (see, e.g.,
Discourse on Method, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), Part Four). In this manner,
Descartes associates the self strictly with the latter of these two substances and thereby goes even further
than Plato in eliminating any identifiable relationship between the two aspects of the human being. In the
end, then, for Plato and Descartes the self ends up being construed in a monolithic manner. With his
opposition to such views, Kierkegaard serves as a predecessor to 20th century critical thinkers such as
Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
24 Concerning the final of these pairs, see also Vigilius Haufniensis’ discussion in SKS 4, 349 /
CA, 43-4.
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however different they may be from one another.”25 We may say that Anti-Climacus’
account is therefore an attempt to articulate and to preserve the multifaceted and
dynamic nature of the self.
In elaborating on this both/and aspect of the self, Anti-Climacus appeals to the
notion of synthesis. Synthesis for him, however, can carry a couple of different
meanings. First, the self as a synthesis means that the dialectical aspects comprising it are
related in such a manner that each is fundamentally required and implied by the other.26 To
make this point more concretely, Anti-Climacus appeals to the analogy of respiration.
Just as breathing depends upon both contrasting movements of inhaling and exhaling
(Ind- og Udaanden), so also does personhood (Personligheden) require that both dialectical
aspects of the self are essentially at play and intertwined.27 This dynamic, then, is what
differentiates a synthesis from a mere combination. Second, Anti-Climacus also employs
the term synthesis to refer to the act of relating the dialectical parts.28 This is precisely
what he means with his claim that the relation of the dialectical pairs alone does not
constitute selfhood,29 but rather that the self emerges only when the relation is related to
itself and is done so in a continuous fashion. Moreover, such an act of synthesis is set
before each and every person as the task of becoming an authentic self. As Robert C.
Roberts nicely puts it, “the self ‘synthesizes’ these elements of itself only if, of its own
will, it orders these elements of itself in an appropriate order, relates them to each other
in a correct relation. In this case, it becomes genuinely a human self, or ‘spirit’.”30 In short,

Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 237.
Heiko Schulz, “To Believe is to Be: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s Phenomenology of (Un)Freedom in The Sickness unto Death,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1996, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and
Herman Deuser (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 166; Hubert L. Dreyfus,
“Kierkegaard on the Self,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington and
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 12.
27 SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 40.
28 Deede, “The Infinite Qualitative Difference,” 30.
29 SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13.
30 Robert C. Roberts, “The Grammar of Sin and the Conceptual Unity of The Sickness unto Death,”
in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1987), 138.
25
26
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then, the synthesis of the self requires at the same time a synthesizing of the self, which
means that selfhood takes form precisely in the dynamic activity of becoming a self.
It is important to point out that Anti-Climacus’ language of both/and synthesis
is not to be equated with Hegelian dialectics or mediation. Hegel, in his attack upon the
classical logic of Aristotle and particularly the laws of non-contradiction and excluded
middle, argues for an account of contradiction that includes movement as unfolding
progress.31 This is his famous theory of thesis-antithesis-synthesis in which one term is
established and then negated by a second, leaving a third positive relation between the
contradictory terms that then becomes a new term to begin the process anew on a higher
level.32 The key difference between this account and that of Anti-Climacus is that
whereas Hegel talks about resolution of contraries, Anti-Climacus focuses on remaining
with the tension of the unresolved contraries. Westphal makes this point well when he
notes, “Anti-Climacus might better have spoken of a dialectical tension than of a
synthesis; for the unity of the elements is paradoxical and unresolved. They do not
dissolve into some third thing that is neither. The model would be more like oil and
water than like the union of hydrogen and oxygen in a molecule of water.”33 In this
respect, any movement in Anti-Climacus’ account of the self is limited to the movement
of interrelation rather than the movement of resolution.
In contrast to mediation, then, what Anti-Climacus offers is an account of the
self as a paradox. More specifically, by paradox here Anti-Climacus intends the dialectical
paradox of reciprocally-related opposites.34 An important point we may emphasize
concerning such a construal of the self is that the self ought not to be viewed in terms of
31 In Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1989), 439,
Hegel writes, “Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality.” Quoted in Jon Stewart,
“Introduction,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, ed. Jon Stewart
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 14.
32 Stewart, “Introduction,” 14.
33 Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 237.
34 On this point see Timothy Tian-min Lin, Paradox in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, Dissertation
(Boston, MA: Boston University, 1969), 144, 148.
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a static substance, and neither should it be understood merely as the inert “negative
unity” of contraries.35 Rather, it is more appropriate to understand the self as an active
movement in the perpetual process of becoming.36 As M. Jamie Ferreira puts it,
“Although it achieves a ‘unity,’ the synthesis at issue is not a static resolution of thesis
and antithesis; it is not a resolving of tension between ‘constituents’ or ‘factors’ of the
self…This synthesis is a paradoxical situation…”37 As we will see below, this point
concerning the dynamic nature of the paradoxical self proves crucial for articulating the
significance of paradox for sacred tension and Christian existence.

The Self as Before God: The Etymological Form of Paradox
The majority of the uses of the term paradox in The Sickness unto Death occur in
Part Two, and particularly within the first section entitled “Despair Is Sin.”38 Paradox
functions here primarily to articulate the limitations of human understanding and ability
as well as to challenge human hubris by emphasizing the radical difference between God
and human beings.39 For example, in a discussion on the nature of sin as a position, AntiClimacus writes, “paradox, faith, and dogma—these three constituents have an
agreement and an alliance that are the surest solidarity and bulwark against all pagan
wisdom.”40 It is precisely because paradox here serves as a limitation that Anti-Climacus
makes an essential connection between paradox and offense, the latter of which he

SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13.
See, e.g., SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30: “every moment that a self exists, it is in a process of
becoming…”
37 M. Jamie Ferreira, “Imagination and the Despair of Sin,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997,
ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Herman Deuser (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 18.
38 Anti-Climacus employs the term twice in Part One, but in a rather idiosyncratic fashion that
does not relate to the dialectical or etymological forms. See SKS 11, 138 / SUD, 22.
39 On this point, see Seat, The Meaning of “Paradox,” 229-30.
40 SKS 11, 209 / SUD, 96-7. See also SKS 11, 218 / SUD, 106.
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describes as “Christianity’s weapon against all speculation.”41 But how, more specifically,
are we to characterize this etymological form of paradox?
To begin, we may return to the issue of selfhood. Just as with the dialectical
form, Anti-Climacus draws an important connection between the self and the
etymological form of paradox. In this case, though, paradox is specifically linked to the
self as it stands before God. As we have already shown, for Anti-Climacus the self is not
simply the relation of opposing dialectical elements. Neither, however, is it merely the
self-relating of this relation. Rather, included in the definition of the self from Part One is
also a third relation, namely the relation of the entire relation to what Anti-Climacus
identifies as “another” (et Andet):
Such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established
itself or have been established by another. If the relation that relates itself to
itself has been established by another, then the relation is indeed the third, but
this relation, the third, is yet again a relation and relates itself to that which
established the entire relation. The human self is such a derived, established
relation, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates
itself to another…to that which has established the entire relation.42
In this respect, becoming a self cannot be done in a strictly self-referential manner, but
rather it plays out in relation to God who transcends the self-relating relation.43 In the
end, then, what we have is an account of the self as a relation that relates itself to itself by

SKS 11, 196-7 / SUD, 83.
SKS 11, 129 / SUD, 13-14.
43
Because this discussion of “another” occurs in Part One where theological language is not yet in
full force, one could be tempted to think that “another” need not refer to God. There exists, however,
significant textual evidence against this view. For example, reading God as the other is implied in AntiClimacus’ various claims he makes along the lines that the task of becoming a self “can be done only
through the relationship to God” (SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30. See also SKS 11, 143 / SUD, 27; SKS 11, 151 /
SUD, 35; SKS 11, 155-6 / SUD, 40; SKS 11, 161 / SUD, 46. On this point see Westphal, “Kierkegaard’s
Psychology,” 46; Schulz, “To Believe is to Be,” 167; Christian Hjortkjær and Søren Willert, “The Self as a
Center of Ethical Gravity: A Constructive Dialogue Between Søren Kierkegaard and George Herbert
Mead,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2013, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and
New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 462). In a similar vein, reading “another” as God is supported
by the definition of faith as the self relating to itself and willing to be itself by grounding itself in the power
that established the entire relation (SKS 11, 242 / SUD, 131. Compare this to Pap. VIII 2 B 170 and Pap. VIII 2
B 168). For Anti-Climacus, it is God alone who possesses such a power, and particularly the power to
create selves that are of infinite nature. On this point, see Westphal, “Kierkegaard’s Psychology,” 60.
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relating to God as the other who grounds the entire relationship. In short, this is what it
means for the self to exist as itself before God.
It is here where the self stands in relation to God that we begin to see the crucial
role played by paradox in its etymological form. Any relationship between the self and
God, but especially such an intimate one implied by the phrase before God, runs the risk of
a pantheistic abolishment of the delineation between God and human beings. Although
such a risk is in some sense implied by the incarnational movement of the divine into
communion with humanity,44 for Anti-Climacus its central underlying reason is
humanity’s problematic attempt within Christendom to encroach upon divinity, “first in
a highbrow way through speculation, then in a lowbrow way in the highways and
byways.”45 Christianity, however, is “safeguarded [betrygget] by the paradox”46 from such
hubris:
Christianity teaches that everything essentially Christian depends solely upon
faith; therefore it wants to be precisely a Socratic, God-fearing ignorance, which
by means of ignorance guards faith against speculation, keeping watch so that
the gulf of qualitative difference between God and man may be maintained as it
is in the paradox and faith, so that God and man do not, even more dreadfully
than ever in paganism, do not merge in some way, philosophice, poetice, etc. into
one—in the system.47
By means of paradox Christianity thus protects itself against “the most dreadful of all
blasphemies”48 that is the abolishment of the divine-human distinction.
In carrying out the task of articulating proper human limitation, Anti-Climacus
appeals to what he identifies as the paradoxes of sin and atonement. Regarding the
former, he argues that sin is a paradox in that it operates as a position rooted in the

44 SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117: “No teaching on earth has ever really brought God and man so close
together as Christianity…”
45 SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117.
46 SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117.
47 SKS 11, 211 / SUD, 99.
48 SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117.
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human being that must be revealed by God and that thereby cannot be grasped by the
understanding. As he puts it, “I steadfastly hold to the Christian teaching that sin is a
position—yet not as if it could be comprehended, but as a paradox that must be
believed.”49 Given the paradoxical nature of sin, Anti-Climacus points out how the
Atonement with its incomprehensible complete forgiveness of sin is paradoxical in a
similar fashion:
[T]he paradox is the implicit consequence of the doctrine of the Atonement.
First of all, Christianity proceeds to establish sin so firmly as a position that the
human understanding can never comprehend it; and then it is this same
Christian teaching that again undertakes to eliminate this position in such a way
that the human understanding can never comprehend it.50
Whereas speculation ultimately tries to temper this view of sin and atonement, and in so
doing it attempts to do away with paradox, Christianity is “as paradoxical on this point as
possible” in that it emphasizes both to the most radical extent.51
To summarize, paradox serves to emphasize the divine-human distinction and
to limit the self by making it clear that the human being can neither understand nor
overcome sin and that she must thereby rely upon divine aid and redemption. As such,
paradox in its etymological form is directly tied to what it means to become a self before
God. It is precisely in this sense that Anti-Climacus writes, “the crucial Christian
qualification: before God…in turn has Christianity’s crucial criterion: the absurd, the
paradox, the possibility of offense.”52

SKS 11, 210 / SUD, 98. See also SKS 11, 218 / SUD, 106: “(this must be believed, since it is
indeed the paradox that no man can comprehend) sin is a position…”
50 SKS 11, 212 / SUD, 100.
51 SKS 11, 212 / SUD, 100.
52 SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 83.
49

109
3.3 - Responding to Paradox: Despair, Sin, and the Loss of Tension
Having outlined the notion of paradox, we may now shift our attention to the
despair and sin comprising the “miserable condition” that is the sickness unto death.53 In
this section I argue that despair and sin represent negative responses to paradox that
involve the loss of tension. This argument proves particularly important for the next
section where I trace out sacred tension in large part by contrasting it with despair and
sin. To begin, a couple of preliminary remarks are in order.
First, what is the relationship between despair and sin? On the one hand, AntiClimacus is careful to highlight their differences: despair is employed in Part One to
describe the sickness unto death considered as a human phenomenon, and sin is
employed in Part Two as the description of the sickness unto death that makes recourse
to dogmatic categories.54 One could thus describe despair as a philosophical or
phenomenological notion and sin as a theological one.55 In one sense, the point of
making this distinction for Anti-Climacus reflects Kierkegaard’s larger pedagogical and
Socratic task: in engaging his readers it would be less effective in encouraging proper
subjectivity regarding dogmatic categories for Anti-Climacus to jump immediate into a
discussion of sin without first dwelling on the phenomenon of despair as a universal
human experience to which the reader can immediately relate from the place in which
she finds herself.56 In another sense, Anti-Climacus also makes the distinction in order to
lay emphasis on the point that sin as a theological notion is directly connected to one’s
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SKS 11, 124 / SUD, 8.
See, e.g., SKS 11, 191 / SUD, 77; SKS 11, 193 / SUD, 79; SKS 11, 195 / SUD, 81; SKS 11, 208

/ SUD, 96.
55 See, e.g., James L. Marsh, “Kierkegaard’s Double Dialectic of Despair and Sin,” in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1987), 67.
56 This is another expression of Kierkegaard’s fundamental principle of communication that if
one is to succeed in leading a person to a specific place, one must meet him where he is and begin there.
See SKS 16, 27-9 / PV, 45-7; Matthew T. Nowachek, “Kierkegaard as Pedagogue: Some Insights for
Teaching Introductory Philosophy Courses,” Teaching Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2014), 346-8.
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consciousness of existing “before God.”57 On the other hand, Anti-Climacus is also clear
that despair and sin are inseparable. The purpose of Part Two, “Despair is Sin,” is to make
precisely this point.58 We may thus say that although sin is described as despair paired
with a conception of God, despair ought still to be considered sin.59 This is an important
point to carry with us in the analysis that follows not only because it reminds us of the
congruity between Anti-Climacus’ language of despair and his language of sin, but also in
that it serves as an important corrective to certain philosophically-oriented readings of
The Sickness unto Death that would focus largely or exclusively on the first part of the text
and the notion of despair to the exclusion of the rest.
Second, in that Anti-Climacus characterizes the self as a relation (Forhold), he
describes despair and sin in terms of misrelation (Misforhold). Thus, regarding the selfrelating relation, despair is the failure to relate the aspects of the self as initially and
properly established by God.60 In addition, despair and sin are the failure to relate
properly to God—what Kierkegaard identifies in his papers as the fundamental
misrelation.61 Of these two broad forms of misrelation Anti-Climacus articulates several
variations. We may briefly outline a few as preparation for our discussion of the loss of
tension.

Despair Defined with Regards to the Self as a Synthesis
With respect to the self as a synthesis, Anti-Climacus describes two possible
forms of despair. The first is despair defined by finitude/infinitude. Proper selfhood is a

SKS 11, 191 / SUD, 77.
See Beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses, 81, 111-14.
59 See, e.g., Anti-Climacus’ discussion of the pagan who lacks a conception of God, but who
nevertheless is still “immersed in sin.” SKS 11, 194 / SUD, 81. This coheres well with Anti-Climacus’
claims that despair is universal (SKS 11, 138-44 / SUD, 22-8) and that every person is a sinner (SKS 11, 233
/ SUD, 121).
60 SKS 11, 132 / SUD, 16.
61 Pap. VIII 2 B 168. Quoted in JP 1, 749.
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process of “becom[ing] concrete” (at vorde concret) and to become concrete is neither to
become finite nor infinite, but rather to exist as a synthesis of these two aspects.62 One
expression of the despair of infinitude/finitude, then, is the self’s attempt to become
infinite and thereby to lack finitude. Such a person in despair soars off into limitless
fantasy, speculation, and abstraction where she increasingly loses touch with her facticity.
This despair coincides with the speculative strain of Christendom where the speculative
thinker becomes so captivated with the abstract system that she fails to recognize her
finite nature as an existing being. The converse expression of despair is that in which the
self lacks infinitude. Anti-Climacus describes this as an artificial “limiting” (Bornerethed,
Begrændsethed)63 where the self reduces itself to its facticity. Moreover, he associates it with
the civic expression of Christendom in which the individual “does not dare to believe in
himself, finds it too hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to be like the others,
to become a copy, a number, a mass man.”64 Whether one slides into infinitude or
finitude, the result is the same: the failure to become oneself.
The second form is despair defined by possibility/necessity, and, as with the
previous form, such despair emerges from an emphasis on one of the dialectical aspects
to the detriment of the other. On the one hand, the despair of possibility is to lack
necessity as an important limiting condition for the self. As Anti-Climacus remarks,
“possibility seems greater and greater to the self; more and more becomes possible
because nothing becomes actual…but this is exactly the point at which the abyss
[Afgrunden] swallows up the self.”65 The problem here is precisely the inability of the
individual to submit to necessity and to the limitations that are fundamental to the self.
In Anti-Climacus’ terms, “Instead of taking the possibility back into necessity, he chases

SKS 11, 146 / SUD, 30.
SKS 11, 149 / SUD, 33. This artificial “limitation” (Begrændsethed) stands in contrast to the
“boundary” (Grændse) established by the paradox. See, e.g., SKS 4, 249 / PF, 44.
64 SKS 11, 149 / SUD, 33-4.
65 SKS 11, 151 / SUD, 36.
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after possibility—and at last cannot find his way back to himself.”66 On the other hand,
the despair of necessity is to lack possibility, and particularly to lose sight of the truth that
for God all things are possible. Just as oxygen allows one to breathe, possibility is what
revives the individual when he suffers under the weight of fatalism. As Anti-Climacus
puts it, the imagination of possibility “teach[es] him to hope and to fear—or to fear and
to hope—by rendering possible that which surpasses the quantum satis [sufficient
standard] of any experience.”67 Thus, if either possibility or necessity becomes lacking,
the self slides into despair.
From this description, we now see how such despair relates to paradox. The self
as a paradoxical synthesizing synthesis not only makes despair possible by nature of its
constitution in the sense that this paradoxical dynamic provides the structure from which
the individual can freely depart and thereby fall into despair, but paradox as an account
of the dialectically opposed elements of the self provides one of the main reference
points Anti-Climacus relies upon in order to identify what constitutes despair and how
such despair is to be characterized. In short, then, paradox in its dialectical form as a
description of the self serves as the ontological and epistemological basis for being able
to suffer despair and to recognize it, but also eventually to overcome it.

Despair Defined by Consciousness
Anti-Climacus’ second broad category of despair turns on the idea that despair
comes in gradations tied to consciousness such that greater consciousness entails greater
despair. Despair therefore ranges from the state of being unaware of one’s despair to the
full-fledged conscious despair of Satan.68 With respect to the lowest level, namely the
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despair that is ignorant of being despair, Anti-Climacus notes that such spiritlessness
hardly qualifies as despair in that the individual lacks selfhood and the God relation;
nevertheless, it is precisely such ignorance that is the despair.69
Conscious despair comes in two forms, namely despair of weakness and despair
of defiance.70 Regarding the former, Anti-Climacus notes that this despair can be despair
over something earthly in that the individual feels he has been deprived of something
required to become the self he wanted to be, or, it can be despair over oneself in that rather
than embracing his weakness and thereby beginning down the path of recovery, the
individual instead sinks down into his own despairing self. Simply put, then,
characteristic of the despair of weakness is that the individual does not will to be the self
that he is in his facticity. With respect to despair of defiance, the individual despairs not
over the self that he is unable to be, but rather he despairs in willing to be a self he is not.
As Anti-Climacus puts it, such despair is “the despairing misuse of the eternal within the
self to will in despair to be oneself.”71 Characteristic of the despair of defiance is the
desire for mastery: “the self in despair wants to be master of itself or to create itself, to
make his self into the self he wants to be, to determine what he will have or not have in
his concrete self [concrete Selv].”72 Put another way, the self in defiance desires to usurp the
place of God and thereby to become itself a god who is “in the beginning” (i

SKS 11, 161 / SUD, 46. This is the existence of the pagan who, regardless of the greatness of
his achievements or his virtuousness, remains unaware of being a self before God and for this reason lives
in despair.
70 As Anti-Climacus notes, this is a relative distinction in the sense that “No despair is entirely
free of defiance…On the other hand, even despair’s most extreme defiance is never really free of some
weakness.” See SKS 11, 164 / SUD, 49.
71 SKS 11, 181 / SUD, 67.
72 SKS 11, 182 / SUD, 68. See also SKS 11, 183 / SUD, 69. Anti-Climacus describes the task “to
become concrete” (at vorde concret) as a task that can only be done through a relationship with God. See SKS
11, 146 / SUD, 30.
69
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Begyndelsen).73 Such an attempt at self-divination is the self’s greatest torment, but also its
pleasure and delight.
The shift from weakness to defiance entails an increase in the intensity of
despair leading to its most extreme form, what Anti-Climacus identifies as the demonic
inwardness of “inclosing reserve” or “isolation” (Indesluttethed).74 Indesluttethed represents
the defiant state of the self where one separates oneself from both human others and the
divine other, and shuts oneself within oneself and one’s despair with no will to emerge.
For Anti-Climacus, it is “inwardness with a jammed lock” 75 behind which “sits the self,
so to speak, watching itself, preoccupied with or filling up time with not willing to be
itself and yet being self enough to love itself.”76 Moreover, he remarks that Indesluttethed is
“itself something spiritual and is one of the safeguards to ensure having, as it were, an inclosure [Indelukke] behind actuality, a world ex-clusively [udelukkende] for itself, a world
where the self in despair is restlessly [rastløs] and tormentedly engaged in willing to be
itself.”77 Whereas selfhood for Anti-Climacus depends upon the dialectic of recognition
in which one becomes a self in relation to human others and the divine other,78 the
person of Indesluttethed attempts to pulls himself out of such a dialectic in order to make

SKS 11, 182 / SUD, 68. This is an allusion to Genesis 1:1 where God as creator is described as
being “in the beginning” (i.e., I Begyndelsen skabte Gud Himmelen og Jorden) as well as to John 1:1 where Christ
is described as existing “in the beginning” (i.e., I Begyndelsen var Ordet).
74 Indesluttethed is at play in the despair of weakness as the state in which the self is passively
trapped within itself, but its more severe expression emerges in the despair of defiance as the active closing
off of the self. Moreover, it is important here to make a clear distinction between “inclosing reserve”
(Indesluttethed) and “inwardness” (Inderlighed). Whereas the former represents the demonic turn inward that
excludes human others and God, the latter represents a fundamental component of faith as the inward
movement by which one separates oneself from the crowd (Mængden) as the single individual (den Enkelte)
in order to meet human others and God in an authentic and properly subjective fashion. For a good
discussion of inwardness, see e.g., how Johannes Climacus ties it to subjectivity (SKS 7, 173-228 / CUP1,
189-251) and how Vigilius Haufniensis ties it to seriousness/earnestness (SKS 4, 446-53 / CA, 146-54).
This point concerning Indesluttethed and Inderlighed is also nicely represented with respect to language by the
difference between the individual of inclosing reserve who in his inability to speak slides into demonic
muteness (SKS 4, 424-6 / CA, 123-4) and Abraham as the knight of faith who is unable to speak but
remains in a vitalizing stance of receptivity to God (SKS 4, 177-8 / FT, 88).
75 SKS 11, 186 / SUD, 72. See also SKS 6, 177 / SLW, 189.
76 SKS 11, 177 / SUD, 63. Anti-Climacus here discusses Indesluttethed near the end of the section
on the despair of weakness.
77 SKS 11, 186-7 / SUD, 73.
78 SKS 11, 193-4 / SUD, 79-80.
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the futile effort at becoming a self not by being constituted in relation to the other, but
rather strictly in relation to himself and his own self-determined criterion (Maalestok).79
Just as with milder states of defiance, Indesluttethed centers on control, but such control is
hidden away so deeply that the self may appear entirely free, while at the same time
becoming a prisoner to itself.80 Ironically, by masking its defiance as a way of retaining
control, the self ultimately loses control altogether.
Furthermore, Indesluttethed as the will to complete self-determination is at essence
a form of rebellion against God that is an expression of the sin of pride.81 Anti-Climacus
describes such rebellion by employing a writing metaphor:
[I]t is as if an error slipped into an author’s writing and the error became
conscious of itself as an error—perhaps it actually was not a mistake but in a
much higher sense an essential part of the whole production—and now this
error wants to mutiny against the author, out of hatred toward him, forbidding
him to correct it and in maniacal defiance saying to him: No, I refuse to be
erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness that you are a second-rate
author.82
Although Anti-Climacus notes that this form of sinful despair is rare, such rarity does not
detract from its significance. Rather, he treats it as something of a telos that exemplifies
the destructive end towards which all despair ultimately heads if it remains unchecked
and unresolved.
Despair as described here is also closely tied to paradox. As we noted above,
consciousness in despair and sin is directly linked to the increasing consciousness of
oneself as a self that exists before God. Such consciousness, however, is only possible
when the difference between God and humanity has been made manifest. For AntiClimacus this manifestation is precisely the function of paradox in its etymological form.
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In revealing such difference and allowing the individual to become conscious of himself
before God, the paradox opens up the possibility of despair and sin as defiance. This
dynamic is particularly apparent in the sin of the demonic individual of Indesluttethed who
is fully aware of the paradox and what it entails for his status in relation to God, yet who
in offense freely rejects the paradox in an attempt at self-divination. Thus, we may say
that without the etymological paradox there would be no possibility of despair or sin in
terms of defiance against God.

Despair, Sin, and Loss of Tension
Having introduced despair and sin, we may now turn our discussion to the
manner by which these notions represent loss of tension.83 In broad terms, AntiClimacus notes that despair operates as “an impotent self-consuming” (en afmægtig
Selvfortærelse) where the self cannot do what it wants, but rather despairs in “impotence”
(Afmagt).84 In addition, he describes the sinner as enervated (afmattet) like the coiled spring
that has become slackened (Springfjerdern afspænd) and in which there remains “no
momentum, no impetus.”85 Anti-Climacus’ point with these claims is that despair and sin,
despite any appearance to the contrary, are ultimately antithetical to vitality, which is to
say that they constitute a loss of tension. As a more concrete description of this loss of
tension, we may consider two points.
First, Anti-Climacus links the loss of tension associated with despair to
improper forms of tranquility, security, and rest. One way this plays out is through the
spiritless pursuit of such things as trivialities, diversions, and comforts. Spiritlessness of

83 The phrase “loss of tension” is more appropriate to describe the despair of weakness and the
phrase “evasion of tension” to describe the despair of defiance. I nevertheless employ loss of tension here
to encompass both.
84 SKS 11, 134 / SUD, 18. Compare this to SKS 10, 177 / CD, 165; SKS 8, 74 / TA, 77; SKS 8, 77
/ TA, 80; SKS 8, 78 / TA, 81.
85 SKS 11, 219 / SUD, 107.
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this sort is dangerous precisely because it “not only does not cause any inconvenience in
life but makes life cozy and comfortable” and thus is not regarded by most as despair.86
More strikingly, such despairing loss of tension emerges in and is fostered through what
many would identify as the experience of happiness. As Anti-Climacus writes, “happiness
[Lykke] is not a qualification of spirit, and deep, deep within the most secret hiding place
of happiness there dwells also anxiety, which is despair; it very much wishes to be
allowed to remain there, because for despair the most cherished and desirable place to
live is in the heart of happiness. Despite its illusory security and tranquility [sin illusoriske
Tryghed og Ro], all immediacy is anxiety…”87 Such loss of tension is characteristic of civic
Christendom with its comfort and security associated with social recognition where the
despairing person “avoid[s] every gust of unfavorable wind”88 by running to the crowd
and its false sense of safety in numbers. Even the speculative thinkers within
Christendom who put forward the appearance of moving beyond the trivialities of the
commoners also evade tension by fleeing to what they perceive as their secure abstract
philosophical system in which they avoid coming to terms with the concrete tensionfilled existential stance that awaits would each one of them take the risk of becoming a
single individual. Thus, although the person in despair finds some kind of rest in her
trivial comforts, in the security of her social structure, and in her philosophical system,
this rest is an improper sort in that it is improperly grounded. As Anti-Climacus notes,
underlying such rest and its “spiritless sense of security” (den aandløse Tryghed) is not the
proper grounding of the God relationship. Rather, “anxiety lies underneath [i Grunden];
likewise, despair also lies underneath [i Grunden], and when the enchantment of illusion is
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over, when existence begins to totter, then despair, too, immediately appears as that
which lay underneath [i Grunden].”89
Second, Anti-Climacus expresses despairing loss of tension in his description of
sin as a particular kind of “state” (Tilstand). Although faith at times is also characterized
as a state,90 sin as a state differs in that it is essentially tied to immobility: each moment
one remains standing (bliver…staaende)91 in sin one sinks more deeply and becomes
increasingly stuck. As Anti-Climacus puts it, “the abiding and lingering in sin [Tilstanden i
Synden] is the continuance of sin, is the new sin.”92 Moreover, he writes, “the state of sin
is what holds [the sinner] together deep down where he has sunk [hvor han er sunken],
profanely strengthening him with its consistency.”93 Even as it projects the illusion of
defiant strength, Indesluttethed as the greatest form of despair and sin represents the
greatest loss of tension associated with becoming stuck in sin. For Anti-Climacus, the
movement of Indesluttethed is a kind of nihilistic anti-movement in which one is
incessantly dying, but cannot die, or, it is the nothingness of being unable to “reduce
[one]self to nothing.”94 Furthermore, the separation from God associated with the state
of Indesluttethed is the utmost expression of the ossification of the self as it becomes
bound to itself. Early on in his text Anti-Climacus provides something of a description of
how this state of affairs looks, remarking, “if you have lived in despair, then, regardless
of whatever else you won or lost, everything is lost for you, eternity does not
acknowledge you, it never knew you—or still more terrible, it knows you as you are
known and it binds you to yourself [sætter Dig fast ved Dit Selv] in despair.”95 In the state of

SKS 11, 159 / SUD, 44.
See, e.g., SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 14; SKS 11, 164 / SUD, 49; SKS 11, 242 / SUD, 131.
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despair and sin, then, one loses all movement and thereby the sustained tension that is
essential to the life of faith.
Despite the differences between the expressions of loss of tension described
above, the common underlying cause for them is the same, namely a departure from the
paradoxical. This is the case not only for civic Christendom and its rejection of paradox
for finitude and necessity or for speculative Christendom and its rejection of paradox for
infinitude and possibility, but also for the despairing sinner’s rejection of paradox in his
defiant and rebellious stance against God. For Anti-Climacus, however, the despairing
loss of tension is not the sole response one may have to paradox. In the next section we
may therefore articulate another possibility.

3.4 - Responding to Paradox: Living within the Sacred Tension
In contrast to the negative response to paradox of despair and sin along with its
associated loss of tension, Anti-Climacus outlines a positive response that involves the
fostering and preservation of tension. In this section, I focus on Anti-Climacus’
description of faith as tied to paradox and selfhood, and I develop this account in terms
of the framework of sacred tension.

Faith as Grounded Restlessness
In that Anti-Climacus sets up faith as the opposite of sin (and despair),96 a good
place to begin our discussion of sacred tension is with his account of faith. Consider the
following definition: faith is “in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self
rests transparently [grunder Selvet gjennemsigtigt] in the power that established it.”97 This
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translation by the Hongs is rather unfortunate in that it gives the impression that AntiClimacus is here describing faith as a kind of resting, and otherwise careful scholars seem
to have appropriated this misrepresentation into their own expositions.98 Although AntiClimacus in his ruminations on faith does at times appeal to the language of rest,99 his
particular point with this definition is not one of resting, but of grounding.
At first glance, the idea of grounding might seem to imply the exact opposite of
sacred tension as we have been describing it and thereby might seem to call into question
our overall project in this chapter. This would certainly be the case were grounding to be
understood in a foundationalist sense as providing certainty or security that allows one to
come to a rest that is devoid of movement or impetus. Anti-Climacus’ view of
grounding, however, is not of this sort. Rather, Anti-Climacus sets up grounding as the
antithesis to the “groundlessness” (der ingen Grund er)100 of spiritless existence or to
speculative existence that, metaphorically speaking, sews “without fastening the end.”101
He thus employs the concept as a non-foundational basis to counteract the nihilism of
Christendom, which in turn makes possible the proper restlessness and perpetual
movement essential to a living relationship with the living God. Moreover, such
grounding for Anti-Climacus is required if repentance is to arise in the sense that the life
of spirit only breaks through “from the ground upward” (fra Grunden af).102 AntiClimacus’ account is therefore similar to Kierkegaard’s view in Works of Love where love

98 See, e.g., Robert B. Puchniak, “Kierkegaard’s ‘Self’ and Augustinian Influence,” in Kierkegaard
Studies Yearbook 2011, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and New York, NY:
Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 190; Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 251-2; Christopher B. Barnett, “‘Rest’
as Unio Mystica?: Kierkegaard, Augustine, and the Spiritual Life,” Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality
16, no. 1 (2016), 70. In contrast, see the more careful analysis of William C. Davis, “Kierkegaard on the
Transformation of the Individual in Conversion,” Religious Studies 28, no. 2 (1992), 156.
99 See, e.g., SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 14; SKS 11, 219 / SUD, 107.
100 SKS 11, 214 / SUD, 101.
101 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 93. Both of these are expressions of the state of affairs where,
paradoxically, despair and anxiety are present “i Grunden.” SKS 11, 159 / SUD, 44.
102 SKS 11, 174 / SUD, 59.
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as foundational (i Grunden) in no way precludes, but rather enables the active striving of
the faithful individual who practices the works of neighbor love.103
With his account of the restless grounding of faith, Anti-Climacus nevertheless
still allows for a certain kind of rest, security, and tranquility. For example, he notes that
the self is “unable to arrive at or be in equilibrium and rest [Ligevægt og Ro] by itself, but
only, in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the entire
relation.”104 Or later he remarks that although “security and tranquility [Tryghed og
Beroligelse] can signify being in despair,” they can also signify “having conquered despair
and having won peace [Fred].”105 In addition, Anti-Climacus not only describes faith in
terms of “a secure navigation guide” (sikkre Sømærke),106 but he also contrasts it with the
absence of steadfastness in despair by identifying it as the state where the self becomes
“eternally steadfast” (evig fast).107 In interpreting such claims, it is crucially important to
remember that Anti-Climacus always employs notions such as rest in a dialectical
manner, and therefore they cannot be properly understood without recognizing that they
also imply connotations such as restlessness, movement, risk or fear and trembling.
Indeed, as he remarks in a footnote, “In the life of spirit, everything is dialectical.”108 It is
for this reason, for example, that Anti-Climacus can describe faith as the state (Tilstand)
of peace, security, and tranquility where despair is entirely rooted out while noting that in
the life of spirit “there is no standing still [Stilstand] (really no state [Tilstand], either;
everything is actuation)…”109 If one misses this dialectical point, one misses what is
central to Anti-Climacus’ construal of Christianity.

SKS 9, 212-26 / WL, 209-24.
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106 SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 82 (I have modified the translation).
107 SKS 11, 183 / SUD, 69.
108 SKS 11, 228fn / SUD, 116fn.
109 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 94. See also SKS 11, 151 / SUD, 36: “to become oneself is literally a
movement in that place. To become is a movement away from that place, but to become oneself is a
movement in that place.”
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Having clarified what Anti-Climacus means by grounding in his account of faith
as well as the manner by which such grounding is tied to rest and restlessness, we may
dedicate the remainder of this section to a discussion of sacred tension as it is related to
the forms of paradox outlined above.

Sacred Tension and the Dialectical Paradox
In that the loss of tension in despair and sin plays out through the failure or
refusal to hold together the dialectical aspects of the self in a paradoxical relation, sacred
tension is precisely the continuous striving of the self to exist in such a manner that the
paradox of the self is fully embraced. What this means for the individual is that she
places herself into the tense position where she unceasingly fights against the sinful
tendency to slide to one side of the paradoxical dialectic to the detriment of the other110
while struggling to affirm both aspects of the self. In Ferreira’s terms, this is the task of
“maintaining a dynamic tension between opposing elements (each of which is its
opposite) without eliminating, or even unequally weighting one or the other.”111 What we
have here, then, is not the resolution of tension associated with the dialectical
constitution of the self, but rather the fostering and preservation of such tension. Thus,
when Anti-Climacus writes that “the good health of faith…resolves contradictions [løser
Modsigelser],”112 we should therefore not understand him as arguing to do away with
tension, but rather to overcome the “tormenting contradiction” (qvalfulde Modsigelse)
suffered by the despairing individual when she departs from the self’s proper paradoxical
constitution.

Anthony Rudd, “Kierkegaard on Patience and the Temporality of the Self: The Virtue of a
Being in Time,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 3 (2008), 501.
111 Ferreira, “Imagination and the Despair of Sin,” 17.
112 SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 40.
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Described in this manner, living within the sacred tension can be understood as
a distinctively ethical task.113 In short, the ethical demand Anti-Climacus puts forward is
that one become the self that God intends one to be—what Grøn identifies as
“becoming a whole human being ethically understood”114—and that one must meet this
demand with concrete striving.115 As Domingos Sousa succinctly puts it, “For
Kierkegaard the self is not a static entity but a dynamic and unfolding reality, something I
must strive to become. One is not a self but becomes a self as an ethical-religious task to be
actualized.”116 For Anti-Climacus, this task is one that is “prodigious[ly] strenuous” (uhyre
Anstrengelse) in that it is never fully achieved but rather requires continuous effort and
dedication. Westphal correctly highlights this point when he notes,
The task of living the tension of the dialectical simultaneity of dipolar categories
is an extraordinarily demanding and strenuous task. In fact, this way of
describing it is misleading, for this task is difficult in a totally different way from
that of ordinary tasks. Instead of an extraordinarily strenuous task we should
speak of a uniquely strenuous task.117
Living within the sacred tension in The Sickness unto Death, however, cannot be reduced to
strenuous ethical striving. Rather, the relation to God also plays an important role insofar
as the human being alone is unable to become a full self strictly in her own power—a
point implied in Anti-Climacus’ claim that the self in faith must be grounded “in the
power [den Magt] that established it.”118 The etymological paradox associated with the

113 By this, I mean the second ethics that takes into account the concept of sin. See SKS 11, 201-3
/ SUD, 88-90. On this point, see, e.g., Grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet, 278ff.
114 See, e.g., Grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet, 278. See also Lin, Paradox, 147; Peter J. Mehl,
“Despair’s Demand: An Appraisal of Kierkegaard’s Argument for God,” Philosophy of Religion 32, no. 3
(1992), 170; Rudd, “Kierkegaard on Patience,” 499; Hjortkjær and Willert, “The Self,” 461-2.
115 See, e.g., SKS 11, 170 / SUD, 55; SKS 11, 193-4 / SUD, 79-80. Such ethical striving stands in
sharp contrast to “despairing striving” (fortvivlede Stræben). See SKS 11, 183 / SUD, 69.
116 “Kierkegaard’s Anthropology of the Self: Ethico-Religious and Social Dimensions of
Selfhood,” Heythrop Journal 53, no. 1 (2012), 37.
117 Westphal, “Kierkegaard’s Psychology,” 64.
118 SKS 11, 242 / SUD, 131.
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relation to God is therefore crucial for understanding the nature of sacred tension within
The Sickness unto Death.

Sacred Tension and the Etymological Paradox
In that the loss of tension in despair and sin plays out in the individual’s refusal
to exist in a paradoxical relation to God predicated upon the divine-human distinction,
sacred tension involves embracing one’s status as dependent upon God and thus
remaining in the tension where one perpetually risks believing that for God all things are
possible, faces the possibility of offense, and remains open to the possibility of divine
help. In unpacking this, we may narrow in on the notion of possibility (Mulighed).
As we have already pointed out in some detail above, Anti-Climacus in Part One
of The Sickness of Death sets up possibility as the dialectical opposite of necessity. At the
same time, he is clear that possibility is not merely a dialectical opposite, but it also serves
as an essential element of faith. For example, in the section “Necessity’s Despair is to Lack
Possibility,” Anti-Climacus asks his reader to imagine a situation in which “salvation is,
humanly speaking, utterly impossible” after which he then asks the reader to imagine
possibility tied to the idea that “for God everything is possible” and to believe in such
possibility.119 As he notes, the “battle of faith” (Troens Kamp)120 begins where human
beings have abandoned self-reliance and have come to a point of desperate need:
What is decisive is that with God everything is possible. This is eternally true
and consequently true at every moment. This is indeed a generally recognized
truth, which is commonly expressed in this way, but the critical decision does
not come until a person is brought to his extremity, when, humanly speaking,
there is no possibility. Then the question is whether he will believe that for God
everything is possible, that is, whether he will believe.121
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In stepping into the risk-filled tension of having no assurance and feeling entirely
powerless but yet still believing, it is here “unexpectedly, miraculously, divinely, help does
come.”122 For Anti-Climacus, this is “the ever infallible [sikkre] antidote for despair…”123
Sacred tension, therefore, plays out exactly in holding onto belief in divine possibility in
the midst of human impossibility while remaining within a relationship of dependence
upon God in which one recognizes that God alone has the power to overcome human
impossibility.
Another manner Anti-Climacus employs the notion of possibility that is relevant
for describing sacred tension in relation to the etymological paradox is in terms of what
he identifies as the possibility of offense (Forargelses Mulighed). For Anti-Climacus,
paradox, as representing the radical difference between God and human beings, always
carries with it the possibility of offense in the sense that the individual engaging the
paradox may respond in one of two ways: either in offense or in faith.124 It is precisely
here upon the apex of faith as it is precariously perched over the abyss of despair that the
individual finds herself in a radical tension. Resolution of such tension would come only
if the individual were to become offended and fall into despair. Faith, in contrast, is
never free of tension in the sense that the possibility of offense remains perpetually
present in the life of faith as that which must “at every moment” (i ethvert Øieblik) be
“throw[n] away.”125 As Anti-Climacus puts it, “Not to be in despair must signify the
destroyed possibility of being able to be in despair; if a person is truly not to be in
despair, he must at every moment [i ethvert Øieblik] destroy [tilintetgjøre]126 the
possibility.”127
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In a footnote near the middle of a discussion on offense in Part Two, AntiClimacus introduces a notion that is helpful for our investigation here, namely that of
“annulled possibility” (ophævet Mulighed). As he writes, “offense as annulled possibility is
an element in faith…”128 In the context of his exposition of the nature of faith in Fear and
Trembling, John Lippitt, himself drawing on the thought of Ronald L. Hall,129 offers a
helpful gloss on this notion:
[D]espair is necessary for faith as an annulled possibility: something which, at all
times, the person of faith “at every moment, destroys, negates, annuls, as a
possibility.” If it helps, consider this. In the Postscript, Climacus famously
describes faith as like being out on 70,000 fathoms of water (CUP 204). If we
combine these two images, despair is the desire to give up and stop treading
water: survival (that is, faith) is only possible by refusing that temptation—and
doing so continually!130
Niels Jørgen Cappelørn likewise provides an insightful discussion of this dynamic. As he
remarks,
The believer who has passed through the possibility of offense and now thinks
he or she has believed enough, has become perfect in faith and comprehends it,
is in fact on his or her way to losing faith, just as he or she can lose his or her
mind. The possibility of offense is indeed “a suspended moment” but only in
the instant when the individual obtains faith. It is not, however, abolished in
faith, but is included in it—as a lasting possibility. A perfect faith, a fulfilled
faith, or a finished faith, which has completed the task of believing and of
fighting faith’s battle against the possibility of offense, does not exist.131
Considered in this manner, we may say that for Anti-Climacus the ongoing destruction
of the possibility of offense in order to remain in faith is precisely the same movement
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that has been described in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 as the tension-filled stance between
despair and security where one unceasingly pursues God in perpetual fear and trembling and
in the process is met by the divine. In a discourse from Thoughts That Wound From
Behind—For Upbuilding published the year prior to The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard
develops a strikingly similar idea:
No, away, pernicious sureness [Sikkerhed]. Save me, O God, from ever becoming
completely sure [sikker]; keep me unsure [i Usikkerheden] until the end so that
then, if I receive eternal blessedness, I might be completely sure that I have it by
grace. It is empty shadowboxing to give assurance [at forsikkre] that one believes
that it is by grace—and then to be completely sure. The true, the essential
expression of its being by grace is the very fear and trembling of unsureness
[Usikkerhedens Frygt og Bæven]. There lies faith—as far, just as far, from despair
[Fortvivlelse] and from sureness [Sikkerhed].132
In the same manner that for Kierkegaard remaining within the sacred tension depends
upon grace, for Anti-Climacus the tension-filled process of annulling despair likewise
requires divine assistance.
As a concluding word, we may note that the existential stance of living within
the sacred tension that emerges in relation to the etymological paradox is for AntiClimacus a fundamental expression of worship. Near the end of The Sickness unto Death,
Anti-Climacus makes the following significant claim: “The person who does not take
offense worships in faith. But to worship, which is the expression of faith, is to express
that the infinite, chasmal, qualitative abyss between them [the person and God] is
confirmed.”133 For Anti-Climacus, worship means recognizing divine superiority over the
human being and embracing this in one’s life as the path to a right relation to God.134 As
we have displayed above, paradox in its etymological form provides the means for clearly
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drawing out the divine-human distinction and for making possible the existential stance
where the believer continually trusts in God not only to overcome what is seen as
humanly impossible but also to help in the process of perpetually annulling the possibility
of offense.135 Thus, for Anti-Climacus as for Kierkegaard, living within the sacred tension
could just as well be construed as worshipping within the sacred tension.

3.5 - The Self within Sacred Tension: On Dedicated Patience and Humble
Courage

Having offered an account of sacred tension in The Sickness unto Death, we may
now move to a brief discussion of the self within such sacred tension by narrowing in on
what I suggest are two of its central virtues. My aim in this section, therefore, is to
provide a more concrete and substantive description of some of the significant aspects of
Anti-Climacus’ account of Christian existence.

Dedicated Patience
One crucial virtue that emerges within the sacred tension in association with the
dialectical paradox is that of dedicated patience. In the process of becoming a self,
patience is required precisely because the task of selfhood is temporally extended and
thereby does not lend itself to immediate fulfillment. Moreover, the failure to hold
together the dialectical aspects of the self due to human sinfulness entails that the
Christian individual must time and again return to the task of selfhood without
abandoning it in impatience in the moment of sin. The practice of such patience also
requires dedication. Dedication to the task of selfhood is what allows one to wait in

135 The latter is exactly what Anti-Climacus intends with his contrast “Tilbedelse—Forargelse.” See
SKS 11, 200 / SUD, 86.
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patient expectancy for the task’s fulfillment despite the extended nature of this task or its
eventual postponement due to the individual’s sin. In short, then, without dedication in
the form of commitment to the task of selfhood, the individual will be unable to
continue on in the process of patiently relating the aspects of the self towards the ideal of
proper paradoxical relation. Rather, he will become frustrated and disillusioned with the
task, such that he merely capitulates and settles into his despair and sin.
In his essay “Kierkegaard on Patience and the Temporality of the Self,”
Anthony Rudd develops a reading of The Sickness unto Death centered on the virtue of
patience that proves relevant here. For Rudd, Anti-Climacus’ account of gaining the self as
“a process that I am engaged in throughout my life, one that does not issue in secure
results on which I can then sit comfortably back, but one that must be renewed in every
moment,” 136 is made possible precisely because of dedicated patience. In support of this
claim, Rudd quotes Kierkegaard’s own voice in the discourse “To Preserve One’s Soul in
Patience”: “A person does not first gain his soul and then have the need for patience to
preserve it, but he gains it in no other way than by preserving it, and therefore patience is
the first and patience is the last…”137 In Rudd’ reading, such patience involves a
backwards-looking aspect in that one acts in the present in relation to what has gone
before, but it also involves a forward-oriented aspect that he describes as “a way of living
in the expectancy of a fulfillment that is still to come.” 138 Patience, when construed as
Rudd does in terms of expectancy comes into perfect alignment with the notion of hope.
It is for this reason that Anti-Climacus returns repeatedly to the importance of hope as
that which guides the individual in her patient task of becoming a self.139
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Humble Courage
A second crucial virtue in The Sickness unto Death and that which emerges within
the sacred tension in association with the etymological paradox is that of humble
courage. In support of this claim, we may touch upon Anti-Climacus’ reflections on
humility, courage, and humble courage.
To return to a point alluded to above, despair and sin are fundamentally tied to
lack of humility. For example, Anti-Climacus describes despair as “an unwillingness to be
comforted by and healed by the eternal”140 or as the refusal to undergo the humbling
(ydmygende) process of “becoming a nothing in the hand of the ‘Helper’ for whom all
things are possible.”141 Likewise, the sin of pride is to lack the humility required for
repentance, forgiveness, and thankfulness.142 Thus, regardless of the severity of despair
and sin, lack of humility is one of their central underlying characteristics.
In contrast, humility for Anti-Climacus is synonymous with receptivity. To
practice humility is to become receptive to help and to healing as well as to become open
to the possibility of being transformed by a power greater than oneself. Thus, whereas
the despairing individual pridefully entrenches himself in his despair and sin, the person
of humility turns “away from despair to faith and before God [for Gud] humbl[es] himself
[ydmygende sig] under his weakness…”143 Moreover, whereas the demonic individual once
and for all refuses “to hear anything about repentance and grace,”144 the person of
humility welcomes grace “by humbly [med ydmydt] thanking God that he helped him to
resist temptation for so long a time…and then humbling himself [ydmyge sig] under the

SKS 11, 184 / SUD, 70.
See, SKS 11, 185 / SUD, 71.
142 See, e.g., SKS 11, 223-4 / SUD, 110-12.
143 SKS 11, 176 / SUD, 61 (I have modified the translation).
144 SKS 11, 222 / SUD, 110.
140
141

131
recollection of what he has been.”145 As such, rather than the inward retreat into the
suffocating prison of Indesluttethed, humility is an outward movement of freedom in
“adoration under the extraordinary”146 by which the believer ultimately comes to
understand that the weight of God that weighs down “through humiliation” (i Ydmygelse)
is at the same time that which “lifts one up” into glory.147
Alongside humility, courage also plays an important role in the Sickness unto
Death. For example, as a contrast to the individual who lives in sensate categories and
lacks the courage to become spirit,148 Anti-Climacus draws a direct connection between
courage and Christian existence. Thus, in the final few lines of the introduction he writes,
“Only the Christian knows what is meant by the sickness unto death. As a Christian, he
gained a courage [Mod] that the natural man does not know, and he gained this courage
by learning to fear something even more horrifying.”149 Anti-Climacus here connects
courage to receptivity in the sense that such courage takes form only when the individual
is taught by God what to fear. This connection between courage and receptivity is even
more explicit in Anti-Climacus’ discussion of the despair of defiance in which he sets up
courage as the alternative to such despair. As he notes, “through the aid of the eternal,
the self has the courage [Mod] to lose itself in order to win itself.”150 To summarize this
account of courage we could thereby say, in the spirit of Kierkegaardian word-play, that
it requires a great deal of courage (Mod) in order to relinquish one’s opposition (Modstand) to God.
Furthermore, at a couple of significant places within the text Anti-Climacus
employs the compound term “humble courage” (ydmygt Mod), which he closely links to
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the notion of offense. Consider, for example, the story Anti-Climacus employs in Part
Two about a great emperor, a lowly day laborer, and an odd proposal. Anti-Climacus asks
the reader to imagine that one day the emperor hits upon the idea to send for the laborer
and to invite this lowly man to become his son-in-law. In response, the laborer becomes
confused, self-conscious, and embarrassed, for he harbors the suspicion that the entire
affair is merely a farce at his expense. For the laborer, a small favor from the emperor
would have made sense, but the extraordinary offer now facing him is simply too much
for him to accept. As Anti-Climacus remarks, it is precisely at this point that humble
courage is required:
But this, this plan for him to become a son-in-law, well, that was far too much.
Now suppose, however, that the plan dealt not with an external reality but an
internal one, so that facticity could not provide the laborer with certainty but
that faith itself was the only facticity, and thus everything was left up to faith,
whether he had sufficient humble courage [ydmygt Mod] to dare to believe it (for
brash courage [frækt Mod] cannot help unto faith). How many day laborers are
there who would have this courage [Mod]? The person lacking this courage [Mod]
would be offended; to him the extraordinary would sound like a gibe at him. He
would then perhaps honestly and forthrightly confess: Such a thing is too high
for me, I cannot grasp it; to be perfectly blunt, to me it is a piece of folly.151
In the discussion immediately following, Anti-Climacus draws a connection between this
tale and the manner by which the Christian is called to exist “on the most intimate terms
with God”152 in an intimate relation to the incarnate Christ. In doing so, Anti-Climacus
once again emphasizes humble courage and connects it to receptivity and divine help:
God comes to the world, allows himself to be born, to suffer, to die, and this
suffering God—he almost implores and beseeches this person to accept the
help that is offered him! Truly, if there is anything to lose one’s mind over, this
is it! Everyone lacking the humble courage [ydmygt Mod] to dare to believe this is
offended. But why is he offended? Because it is too high for him, because his
mind cannot grasp it, because he cannot attain bold confidence [Frimodighed] in
the face of it and therefore must get rid of it, pass it off as a bagatelle, nonsense,
folly, for it seems as if it would choke him.153
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With this description of the Incarnation and the response of the Christian, we see how
humble courage becomes something of a cardinal virtue for Anti-Climacus.154 In humble
courage one opens oneself in receptivity to divine help as a key element of what it means
to annul the possibility of offense. Moreover, in humble courage one takes an enormous
risk in becoming vulnerable before the grace of God and trusting in such grace without
any human guarantee that it will be fulfilled. For Anti-Climacus, it is precisely this aspect
of Christian existence that requires courage—courage to accept the risk associated with
objective uncertainty where one is out on 70,000 fathoms of water155—as well as the
humility to be embraced by God after such a courageous step it taken. In the end, there
is hardly a better description than this for what it means to live within the sacred tension.

An Objection and Reply
My focus in this section on dedicated patience and humble courage as crucial
virtues of the self within sacred tension nevertheless invites an objection. Briefly stated, is
not Anti-Climacus fundamentally opposed to the virtue framework? After all, he is
unambiguous in his critique of pagan Greek ethics and his claim that the opposite of sin
is not virtue, but rather faith.156 Would it not therefore be fundamentally wrong-headed
to talk about the virtues in relation to The Sickness unto Death?
As a reply, we may note that Anti-Climacus is unquestionably opposed to a
certain kind of virtue ethics. Thus, we may once again agree with Bruce Kirmmse that
Kierkegaard (and Anti-Climacus) ought not to be identified with the virtue framework if

Clare Carlisle makes a similar claim in relation to Fear and Trembling, noting that humble
courage “is the cardinal virtue of religious life.” See, “Humble Courage: Kierkegaard on Abraham and
Mary,” Literature & Theology (2014), 8.
155 See SKS 7, 187 / CUP1, 204.
156 See, e.g., SKS 11, 161 / SUD, 46; SKS 11, 183 / SUD, 69; SKS 11, 236 / SUD, 124.
154
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by this we mean a system of self-actualization predicated entirely upon human wisdom
and ability.157 This, however, does not thereby entail that Anti-Climacus puts forward a
blanket rejection of all notions of virtue. From our brief discussion above it becomes
clear that although dedicated patience and humble courage require sustained practice and
play a crucial role in shaping the disposition of the Christian individual as is characteristic
of virtue in general, they are also essentially bound up with receptivity and divine
intervention within the believer’s life and therefore are fundamentally opposed to selfactualization. As such, it is entirely possible to talk about practicing patient dedication
and humble courage as well as developing in these virtues without thereby assuming the
classical virtue framework that Anti-Climacus rejects. In short, then, the virtues of
patient dedication and humble courage both play an important role in how the Christian
exists in that they are expressions of the practical, active, and sustained relationship of
reliance upon God within the sacred tension that is essential to faith.

3.6 - Concluding Remarks
I have argued in this chapter that Anti-Climacus employs paradox in its dialectical
and etymological forms in order to provide an account of what it means to become a self
that is both properly related to itself and properly related to God. In addition, I have
shown how this account functions as an expression of sacred tension in contrast to the
failure of selfhood and the loss of tension associated with despair and sin. Moreover, I
have focused on the virtues of dedicated patience and humble courage as characteristic
of the self within sacred tension and characteristic of Anti-Climacus’ description of
Christian existence in general. In pointing to the centrality of these virtues as concrete

157 See Bruce Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” in Kierkegaard
After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd (Chicago
and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2001), 191-210.
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pieces of what it means to exist as a Christian, I have thus complemented Grøn’s claim
concerning the unity of The Sickness unto Death (i.e., that Part One is not only
anthropologically, but also theologically revealing)158 by showing how Anti-Climacus’
explicitly dogmatic reflections in Part Two are revealing not only for theology, but also for
anthropology. In the end, then, I have argued for a reading of The Sickness unto Death that
ties together the three important themes of paradox, sacred tension, and Christian
existence.
In moving towards the conclusion of this chapter, we may make a connection
back to the account of sacred tension introduced in Chapter 1. As we pointed out above,
sacred tension regarding the dialectical paradox plays out in the striving of the individual
to become a self, and sacred tension regarding the etymological paradox turns on
receptivity in the sense that in order to become a self before God, one must accept one’s
limitations and open oneself to divine provision. Interestingly, it is in relation to these
two expressions of sacred tension that we find another sacred tension between the sacred
tensions. For Anti-Climacus, Christian existence can be reduced neither to striving nor to
receptivity, but rather it must include both of these emphasized to their fullest.
Moreover, insofar as striving maps onto the category of works and receptivity maps onto
the category of grace, Anti-Climacus in his own particular fashion emphasizes the
fundamental grace/works dialectic introduced in Chapter 1 that is central to Kierkegaard’s
challenge to his contemporaries. In this respect, The Sickness unto Death plays a crucial role
in Kierkegaard’s overall ethico-religious task.
In looking forward to the next chapter, I would like to turn once again to
offense. As we have pointed out at several places above, selfhood is intertwined with the
possibility of offense. As Anti-Climacus remarks, “If ‘the single individual’ is to feel in
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Grøn, “The Relation,” 40.
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kinship with God (and this is what Christianity teaches), then he also senses the full
weight of it in fear and trembling, and he must discover—as if it were not an ancient
discovery—the possibility of offense.”159 Offense for Kierkegaard is fundamentally tied
to the God-man whom he identifies as the absolute paradox, but despite this Anti-Climacus
in The Sickness unto Death affords relatively sparse attention to the Incarnation. For this
reason we may now shift our attention from this specific text to the question of paradox
and Christian existence in relation to Kierkegaard’s Christology.

159

SKS 11, 232fn / SUD, 120fn.
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CHAPTER 4
PARADOX AND THE GOD-MAN:
ON CHRISTOLOGY, REJECTING/EMBRACING CHRIST,
AND CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE
[F]aith, self-active, relates itself to the improbable and the paradox, is selfactive in discovering it and in holding it fast at every moment [hvert
Øieblik fastholde det]—in order to be able to believe.1
[T]he certitude of faith [Troens Vished]…at every moment has within
itself the infinite dialectic of uncertainty [Uvishedens uendelige
Dialektik]…2
The God-man is the paradox, absolutely the paradox. Therefore, it is
altogether certain that the understanding must come to a standstill [komme
til at staae stille] on it. If a person is not conscious of offense at the
loftiness, he will be aware of it in relation to the lowliness.3

For this chapter I turn to the third of our four expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought, namely that associated with the God-man. In that Kierkegaard is
fundamentally a Christocentric thinker,4 Jesus Christ figures prominently in his
philosophical and religious thought, with the paradox of the God-man playing a central
role.5 It will therefore be important for our study to dedicate close attention to
Kierkegaard’s discussion of this expression of paradox. My argument can be summarized
as follows. As a response to the Christological accounts of his era, Kierkegaard develops
his own view of the Incarnation by appealing to the notion of paradox. In particular,
Kierkegaard offers two variations on which we will focus: first, the God-man as the
dialectical unity of the eternal/temporal that transcends and challenges the
understanding; and, second, the God-man as the dialectical unity of loftiness/lowliness
that is the sign of contradiction and the possibility of offense. These Christological

SKS 7, 212 / CUP1, 233.
SKS 7, 59 / CUP1, 55.
3 SKS 12, 93 / PC, 82-3.
4 See, e.g., Tim Rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
1
2

2001).

5

See, e.g., SKS 7, 198 / CUP1, 217; SKS 7, 490-1 / CUP1, 540.
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accounts in turn carry significant implications for Christian existence. In contrast to the
loss of tension associated with either the indirect rejection of the paradoxical God-man
by turning to the Christendom expression of faith in its civic or speculative forms, or the
direct rejection of the paradoxical God-man that is offense, embracing the paradox of
Jesus Christ represents a form of sacred tension characterized by passionate limitation,
by holding on to security in insecurity as well as certainty in uncertainty, by the perpetual
annulment of offense, and by imitation—the fundamental underlying virtue of which I
argue is humble striving. In this respect, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s reflections on the
paradox of the God-man prove crucial to his overall ethico-religious task of
(re)introducing Christianity into Christendom.
To carry out this argument I proceed in five sections. In Section 4.1, I begin with
several preliminary remarks on Christology and Kierkegaard as a backdrop to the
discussion of the paradox of the God-man. For Section 4.2, I outline two of Kierkegaard’s
variations on the paradoxical God-man that he develops in the Climacean works and in
Practice in Christianity, respectively. In Section 4.3, I focus on the loss of tension associated
with rejection of the paradoxical God-man. In contrast to this, for Section 4.4 I develop
an account of the sacred tension involved in embracing the paradoxical God-man, and I
outline the virtue of humble striving at the heart of such tension. In doing so, I reflect
briefly on the biblical figures of John the Baptist and the Apostle Peter. In Section 4.5, I
conclude by drawing an explicit connection between this chapter and the argument from
Chapter 1.

4.1 - Preliminary Remarks on Christology and Kierkegaard
In broadest terms, Christology (i.e., Christos-logos) is simply discourse on Christ.
Traditional orthodox Christology, in particular, is grounded on the orthodox creeds and
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centers on the affirmation of Jesus Christ as true God and true man, fully God and fully
human. In the same fashion that such Christology develops in response to certain
problematic Christologies emerging at the time of the early church such as Ebionitism
and Gnosticism (Docetism),6 Kierkegaard develops his particular thoughts on
Christology in response to what he perceives as the problematic accounts of Christ
floating around in his own 19th century context. Anti-Climacus, in Practice, provides a
sketch of two such Christologies:
By way of didacticism, the God-man has been made into that speculative unity
of God and man sub specie aeterni or made visible in that nowhere-to-be-found
medium of pure being, rather than that the God-man is the unity of being God
and an individual human being in a historically actual situation. Or Christ has
been abolished altogether, thrown out and his teaching taken over, and finally he
is regarded as one regards an anonymous writer: the teaching is the principle
thing, is everything.7
In following the lead of David R. Law and Sylvia Walsh, we may identify these two views
as speculative Christology and rationalist Christology, respectively.8 Generally speaking,
the rise of the former view in 19th century Denmark can be traced back to the influence
of Hegel and his account of mediation.9 For Hegel, the Incarnation makes sense only
when understood conceptually, for it is concepts alone that can undergo the process of
mediation. This entails that Christ is construed in terms of the union of the abstract
essences of divinity and humanity but not in terms of the unity of God and a particular
temporal human being. Such an attempt to recast Christ apart from explicit emphasis on

SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123.
SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123.
8 David R. Law, “The Existential Chalcedonian Christology of Kierkegaard’s Practice in
Christianity,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2010, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin
and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 129-52; Sylvia Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an
Existential Mode (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 112-13.
9 This was, in turn, later adopted by Hans Lassen Martensen. See, e.g., “Rationalisme,
Supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii (I Anledning af H.H. Biskop Mynsters Afhandling herom i dette
Tidsskrifts forrige Hefte),” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik 1 (1839): 456-73, particularly 136-7. For a good
discussion of this, see Jon Stewart, “Introduction,” in Mynster’s ‘Rationalism, Supernaturalism’ and the Debate
about Mediation, ed. and trans. Jon Stewart (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 1-45.
6
7
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his concrete existence as a particular person in a particular time and in a particularly place
is necessarily to misconstrue Christ and to de-emphasize his particular expression of
humanity.10 As Anti-Climacus describes it, “speculation takes away from the God-man
the qualifications of temporality, contemporaneity, and actuality.”11 The latter view
represents the movement within the broader theological push of 19th century Europe to
transform Christianity into a religion of reason that downplays or even outright denies
the divinity of Jesus Christ by re-characterizing him as a mere “teacher of moral
values.”12 This Christology was rampant among post-Enlightenment liberal theologians,13
with David Strauss and his controversial book Das Leben Jesu at the center of the
discussion. In short, Strauss argues for a particular reading of the Bible in which he
removes from its account of Jesus any miraculous or supernatural elements, with the
consequence that Jesus is recast as a gifted teacher who has merely been deified through
the myth-making Christian tradition.14 Although Kierkegaard affords less explicit
attention to this Christology compared to that of Hegel and the Hegelians, such a
humanistic presentation of Christ would undoubtedly have had a significant impact on
his Christological view.15

10 See David James, “The Absolute Paradox: Kierkegaard’s Argument Against Hegel’s Account of
the Relation of Faith to Philosophy,” in Kierkegaardiana 24 (2007), 110, 117.
11 SKS 12, 92 / PC, 81.
12 Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 131.
13 See George Pattison, “D.F. Strauss: Kierkegaard and Radical Demythologization,” in
Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: Tome II: Theology, ed. Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2007), 237. Friedrich Schleiermacher, considered the father of modern liberal theology, generally
remains faithful to the traditional creeds and doctrinal statements concerning Jesus Christ. Despite this, he
nevertheless rejects the Chalcedon two natures doctrine as incoherent. See The Christian Faith (London and
New York, NY: T&T Clark, 1999), 391-8. Kierkegaard owned a copy of Der christliche Glaube (The Auction
Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library, ed. Katalin Nun, Gerhard Schreiber, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), 16) and he was quite familiar with Schleiermacher’s thought (Richard E.
Crouter, “Schleiermacher: Revisiting Kierkegaard’s Relation to Him,” in Kierkegaard and His German
Contemporaries: Tome II: Theology, 197-231, ed. Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007)).
As such we have good reason to suspect that Kierkegaard’s appeal to paradox in his description of the
God-man may be directed in part against Schleiermacher’s Christology.
14 Climacus appears to be addressing Strauss in his reference to “The modern mythical
allegorizing trend” that “summarily declares Christianity to be a myth.” See SKS 7, 199 / CUP1, 218.
15 Although Kierkegaard did not own a copy of Strauss’ book, he was nevertheless still engaged
with Strauss’ ideas through, for example, his reading of Julius Schaller’s critical account of Strauss’ view:
Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss
(Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1838).
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From this brief discussion we see that these modern Christologies and the
ancient heresies are similar in the sense that they tend towards eliminating the tension
inherent to Christ as fully god and fully human.16 It is in part in response to such a drift
and the resultant one-sided and un-dialectical accounts of Christ that Kierkegaard turns
to the notion of paradox.17 What this means, I suggest, is that regarding the question of
Christ’s divinity and humanity Kierkegaard pursues a Christology that is entirely
consistent with the traditional Christology of orthodox Christianity. In other words,
although Kierkegaard never attempts to defend the orthodox view, he is nevertheless
interested in retaining its categories and terminology.18 As Murray Rae notes, “A striking
feature of both the signed and the pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard is the ready
acceptance of orthodox Christological confessions…The Christological formulations of
the Nicene Creed and the Council of Chalcedon are upheld, when, under his own name,
Kierkegaard writes, ‘At every moment Christ is God just as much as he is man.’”19
Despite such similarity, the modern Christologies, as Anti-Climacus suggests in
Practice,20 nevertheless differ from the ancient heresies in one vital way, namely in that
they are far more inclined to treat engagement with Christ simply as a theoretical and an
academic exercise. As Kierkegaard sees it, with their particular approach to the doctrinal
question of Christ the professors and speculative thinkers of his era act like puzzle-

16 Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 134; Sylvia Walsh, “Kierkegaard’s Theology,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 297.
17 We may therefore agree with Kyle Roberts that Kierkegaard “articulated a Christology of
paradox” (“The Living Word and the Word of God: The Pietist Impulse in Kierkegaard and Grundtvig,”
in The Pietist Impulse in Christianity, ed. Christian T. Collins Winn, et al. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011),
120) and with Law that Kierkegaard’s “Christology is centred on the concept of paradox” (“Kierkegaard’s
Christology,” Theology 99, no. 789, (1996), 206).
18 See, e.g., SKS 18, 83, FF:36 / JP 1, 284. On this point, see Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision of
the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology,
78; Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 134; Kelly Dean Jolley, “Kierkegaard’s Climacus on
Discipleship and the Incarnation,” New Blackfriars 93, no. 1043 (2012), 88; Robert B. Puchniak,
“Athanasius: Kierkegaard’s Curious Comment,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions, ed. Jon
Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 5.
19 Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology (London and New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2010), 58.
The Kierkegaard quotation comes from SKS 18, 83, FF:36 / JP 1, 284.
20 SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123.
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solvers who are interested merely in offering a rational and culturally acceptable account
of the Incarnation.21 Kierkegaard, however, was deeply opposed to this characteristically
modern treatment of Christology. Indeed, such an approach to Christ for Kierkegaard is
a distraction or, as Law describes it, “another attempt on the part of human beings to
avoid the real challenge of Christianity.”22 In contrast, Kierkegaard is clear to point out
that Christ is a person and not a doctrine, and because of this it is crucial to resist the
temptation to reduce Christology to an abstract affair that hinders the believer from
developing a properly existential relationship with Jesus Christ. For Kierkegaard, then,
Christology is a constant push away from the speculative problem to the concrete
problem of what it means to exist in relation to the God-man. Thus, we may say that
what Kierkegaard offers his readers is fundamentally an existential Christology. As we will
see, paradox has a principle role to play in such an account.

4.2 - The Paradoxical God-man: Two Variations
In this section we may outline two variations of the paradoxical God-man that
Kierkegaard develops within his authorship. I begin with the Climacean account followed
by that of Anti-Climacus from Practice. I conclude with a summary by which I briefly
point to the etymological and dialectical aspects involved in these presentations of
paradox.

21 See, e.g., SKS 12, 127 / PC, 121; SKS 12, 131 / PC, 126; SKS 23, 470, NB20:148 / JP 2, 1877.
On this point, see Bradley R. Dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ (Washington, D.C.
and Cleveland, OH: Corpus Books, 1968), 59-60; David J. Gouwens, “Kierkegaard’s Understanding of
Doctrine,” Modern Theology 5, no. 1 (1988), 20-1; Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology, 59.
22 David R. Law, “Making Christianity Difficult: The ‘Existential Theology’ of Kierkegaard’s
Postscript,” in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript: A Critical Guide, ed. Rick Anthony Furtak
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 238.
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Johannes Climacus on the Paradoxical God-man
In tracing out the Climacean account we may begin with Climacus’ introduction
of the God-man in Philosophical Fragments through the mediums of a playful thought
experiment and a poetic fairy tale.23 To begin his thought experiment, Climacus leads off
with the Socratic question “Can the truth be learned?”24 to which he responds by
considering two hypotheses: the “A” view of Platonic recollection, and an alternative “B”
view that ironically resembles orthodox Christianity.25 With the former, truth is
understood as inherent to the individual. As such, the temporal point in which one gains
the truth is of fleeting importance, for when one discovers the truth one discovers that
one has always possessed the truth. Likewise, the teacher’s significance is simply that of a
“midwife” who serves merely to draw forth such inherent truth. With the latter, Climacus
considers the case where the individual does not possess the truth and is even unable to
obtain it. In this view, both the moment in time and the teacher are of absolute
significance, for it is the teacher alone who brings truth into existence at a particular
temporal point. Such an act, however, requires that the teacher overcome the learner’s
state of untruth (what Climacus identifies as “sin”26) by transforming the learner into an
entirely new being. As Climacus makes clear, it is only the god who has the power to
bring about such transformation—the god who is therefore a savior, a deliverer, and a
reconciler.27

Portions of this section are reproduced verbatim from Matthew T. Nowachek, “On the NonBracketing of Fairy Tale in Paradox Discourse: Kierkegaard, the Analytic Tradition, and the Importance of
Inclusivity,” International Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2012), 5-20. Permission for reuse of this material
has been granted by the publisher.
24 SKS 4, 218 / PF, 9.
25 See C. Stephen Evans, “The Role of Irony in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” in
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2004, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and New
York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 63-79.
26 SKS 4, 224 / PF, 15. Cf. SKS 7, 191 / CUP1, 208.
27 SKS 4, 226 / PF, 17.
23
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But what would lead the god to act in such a manner? For Climacus, the answer
is love.28 To expand on this point he presents a fairy tale (et Eventyr) about a great king
who falls in love with a lowly maiden. This love, however, faces a fundamental challenge
in that love requires equality in order to be realized within mutual understanding, but the
king and the maiden are radically unequal. In response, the king considers the possibility
of elevating the beloved to royalty in the hope that she would forget her lowly existence.
The king nevertheless finds this option dissatisfactory in that he sees it as psychologically
equivalent to deception. Perhaps the king could instead appear to the maiden in all of his
splendor and in this fashion draw forth her love. Still, the king is dissatisfied because this
option leaves him with the worry that the maiden will fall in love not with him, but with
his riches and glory. All of this therefore leads the king to entertain an altogether
different option, namely that of descent. Guided by the principle that love “does not
change the beloved but changes itself,”29 the king thus assumes the status of a lowly
servant so as to woo the maiden in the hope that she will develop true love in the joy of
mutual understanding.
Although Climacus never refers to Jesus Christ by name due to his ironic and
indirect approach in Fragments,30 he nevertheless paints a distinct picture of the
Incarnation: with the aim of transforming sinners the god assumes the form of a lowly
servant in order to carry out his loving task.31 For the god, however, servanthood is not a
mere disguise as it is for the king, but is rather his “true form.”32 It is precisely this
dynamic, whereby the god becomes a lowly human being in loving pursuit of other

Cf. SKS 11, 237-8 / SUD, 126-7.
SKS 4, 239 / PF, 33.
30 On this specific issue, see, e.g., SKS 7, 249 / CUP1, 274.
31 Cf. SKS 12, 30-1 / PC, 20.
32 SKS 4, 238 / PF, 32.
28
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human beings so as to overcome their sin that Climacus points to as the absolute paradox.33
But how, more precisely, should we understand this paradox?
One sense in which the Incarnation is paradoxical has to do with the dialectical
constitution of the God-man, which is implied in the story of the god becoming a lowly
human being. As Climacus remarks in Chapter 4 of Fragments, the God-man is the
“contradiction” (Modsigelse) that “unites contradictories [Modsigelsen], is the eternalizing of
the historical and the historicizing of the eternal”34 as well as “the eternal becom[ing]
temporal” and “the eternal enter[ing] existence…”35 In Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
Climacus makes this point in a more explicit fashion by focusing on the dialectical
relation between temporality and eternity at play in the God-man. As he notes, “let us
assume that the eternal, essential truth is itself the paradox. How does the paradox
emerge? By placing the eternal, essential truth together with existing. Consequently, if we
place it together in the truth itself, the truth becomes a paradox. The eternal truth has
come into existence in time. That is the paradox.”36 Or later he remarks, “Christianity has
itself proclaimed itself to be the eternal, essential truth that has come into existence in
time; it has proclaimed itself as the paradox…”37 In both Fragments and Postscript, this
dialectical expression of the absolute paradox is therefore nicely summarized in Climacus’
succinct statement that “God, the eternal, has entered into time as an individual human
being…”38

33

See SKS 7, 191 / CUP1, 208; SKS 7, 204 / CUP1, 224; Rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology,

63.
SKS 4, 263 / PF, 61. Cf. SKS 4, 264 / PF, 62; SKS 4, 286 / PF, 87.
SKS 4, 264 / PF, 62.
36 SKS 7, 191 / CUP1, 209. This is in contrast to the Socratic paradox, which emerges when
eternal truth is merely related to an existing temporal person—which is to say this is not an essential but an
accidental paradox. See SKS 7, 188 / CUP1 205; SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 207; SKS 7, 191 / CUP1, 209.
37 SKS 7, 195 / CUP1, 213.
38 SKS 7, 541 / CUP1, 596. See also SKS 7, 191 / CUP1, 209: the distinctly Christian paradox of
the absolute paradox comes to be when “the eternal, essential truth [is placed] together with existing.”
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A handful of scholars have provided helpful glosses on this eternal/temporal
aspect of the paradox. For example, in his study on Kierkegaard’s Christology, Law
writes,
Eternity, on the one hand, and time and existence, on the other, are thus
mutually exclusive opposites. If something is eternal it cannot be temporal and
existent. If something is temporal and existent it cannot be eternal. But
according to Kierkegaard, it is precisely these mutually exclusive opposites that
are brought together in the incarnation. In Christ the eternal has become
temporal and existent. Kierkegaard does not mean, however, that eternity is
cancelled out. It remains eternal but within time. It is precisely this combination
of contradictory categories that constitutes the paradox.39
Moreover, Noel S. Adams has pointed out how this account of the god entering time
despite its not being temporal is an expression of a metaphysical reality and not merely
an epistemological device.40 In a similar vein, Jon Stewart suggests that Climacus’
metaphysical description of the paradox as that which “unites contradictories”41 in
certain respects resembles the Hegelian account of mediation.42 It is important to note,
however, as does Law, Adams, and Stewart, that for Climacus the absolute paradox is not
something that can be mediated in the sense of resolving its dialectical opposites in the
movement of mediation towards higher syntheses.43 In other words, it opposes all
attempts to diminish or to remove its inherent paradoxicality.
This last point brings us to a second sense in which the Incarnation is
paradoxical, namely in its transcendence of human categories and associated limiting
function. In Fragments, Climacus remarks that the understanding (Forstand) is a passion,

Law, “Kierkegaard’s Christology,” 207. See also Law, “Making Christianity Difficult,” 236.
Noel S. Adams, “The Significance of the Eternal in Philosophical Fragments in Terms of the
Absolute Paradox,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1997, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Herman Deuser
(Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 149.
41 SKS 4, 263 / PF, 61. Cf. SKS 4, 264 / PF, 62; SKS 4, 286 / PF, 87.
42 Jon Stewart, “The Paradox and the Criticism of Hegelian Mediation in Philosophical Fragments,”
in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2004, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and New
York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 204.
43 Kierkegaard implies something similar in his journals when he writes that “Philosophy’s idea is
mediation—Christianity’s, the paradox.” See SKS 19, 211, Not7:22 / JP 3, 3072.
39
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and thus like all passions it wills its own downfall (Undergang)44—in this case by
discovering something that thought itself cannot think.45 It is here that the absolute
paradox emerges as “the unknown” (det Ubekjendte) which the understanding runs up
against in its passionate attempt to understand. As Climacus remarks, “what is this
unknown against which the understanding in its paradoxical passion collides and which
even disturbs man and his self-knowledge? It is the unknown…let us call this unknown
the god.”46 The absolute paradox is thus absolute in the sense that it is absolutely different
from the human. On this point Climacus notes, “[I]f a human being is to come truly to
know something about the unknown (the god), he must first come to know that it is
different from him, absolutely different from him.”47 Or in Postscript he remarks that “the
absolute paradox expressly declines all explanation”48 and that “the only possible
understanding of the absolute paradox is that it cannot be understood.”49 Furthermore,
Climacus is clear that such radical difference can be traced back to the sin of the knower
and to the revelatory movement of the divine in overcoming such sin.50 Thus, in a
manner reflective of Anti-Climacus,51 Climacus writes that the “paradox has the duplexity
by which it manifests itself as the absolute—negatively, by bringing into prominence the
absolute difference of sin and, positively, by wanting to annul this absolute difference in
the absolute equality.”52 As the unknown and the absolutely different, the absolute

This is similar to the way in which the passion of self-love wills to be overcome by the passion
of love for another. See SKS 4, 244 / PF, 39; Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 150.
45 SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. Cf. SKS 7, 101-2 / CUP1, 104-5: “in lyrically seeking to surpass itself,
thinking wills to discover the paradoxical…And Christianity is indeed the paradoxical.”
46 SKS 4, 245 / PF, 39.
47 SKS 4, 251 / PF, 46. On the absolute-relative difference, see SKS 7, 198 / CUP1, 217.
Kierkegaard himself draws a similar distinction in The Book on Adler. See SKS 11, 98-9 / BA, 175-6.
48 SKS 7, 511 / CUP1, 562.
49 SKS 7, 199 / CUP1, 218.
50 Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1996), 49.
51 See SKS 11, 212 / SUD, 100.
52 See SKS 4, 252 / PF, 47. See also SKS 4, 224 / PF, 15. On this point, see Louis Dupré,
Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence (New York, NY: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 134-5; C.
Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington and
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paradox therefore functions as a boundary. In Climacus’ words, “What, then, is the
unknown? It is the boundary [Grændsen] that is continually arrived at…”53 In establishing
a boundary, the absolute paradox precipitates a collision between itself and the
understanding in which the “paradoxical passion of the understanding is…continually
colliding with this unknown” as well as perpetually “reaching it and being engaged with
it” while never overcoming it.54 Such a collision is the basis for what Climacus identifies
as the unhappy meeting of offense as well as the happy meeting of faith, which we will
return to in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.

Anti-Climacus on the Paradoxical God-man
Having introduced the Climacean account, we may now turn to the view of the
paradoxical God-man developed by Anti-Climacus in Practice. Already at this point,
however, one may object: is not this move fundamentally misguided given that AntiClimacus appeals to the term “paradox” in Practice a mere nine times, of which only five
are in reference to the God-man? In response, we may note simply that despite such
relative paucity of references to the term paradox, Anti-Climacus still works extensively
with the category of paradox by making use of notions such as “unity” (Eenhed),
“composite” (Sammensætning), and “contradiction” (Modsigelse). By considering several
examples of these notions, I suggest we are able to glean a decent picture of AntiClimacus’ account of the paradoxical God-man.

Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 106; Adams, “The Significance of the Eternal,” 149;
Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, 151.
53 SKS 4, 249 / PF, 44 (translation modified; on this issue, see Matthew T. Nowachek, “John the
Baptist as Exemplar for the Understanding: Reading Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments alongside an
Upbuilding Discourse,” Theology 116, no. 4 (2013), 263n16). Climacus employs similar language in Postscript.
See, e.g., SKS 7, 201 / CUP1, 220.
54 SKS 4, 249 / PF, 44.
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For Anti-Climacus, the God-man is paradoxical in one sense as being “the unity
[Eenheden] of God…and an individual human being in a historically actual situation.”55 To
recall our discussion from Section 4.1, one of the Christologies Kierkegaard attacks is that
by which the God-man is “made into that speculative unity of God and man sub specie
aeterni or made visible in that nowhere-to-be-found medium of pure being…”56 In AntiClimacus’ view, however, the crucial point is not that the Incarnation is the unity of the
abstract concepts of divinity and humanity, but rather that the Incarnation is
fundamentally the unified composite of the dialectically related opposites of God and the
particular person of Jesus Christ. As he remarks, “The God-man is not the union of God
and man—such terminology is a profound optical illusion. The God-man is the unity
[Eenheden] of God and an individual human being.”57 With this account, Anti-Climacus
not only mirrors the dialectical view developed by Climacus in Postscript, but with his
emphasis on the particularity of Christ’s humanity he also further develops Climacus’
fairy tale in Fragments.
Another way in which Anti-Climacus describes the paradoxical God-man is in
terms of the dialectical unity of loftiness/lowliness. For example, in No. 3 of Practice he
writes,
[Christ] is in lowliness and in loftiness one and the same [den Ene og Samme], and
this choice would not be right if someone thought he was to choose between
Christ in lowliness and Christ in loftiness, for Christ is not divided [adskilt]; he is
one and the same [den Ene og Samme]. The choice is not: either lowliness or
loftiness. No, the choice is Christ, but Christ is a composite [et Sammensat] and
yet one and the same [den Ene og Samme], is the abased one and the lofty one…58
SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123.
SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123.
57 SKS 12, 92 / PC, 82. Anti-Climacus, however, is not always precise with his language. At one
point, for example, he writes about “what is united [forenet]” in the God-man in terms of “God and man”
(Gud og Menneske). See SKS 12, 89 / PC, 77. Cf. SKS 18, 158-9, JJ:58 / JP 3, 3075; SKS 20, 394, NB5:54 / JP
1, 321.
58 SKS 12, 164 / PC, 160. See also SKS 12, 71-2 / PC, 59-60. Cf. SKS 8, 351 / UD, 253; SKS 11,
238 / SUD, 127-8. Regarding this point, see Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 140; Walsh,
“Kierkegaard’s Theology,” 298-9. Anti-Climacus also expresses this paradox using the spatial language of
“down” and “up.” See SKS 12, 158 / PC, 154: “Jesus Christ is the same in his abasement [Fornedrelse] as in
his loftiness [Ophøielse].”
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For Anti-Climacus, it is precisely the paradoxical state in which the glorious and powerful
God becomes “the lowly, poor, suffering, and finally powerless human being”59 that
represents the “boundless self-contradiction” (uendelige Selvmodsigelse) which no human
being can grasp. Interestingly, however, although Anti-Climacus is clear concerning the
paradoxical nature of the God-man as a composite of loftiness and lowliness, he
nevertheless emphasizes that the particular relation the single individual has to the Godman must begin with Christ in his abasement in that the call to come and find rest is
spoken by Christ from his position of abasement.60 As Law remarks, “from the human
perspective” it is lowliness that becomes “the dominating element of Christ’s appearance
and the medium through which the would-be follower must relate himself to Christ.”61 It
is exactly this dynamic that underlies Anti-Climacus’ description of the God-man in
terms of “incognito” (Incognito) and “unrecognizability” (Ukjendelighed). As he puts it,
“And now the God-man! He is God but chooses to become this individual human being.
This, as said before, is the most profound incognito or the most impenetrable
unrecognizability that is possible, because the contradiction [Modsigelsen] between being
God and being an individual human being is the greatest possible, the infinitely
qualitative contradiction.”62 Another way to put this is that Anti-Climacus is here
pointing to the importance of beginning with the crucified Christ as the suffering
savior,63 which, as several scholars have pointed out, reveals the deep influence on Anti-
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NB2:157 / JP 3, 3090. On this point, see David R. Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford:
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Climacus of Luther and his theologia crucis.64 The precise reason for such a starting point in
relating to the God-man is something we develop in greater detail later on.
Lest this point about relating to Jesus Christ through his abasement is
misunderstood in a manner that might call into question the paradoxical nature of the
God-man, Anti-Climacus is intentional in his discussion of lowliness to affirm such
paradoxicality by referring to the God-man as “a sign of contradiction” (Modsigelsens
Tegn). As a sign, Jesus shows one thing (his lowliness) while pointing to another (his
loftiness); but at the same time both the sign and the signified remain actual and essential
to the God-man.65 This is, for Anti-Climacus, what it means to say that this sign
“contains a contradiction in its composition” but one where the contradictory parts do
not “annul [ophæve]66 each other in such a way that the sign comes to mean nothing or in
such a way that it becomes the opposite of a sign, an unconditional concealment.”67
Thus, even as one only has immediate access to lowliness, which means that the Godman establishes a paradoxical boundary that limits the individual’s attempt to arrive at
loftiness apart from faith and revelation, within the life of faith both aspects of lowliness
and loftiness must necessarily be presupposed in Christ.68 As Law remarks, “It is because
the God-man is a sign of contradiction that neither of the two natures can be dissolved
into the other, nor one supplant or suppress the other. The divine and human natures,
lowliness and loftiness stand in tension with each other. If this tension is removed, then

64 On this point, see Craig Hinkson, “Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of the Cross,”
International Journal of Systematic Theology 3, no. 1 (2001): 27-45; Noreen Khawaja, “Religious Truth and
Secular Scandal: Kierkegaard’s Pathology of Offense,” Philosophy Today (2015): DOI:
10.5840/philtoday201510785. Cf. SKS 12, 79-80 / PC, 67-8.
65 SKS 12, 130 / PC, 125-6. See also SKS 12, 103 / PC, 94.
66 In using the term ophæve to reflect the German Aufheben, Anti-Climacus undoubtedly levels a
critique against Hegel and the Danish Hegelians. See Jamie Turnbull, “Mediation/Sublation,” in
Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome IV: Individual to Novel, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon
Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 131-6.
67 SKS 12, 130 / PC, 125.
68 Cf. SKS 16, 210 / JFY, 161.
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the God-man dissolves before our eyes and becomes a merely human creation.”69
Moreover, were the contradiction to be annulled, the God-man would no longer serve as
the possibility of offense insofar as offense for Anti-Climacus is dialectical: offense at
loftiness becomes possible when one is confronted by Christ’s lowliness, and offense at
lowliness becomes possible when one believes in Christ’s loftiness. In Walsh’s terms,
The qualitative contradiction of Christ consists in the fact that he combines
both lowliness and loftiness in his person, which presents the possibility of
offence first of all in relation to his loftiness or divinity…and then in relation to
his lowliness or humanity…Neither loftiness nor lowliness is offensive in itself
but only when united in Christ so as to make him ‘a sign of contradiction’ that is
not directly recognizable as God but can only be seen as such indirectly in and
through the incognito of his lowliness and abasement…”70
In the end, then, we may agree with Law that the “choice confronting the human being is
not between Christ in lowliness and Christ in loftiness, which would divide Christ, but of
the united person of Christ, who is both lofty and lowly.”71

Summary: Etymological and Dialectical Aspects of the Paradoxical God-man
To conclude this section, we may briefly summarize our survey of Kierkegaard’s
account of the paradoxical God-man, and we may do so by referring to the two broad
categories outlined in the introduction to this study and which have been employed
throughout. From the discussion above, it is clear that Kierkegaard emphasizes both
etymological and dialectical aspects of paradox in his description of the God-man. With
respect to the former, Climacus in Fragments highlights the manner by which the paradox
limits human understanding in the understanding’s imperialistic attempt to gain mastery

69

Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 141. See also Law, Kierkegaard’s Kenotic Christology,

70

Walsh, “Kierkegaard’s Theology,” 299.
Law, “Existential Chalcedonian Christology,” 140.

221.
71

153
over the paradox.72 Anti-Climacus makes the same point at several places in Practice, as
when he writes that “the understanding must come to a standstill on [the absolute
paradox].”73 Such an etymological aspect is likewise at work in Anti-Climacus’ portrayal
of the God-man as the incognito and the sign of contradiction that causes the individual
to be halted in her movement towards Christ. With respect to the latter, we see how
Kierkegaard underscores the dialectical aspect of paradox in the accounts we have
outlined: Christ as the dialectical unity of eternal/temporal, Christ as the dialectical unity
of God/a particular human being, and Christ as the dialectical unity of
loftiness/lowliness. The focus here is not only the duality of the God-man, but also the
importance of holding the dialectical components of this duality in paradoxical tension.
Although it is important to point out that these etymological and dialectical aspects are
fundamentally intertwined and even inseparable, it is also imperative to take into account
the particular etymological and dialectical nuances Kierkegaard assigns to the God-man
in that these nuances carry slightly different implications for how the Incarnation
operates as well as how one relates to Jesus Christ, and thus how Christian existence
plays out in a concrete manner.

4.3 - Loss of Tension in Rejecting the Paradoxical God-man
Having outlined two variations of the paradoxical God-man, we may now turn to
the loss of tension associated with their rejection, and particularly what I identify as
implicit rejection and explicit rejection. The former assumes the form of Christendom
expressions of faith that rely upon non-paradoxical accounts of the Incarnation. In that
the God-man for Kierkegaard is essentially paradoxical, such a departure from paradox,
though not necessarily intended as a rejection, is nevertheless implicitly to reject the
72
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God-man. The latter represents the explicit refusal to accept the God-man precisely
because it is paradoxical, which is the robust response to Jesus Christ that Kierkegaard
identifies as offense. My claim is that both of these forms of rejection involve the loss of
tension that we have been describing thus far in this study.

Implicit Rejection: Christendom Expressions of Faith and Loss of Tension
One form of implicit rejection of the God-man, which is characteristic of civic
Christendom, plays out in the manner by which individuals appeal to an un-dialectical
account of the Incarnation in order to bolster the established religious order and thereby
their own standing within it. For Anti-Climacus, Christendom believers relate to Christ
strictly in terms of his glory, beauty, and power—as he towers over Denmark with
majesty much in the same way that Bertel Thorvaldsen’s statue of Christ towers over the
congregation of Vor Frue Kirke.74 As the glorious one who has overcome the world and
embedded his authority within the establishment, Christ is also seen as the victorious
head of the “Church triumphant” (triumpherende Kirke)75 in relation to which members of
this church, who thus view themselves as victors, assume a position of admiration. What
is conspicuously missing from this account of the God-man, however, is any mention of
Jesus Christ in his abasement, poverty, suffering, and weakness. Insofar as the God-man
is, for Kierkegaard, essentially paradoxical as the dialectical unity of loftiness/lowliness,
to emphasize Christ’s glory in the manner done within Christendom is thereby to reject
the Incarnation.
Another form of implicit rejection of the God-man, which is characteristic of
speculative Christendom, emerges in the attempt made by Christendom individuals to

Thorvaldsen’s Kristus altar statue represents Christ in his glorified resurrected state. Written on
the base is the phrase “Kommer til mig” from Matthew 11:28, which is the same biblical text upon which
Anti-Climacus grounds his early reflections in Practice.
75 See, e.g., SKS 12, 198-226 / PC, 201-32.
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construe the God-man as something that can be proven by means of historical evidence
or objective demonstration. Regarding historical evidence, Anti-Climacus parodies this
view when he notes that “certainty [Visheden] that [Jesus] was God increases with every
century, so that in our century, the nineteenth, certainty is the greatest it has ever been, a
certainty of which by comparison the first centuries had only a vague inkling.”76 Similarly,
with respect to objective demonstration Anti-Climacus writes in another ironical passage,
“Behind these, the demonstrations [Bevis] and folios, we feel perfectly convinced
[overbevise] ourselves and secure [sikker] against all attack, because every demonstration
and every folio end with: ergo, Christ was the one he claimed to be. By means of the
demonstrations it is just as certain [saa vist] as 2 + 2 = 4 and as easy as putting one’s foot
in a sock.”77 As becomes clear from these passages, motivating the turn to history and
demonstration is the drive to obtain certainty and security in one’s relation to Christ so as
to be assured that one has made the sensible choice in becoming a Christian.78 What this
move presupposes is that the God-man is precisely the kind of object that can be
subjected to such a speculative exercise. In other words, the assumption at work here is
that Jesus Christ can be related to in an objective fashion characteristic of the objective
approach to truth described by Climacus in Postscript.79 For Kierkegaard, however, the
God-man is essentially paradoxical in that it always transcends the understanding and
cannot be forced into the human frameworks of history and demonstration. As AntiClimacus succinctly puts it, “one cannot know [vide] anything at all about Christ; he is the
paradox…that history can never digest or convert into an ordinary syllogism.”80
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Therefore, to construe Christ in a speculative manner that removes the paradoxicality of
the God-man as boundary and limitation is thereby to reject the Incarnation.
Such implicit rejection involves loss of tension in significant ways. With respect
to civic Christendom, loss of tension comes as one departs from the paradoxical Godman and instead settles into the comfortable rest of the established religious order. In
Anti-Climacus’ view, the triumphant church that is led by the glorious Christ means that
“the time of struggling is over” and that there is “nothing more about or for which to
struggle.”81 As such, in contrast to those in the “Church militant” (stridende Kirke) who
remain in perpetual tension by embracing the abased Christ as the object of their faith
while paradoxically holding on to their belief in the glorious Christ,82 members of the
triumphant church sit back in comfort insofar as they deem that the victory has long
been won and there is therefore nothing left to be done. Moreover, in relating to the
glorious Christ through admiration such individuals need take no risks or suffer. Rather,
in smug laziness83 they can remain “safe and calm”84 with the “assurances and
reassurance”85 of “the calm and easy days of Christendom…”86 Whereas for Kierkegaard,
engaging the paradoxical God-man with its unsettling dynamic of glory and abasement or
loftiness and lowliness leads to the ratcheting-up of tension within the life of the believer,
in Christendom individuals “slacken” (afspændte) the paradox of the Incarnation and
thereby distil out “all the vitality and energy” (Saft og Kraft) from Christianity.87 The
resulting enervation is precisely the consequence of departing from the dynamic
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paradoxical God-man for expressing faith through the static entity of the established order
(det Bestaaende)88 with its coziness and gentle comfort.89
With regards to speculative Christendom, loss of tension comes as one departs
from the paradoxical God-man and instead settles into the false assurances of the
speculative system. Whereas engagement with the paradoxical God-man who transcends
human categories opens up a space of radical tension characterized by ambiguity,
uncertainty, and insecurity into which one with the full passion of subjectivity must take
a risk in order to enter, the speculative engagement with Christ in his non-paradoxical
form carries with it no such tension. In drawing speculative conclusions (Slutninger) about
Christ, one departs from the invigoration associated with making a resolution (Beslutning)
about something of which one has no objective certainty.90 Moreover, the push for
certainty and security associated with the mis-construal of the God-man provides one
with an enervating sense of peace and calm associated with the belief that one has arrived
at truth and thereby need no longer struggle. Although for Kierkegaard such peace and
calm are illusory precisely because the God-man is not something that can be proven or
demonstrated,91 they nevertheless operate as something of an opiate in the life of the
speculative thinker that allows him or her to settle into the speculative system with the
assurance that all difficulties have been neatly resolved. In other words, speculative
engagement with Jesus Christ inevitably leads to the state of enervation where,
metaphorically speaking, one no longer exists in the tension of uncertainty out on 70,000
fathoms of water,92 but rather rests in what one believes to be genuine comfort and
security upon a safe and fortified island (albeit an island of one’s own construction) that
88 The term det Bestaaende carries connotations of standing firm, which is to say, lack of movement.
As Anti-Climacus writes, “the Church militant is in the process of becoming [er i Vorden], whereas an
established [bestaaende] Christendom is [er], is not becoming [vorder ikke].” See SKS 12, 207 / PC, 211. Cf. SKS
13, 25 / PV, 18.
89 See, e.g., SKS 12, 97 / PC, 88; SKS 12, 125 / PC, 117.
90 SKS 4, 283 / PF, 84. See also SKS 7, 412 / CUP1, 454.
91 SKS 4, 245 / PF, 40.
92 SKS 7, 187 / CUP1, 204.
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is far removed from the danger of the open waters. Having discussed implicit rejection of
the paradoxical God-man, let us now shift our attention to the explicit rejection that
Kierkegaard identifies as offense.

Explicit Rejection: Offense and Loss of Tension
The notion of offense (Forargelse) is fundamentally tied to the paradox of the
God-man.93 As Climacus describes it, offense “comes into existence with the paradox…”94
More specifically, the paradoxical God-man serves as the possibility of offense in relation
to which offense becomes actualized as the wilful refusal of the God-man precisely because
it is paradoxical. Such explicit rejection, what Anti-Climacus would identify as
“aggravated,”95 is more severe than indirect rejection, and therefore its associated loss of
tension is more intense. In what follows, we may touch upon offense as it occurs in
relation to the two variations of the paradoxical God-man outlined in Section 4.2.
We may begin with offense in Fragments. To recall our discussion from above,
the absolute paradox, as the unknown and a boundary, leads to a collision between itself
and the understanding with two possible results: either the happy meeting of faith or the
unhappy meeting of offense. In the appendix to Chapter 3 entitled “Offense at the
Paradox (An Acoustical Illusion),” Climacus describes the latter as the refusal of the
understanding to accept both the transcendence of the paradox and its own limitations,
which plays out in the passionate fury whereby the understanding declares the paradox to
be foolish and absurd. This declaration, however, is an acoustical illusion (i.e., an echo) in
By offense Kierkegaard implies the scandalous stumbling block of which the Apostle Paul
writes in 1 Corinthians 1:23. See, e.g., SKS 4, 254n / PF, 50n; SKS 7, 195 / CUP1, 213; SKS 7, 200 / CUP1,
219; SKS 7, 266-7 / CUP1, 292-3; SKS 7, 490n / CUP1, 539-40n; SKS 7, 543-4 / CUP1, 598; SKS 7, 549 /
CUP1, 605; SKS 17, 34-6, AA:18 / JP 3, 3247; SKS 19, 49, Not1:7 / Pap. II C 35; SKS 22, 244-5, NB12:168
/ JP 1, 510; SKS 22, 304, NB13:48 / JP 3, 3034; SKS 24, 265, NB23:122 / JP 4, 4209; SKS 25, 391-2,
NB30:14 / JP 2, 2227; SKS 27, 299-310, Papir 306 / JP 4, 3916.
94 SKS 4, 255 / PF, 51. See Julia Watkin, Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy (Lanham,
MD and London: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 182.
95 See SKS 11, 194-5 / SUD, 80-1.
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that it is nothing more than what the absolute paradox has itself proclaimed96—
something the understanding fails to grasp because it is too preoccupied with flaunting
its own “magnificence” (Herlighed) and superiority over the paradox.97 Offense for
Climacus thus operates as a form of pride: it is out of pride that the understanding
refuses to give way in order for the paradox to give itself; it is out of pride that the
understanding derides the paradox for being absurd; and it is out of pride that the
understanding assumes a position of superiority in “insist[ing] that it itself has originated
[opfundet] the paradox.”98 It is this last point, and particularly Climacus’ use of a variation
of the word opfinde,99 that makes the connection to pride especially clear. In short, what
we see here is a battle of origins, or rather a battle over which of the two actors is more
foundational, with offense being the refusal of the understanding to recognize that the
absolute paradox serves as its grounding (i.e., Grund).100
At first glance it would appear, contrary to what I am suggesting, that the
description of offense as a form of passionate rebellion against the paradox represents a
clear case of power and vitality. On a closer look, however, we see that this is not the
case. As Climacus points out, offense at the absolute paradox is fundamentally a
suffering and a weakness.101 In one sense, the understanding suffers in that it does not
originate the offense, but rather offense is something that is placed upon the
understanding from outside of itself. In another sense, the understanding suffers in that
its imperialistic attempt to comprehend is met by the overpowering limiting force of the
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absolute paradox, which wounds and crushes the understanding.102 Thus, even as the
offended understanding lashes out against the paradox—when it “thrusts down the
object of love” or when it “self-tormentingly disciplines itself to callous indifference”—
all of this is nevertheless merely an “illusory expression of strength” that is still a
suffering.103 As Climacus remarks,
No matter if the offended one is sitting crushed and staring almost like a beggar
at the paradox, petrifying [forstenende] in his suffering, or even if he arms himself
with mockery and aims the arrows of his wit as if from a distance—he is
nevertheless suffering and is not at a distance. No matter if the offense came
and took the last crumb of comfort and joy from the offended one or if it made
him strong [stærk]—offense is nevertheless a suffering. It has struggled with the
stronger [den Stærkere], and his posture of vigor [Kraftstilling] has a physical
analogy to that of someone with a broken back, which does indeed give a
singular kind of suppleness.104
Despite such passive suffering, there is, nevertheless, an active component of offense in
the respect that the offended understanding does not allow itself to be annihilated (i.e.,
tilintetgjøre), but rather it remains standing in its prideful rejection of the paradox.105 Even
this stance, however, is still a fundamental expression of weakness, which is precisely
Climacus’ point when he writes that “active offense is always weak enough to be
incapable of tearing itself loose from the cross to which it is nailed or to pull out the
arrow with which it is wounded.”106 The weakness at play here is the same as that of the
despairing self of Indesluttethed that we described in the preceding chapter, namely the
state of the despair of weakness in which “sits the self, so to speak, watching itself,
preoccupied with or filling up time with not willing to be itself and yet being self enough
to love itself.”107 In rejecting the paradoxical God-man, the offended understanding thus
102 SKS 4, 253 / PF, 49. On what he calls the “imperialism” of reason, see Evans, Passionate
Reason, 61-2, 75-6, 78-9, 90, 93-4, 110, 116, 141, 178.
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105 SKS 4, 254 / PF, 50.
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107 SKS 11, 177 / SUD, 63. Interestingly, at one point in Practice Anti-Climacus uses the term
Indesluttethed in what appears to be a positive manner. See SKS 12, 233 / PC, 228.
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sinks down into frustrated impotence, and in this fashion it loses precisely the existential
tension with its associated vigor that is characteristic of the life of authentic faith.
Offense in Practice differs slightly from the Climacean account in that AntiClimacus explicitly ties it to the dialectical nature of the God-man as the paradoxical
unity of loftiness/lowliness.108 For example, in the invocation to No. 1, he writes,
“Would that we might see you as you are and were and will be until your second coming
in glory, as the sign of offense [Forargelsens Tegn] and the object of faith, the lowly man,
yet the Savior and Redeemer of the human race, who out of love came to earth to seek
the lost, to suffer and die…[A]gain and again in concern you had to repeat, ‘Blessed is
the one who is not offended [forarges] at me.’”109 In gesturing towards this particular
dialectical expression of the nature of the God-man, Anti-Climacus points to two forms
of offense: offense at loftiness and offense at lowliness.110 With the former, one assumes
Jesus Christ’s humanity as the starting point and thus becomes offended that such a
lowly person claims to be God: “The possibility of essential offense in relation to
loftiness, that an individual human being speaks or acts as if he were God, declares
himself to be God, therefore in relation to the qualification ‘God’ in the composition
God-man.”111 With the latter, one assumes Jesus Christ’s divinity as the starting point and
thus becomes offended that the almighty God manifests himself as a human being in a
state of utter destitution: “The possibility of essential offense in relation to lowliness, that
the one who passes himself off as God proves to be the lowly, poor, suffering, and

108 This account of offense is nevertheless similar to that described by Climacus in Fragments as
that which arises from the limitation imposed upon the understanding. For Anti-Climacus, offense arises
from the inability of the individual to comprehend how Jesus Christ could be both lofty and lowly at the
same time. On this point, see Cappelørn, “Movements of Offense,” 110.
109 SKS 12, 17-18 / PC, 9-10. Cf. SKS 12, 143-4 / PC, 140.
110 SKS 12, 93 / PC, 82-3. Technically, Anti-Climacus speaks about three forms of offense. The
first form he considers preliminary offense, which is the offense not at Jesus Christ as the God-man, but
rather simply the offense that occurs when a single individual collides with an established order. See SKS
12, 92-3 / PC, 82; SKS 12, 94 / PC, 85. In contrast, offense proper is that which I have introduced here,
namely offense at the lofty/lowly nature of the God-man. For a good discussion of this distinction, see
Cappelørn, “Movements of Offense,” 111-17.
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finally powerless human being.”112 It is important to note that these forms of offense are
dialectical in the sense that neither loftiness nor lowliness is in itself offensive, but rather
each becomes such when related to the other.113 Thus, both forms of offense are
precisely offense at the paradoxical nature of the God-man: either that this particular human
being claims to be God or that God claims to be this particular human being. As with
offense in Fragments, such two-fold offense is likewise an expression of pride in the sense
that it is grounded in the demand made by the offended individual that Jesus Christ
conform to her own categories of what the Incarnation should or should not be as well
as in the refusal to recognize and to relate to Jesus Christ as the paradox he essentially
is.114
Having established that offense in Practice is therefore offense at the paradoxical
nature of the God-man, how then is such offense tied to loss of tension? As the first step
in answering this question we will need to return to the notion of the possibility of
offense. In an important passage at the beginning of No. 2, Anti-Climacus remarks that
the possibility of offense “is the crossroad, or it is like standing at the crossroad” where
“one turns either to offense or to faith…”115 For Anti-Climacus, this crossroad involves a
certain kind of cessation of movement out of which faith or offense can emerge. In
general terms, he describes this phenomenon as the moment in which the understanding
“comes to a standstill” (staaer…stille) on the paradox and the absolute.116 In describing the
particular “crossroad” that emerges when it is made manifest that the call to the glorious
God is voiced by Jesus in his abasement,117 Anti-Climacus employs the etymologically
related language of “the halt” (Standsningen). As he puts it, “if you are disinclined to sneak
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into being a Christian, then there is a prodigious halt, the halt that is the condition for
faith to be able to come into existence: you are halted by the possibility of offense.”118
Thus, in running towards God in order to have one’s burdened lightened and to find rest
(Hvile), individuals are stopped in their tracks as they collide with the paradoxical Godman in the incognito of utter lowliness. What both notions of “coming to a standstill”
and “the halt” display is that cessation of movement is for Kierkegaard not inherently
problematic; to the contrary, in this case stillness serves as the necessary condition for
the emergence of both faith and offense. In other words, the halt is precisely what opens
up a space in which one is able to make a choice between these two responses to the
paradoxical God-man. But how, exactly, does the response of offense to the halt play out
as loss of tension?
In one sense, offense in response to the halt involves a new and deeper form of
motionlessness into which the offended individual slides. This motionlessness is
qualitatively different from the cessation of motion introduced by the halt in that
whereas the former includes the possibility of faith and therefore represents a stillness
that is pregnant with edification, the latter as a rejection of the God-man is strictly
destructive. For Anti-Climacus, despite the halt, the invitation still remains in full force
and requires an immediate response, and therefore hesitation (i.e., delaying action by
taking recourse in a certain kind of distance-creating reflective activity) is the primary
expression of this offended lack of motion. As he puts it, “‘Come here!’ Oh, do not stand
still [staa…ikke stille] and hesitate [betænke Dig]—no, consider [betænke] that each moment
you stand still [staaer stille] after hearing the invitation you will hear its call more faintly
and thus distance yourself even if you remain on the spot [bliver paa Stedet].”119 In another
sense, the offended response to the halt also plays out in what appears on the surface to
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be a robust form of motion. As Anti-Climacus points out, what one observes in the
offense that is the rejection of the invitation to find rest in God is a vast crowd of people
who at first shudder and recoil in meeting Jesus Christ, but then “storm ahead” and
“trample down” in flight from the offensive lowly God—almost as if Christ, rather than
offering an invitation, instead shouted “away, away O unhallowed ones!”120 Although
Anti-Climacus uses the image of fleeing here, what we see is the same dynamic of
distancing oneself from God that is in actuality a form of stifling stillness. In other
words, despite the superficial differences between hesitation and fleeing as offended
responses to the halt, they both involve the same loss of tension: whether passively
rejecting the God-man by refusing to heed the invitation and remaining standing still or
actively rejecting the God-man by fleeing the invitation, both forms represent the
enervation associated with becoming petrified in one’s corruption that is the state of sin.
In the same fashion as with Indesluttethed, this offended response to the God-man is
demonically inward-looking and suffocating. In short, then, the response of offense at
the God-man that results from the refusal to embrace him in his full paradoxicality as
described by Anti-Climacus in Practice represents yet another fundamental form of the
loss of tension.

4.4 - Sacred Tension in Embracing the Paradoxical God-man
For this section we may turn our attention to the sacred tension associated with
embracing the God-man and draw out in concrete terms what this entails for Christian
existence. More specifically, I outline what I identify as four particular expressions of
such sacred tension and I point to humble striving as the central virtue underlying these
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expressions—a virtue exemplified in the biblical figures of John the Baptist and the
Apostle Peter.

Sacred Tension in Embracing the Paradoxical God-man: Four Expressions
The first expression of sacred tension is what we may identify as the dynamic
movement of passionate limitation. To recall our discussion of Fragments above, the
absolute paradox serves as a boundary with which the understanding is “continually
colliding” (støder…bestandig) and which is “continually arrived at” (bestandig kommes),121 but
which is never transgressed or overcome. Whereas the response of offense to this
situation is one of enervation, in the response of faith the understanding finds such
continual unresolved colliding to be vitalizing. More specifically, the understanding runs
up against the paradox and its own limitations, but out of wonder122 it passionately
embraces these limitations and is empowered to return to the paradox by which it once
again undergoes the same process of collision—limitation—engagement. In faith, then,
the understanding does not settle down by merely resolving itself to the
incomprehensibility of the paradox, but instead, as Climacus argues, it responds to such
incomprehensibility with a certain sort of dissatisfaction123—or, perhaps better put, with
a profound sense of longing (i.e., Længsel)124—by which it restlessly seeks “to
comprehend even more deeply…that the paradox is the paradox.”125 Rather than
something enervating or destructive, such longing dissatisfaction serves as an edifying
impetus that increases tension by pushing the understanding into continuous striving
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whereby the Christian individual remains in passionate pursuit of the paradox.126 Thus,
although Climacus writes at certain places about the paradox replacing the category of
motion (Bevægelse) with the category of rest (Hvile) or about the paradox bringing the
understanding to a standstill,127 he is nevertheless clear that faith is essentially a dynamic
movement of perpetual engagement with the absolute paradox characterized by the
passionate embracing of one’s limitations.
A second expression of sacred tension is what we may call the dynamic of
holding on to certainty in uncertainty or security in insecurity. On the one hand, in
embracing the paradoxical God-man, Climacus is clear that the faithful individual must
thereby give up a particular type of certainty and security. Underlying this point is
Climacus’ definition of faith as “An objective uncertainty [den objective Uvished] held fast
[fastholdt] through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness”128—what he also describes
as the “uncertainty of faith” (Troens Usikkerhed).129 Objectively speaking, the person of
faith is unable to rest in historical evidence or demonstration, but rather she restlessly
remains in uncertainty; yet, it is just such restless uncertainty that leads to vitalization. In
Climacus’ terms, uncertainty “is precisely what intensifies the infinite passion of
inwardness, and truth is precisely the daring venture of choosing the objective
uncertainty [det objektivt Uvisse] with the passion of the infinite.”130 On the other hand,
embracing the paradoxical God-man for Climacus also involves a particular kind of
certainty—albeit a certainty that is informed by uncertainty.131 As he notes,
[T]he certitude of faith [Troens Vished] that relates itself to an eternal happiness is
defined by uncertainty [Uvisheden]. If I remove the uncertainty in order to obtain
an even higher certainty, then I do not have a believer in humility, in fear and
SKS 7, 510 / CUP1, 561.
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trembling, but an ethetic coxcomb, a devil of a fellow who, figuratively speaking,
wants to fraternize with God but, strictly speaking, does not relate himself to
God at all. Uncertainty is the sign, and certainty without it is the sign that one
does not relate oneself to God.132
Sacred tension in relation to the paradoxical God-man is therefore to find certainty in the
midst of uncertainty and security in the midst of insecurity. This is precisely “the
struggling certainty” (den stridende Vished) that one gains “not as the battle becomes easier
or more illusory but only as it becomes harder.”133 Moreover, what makes this dynamic a
particularly good description of sacred tension is that in Climacus’ view it is perpetually
upheld in one’s ongoing relation to the paradoxical God-man. Climacus makes this point
in numerous passages,134 but he does so particularly well in the conclusion to Postscript
when he writes, “Faith is the objective uncertainty with the repulsion of the absurd, held
fast [fastholdt] in the passion of inwardness, which is the relation of inwardness intensified
to its highest. This formula fits only the one who has faith, no one else, not even a lover,
or an enthusiast, or a thinker, but solely and only the one who has faith, who relates
himself to the absolute paradox.”135 Lest we give an improper picture of Climacus’ view,
it is important to note that such perpetual holding fast of uncertainty is not something
that the individual carries out strictly in his or her own power. Rather, it is possible only
because divine enabling and aid are also involved. For Climacus, this is precisely what
differentiates faith from the path of self-reliance, for as he notes, “it is easier to maintain
a weak hope by one’s own powers than to gain certitude [Vished] by virtue of the absurd.”136
As such, the tension described here fundamentally depends upon one’s relation to the
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absolute paradox as well as one’s reception of divine assistance—which is precisely what
makes it sacred tension.
A third expression of sacred tension is what we may identify as the dynamic of
perpetual annulment of offense. Although this is certainly present in Fragments in the
understanding’s continuous avoidance of offense in continuously accepting its
limitations, it is even more explicitly at play in Practice. To recall our discussion of Practice
from above, Jesus Christ, from his position of lowliness, invites all to come to him after
which this same lowliness serves as the halt that is the possibility of offense. In contrast
to the offended one who falls away into enervation, the person of faith remains in the
tense position involved in embracing the paradoxical God-man who is both seen as the
lowly man and believed to be the glorious God. And despite his or her weariness, this
person still pushes on “in taking one more step”137 in engaging with Christ. Such a
pushing on is precisely what it means to perpetually annul offense. Kierkegaard is clear
that the possibility of offense never disappears for the existing believer, but rather it is
“close by at every moment”138 and “in relation to Christ qua God-man [it] will continue
until the end of time”139 much in the same way that a person’s shadow never ceases to
accompany her.140 As such, the believer necessarily finds herself in the position by which
she must continually renew her task of “push[ing] through the possibility of offense” by
reaffirming the conviction that “I want only one thing, I want to belong to Christ, I want
to be a Christian.”141 Cappelørn provides a helpful gloss on this dynamic:
The believer who has passed through the possibility of offense and now thinks
he or she has believed enough, has become perfect in faith and comprehends it,
is in fact on his or her way to losing faith, just as he or she can lose his or her
mind. The possibility of offense is indeed “a suspended moment” but only in
the instant when the individual obtains faith. It is not, however, abolished in
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faith, but is included in it—as a lasting possibility. A perfect faith, a fulfilled
faith, or a finished faith, which has completed the task of believing and of
fighting faith’s battle against the possibility of offense, does not exist.142
Just as with the preceding two dynamics, what makes such annulment of offense a good
representation of sacred tension is that it is not carried out once and for all, but rather is
pursued at every moment. As Anti-Climacus nicely puts it, “faith conquers the world by
conquering at every moment [i ethvert Øieblik] the enemy within one’s inner being, the
possibility of offense.”143 Such tension is certainly an expression of restlessness that
stands in stark contrast to the pseudo-rest of comfortable Christendom,144 but it is at the
same time also a form of rest, albeit rest in restlessness. In the invitation, Christ calls all
to come and find rest (Hvile) in him, and the important emphasis here is on in him in the
sense that such rest is precisely rest in the dynamic and paradoxical God-man with both
his demands and his grace. Such a dynamic of restless rest is precisely what is at play in
Matthew 11 upon which Anti-Climacus bases his reflections, for not only is Christ
inviting the individual to find rest in him, but at the same time he also insists that his
yoke be taken up—a yoke that is demanding but nevertheless still easy and light.145 In
summary, then, sacred tension as perpetual annulment of offense is the position in which
one is halted but continually pushes on in faith by refusing to fall into offense. Such
annulment is to find rest, but it is a rest that is grounded on the dynamic foundation of
the paradoxical God-man, which means that it remains in perpetual movement in pursuit
of Christ.146
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A fourth expression of sacred tension in relation to the paradoxical God-man is
that which plays out in the dynamic of imitation (Efterfølgelse).147 In contrast to admiration,
which is a “doz[ing] off” into infatuation where one distances oneself from Christ and
settles down into risk-free comfort,148 Anti-Climacus calls for Christians to be awoken
into the dangerous task of imitation. Again, due to his polemical purposes in Practice,
Anti-Climacus, while acknowledging the importance of holding on to belief in Christ in
his loftiness, draws special attention to the abased Christ as the one who calls individuals
into imitation. It is precisely in order to oppose the Christendom tendency to run off
prematurely to the glorious Christ that Anti-Climacus stresses that “it is the abased Christ
who is speaking, that every word we have from Christ is from him, the abased one.”149
What this means, then, is that the imitating individual does not sit back in sleepy
comfort, but rather she actively undertakes the task of conforming herself to Christ in his
lowliness—which means first and foremost that she will inevitably face a great deal of
suffering.150 At the same time, however, Anti-Climacus is also clear that in imitation,
Christ is to be understood and related to as the prototype (Forbillede) who is not simply
the lowly human being, but rather the paradoxical unity of loftiness/lowliness that stands
both behind the individual in lowliness and ahead of the individual in loftiness:
Christ came to the world with the purpose of saving the world, also with the
purpose—this in turn is implicit in his first purpose—of being the prototype, of
leaving footprints for the person who wanted to join him, who then might
become an imitator; this indeed corresponds to “footprints.” That is why he let
himself be born in lowliness and thereupon lived poor, abandoned, despised,
abased—yes, no human being has lived so abased as he. By comparing the
conditions of his life with Christ’s, even the otherwise lowliest person would
have to come to the conclusion that his own life, humanly speaking, is far
preferable in comparison with the conditions of Christ’s life. Why, then, this
147 Imitation for Kierkegaard is central to what it means to exist in a proper fashion as a Christian.
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lowliness and abasement? Because he who is truly to be the prototype and be
related only to imitators must in one sense be behind people, propelling forward,
while in another sense he stands ahead, beckoning. This is the relation of
loftiness and lowliness in the prototype.151
The tension at work here, then, is precisely that in becoming an imitator of Christ one
becomes “just as poor, despised, insulted, [and] mocked”152 while still holding firm to
belief in the glorious and lofty God who has the power to transform lowly sinners.153 In
other words, one is to struggle and to suffer all the while never letting go of the hope of
glory. This dynamic is indeed the antithesis to the enervated stillness of offense in that it
is within such a dynamic that one remains in the constant motion of following after (i.e.,
følge efter) Christ while embracing him in his full paradoxicality as both the lofty one and
the lowly one.
Imitation, however, also serves as an expression of sacred tension in another
crucial sense that is tied to Christ in his dual role as the lofty prototype and the lowly
redeemer. In imitation, one inevitably falls short in one’s striving after the ideal demand
set up by Christ that “crushes the imitator” and “thrusts him back.”154 As such, the
possibility of imitation also depends upon grace and redemption. In the lead-off prayer
to his essay “Christ as the Prototype,” Kierkegaard offers a nice description of this
dynamic:
Help us all, each one of us, you who both will and can, you who are both the
prototype and the Redeemer [Forbilledet og Forsoneren], and in turn both the
Redeemer and the prototype, so that when the striving one droops under the
prototype, crushed, almost despairing, the Redeemer raises him up again; but at
the same moment you are again the prototype so that he may be kept in the
striving.155
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The tension for the imitator is therefore that of fully striving after the ideal prototype
while at the same time relying entirely upon the grace and redemption provided by the
redeemer when this striving inevitably comes up short. With this dynamic Kierkegaard
clearly gestures towards the fundamental tension of Christian existence encompassed in
the Lutheran notion of simil justus et peccator in which believers find themselves negotiating
the life of faith as both sinner and saved. Cappelørn nicely describes this in terms of
tension: “Human beings are both forgiven of sin and continue to commit sin. Human
beings can never overcome the tension in this life. They will always have a foothold in
both camps.”156 In the end, such a dual existence does not lead to despair, but rather it
pushes the imitator into greater and greater existential tension as she continues to pursue
and to be met by the paradoxical God-man who is both prototype and redeemer.

Humble Striving and Two Concrete Exemplars
To begin to draw this section to a close, we may turn to the virtue of humble
striving. My claim is that this virtue is central to the disposition of the individual of faith
living within the sacred tension that I have described above. In other words, sacred
tension in relation to the paradoxical God-man requires that one’s existential stance is
fundamentally informed by humility and striving. In what follows, I touch upon humble
striving as well as show briefly how it is exemplified in two biblical figures that
Kierkegaard discusses in his writings, namely John the Baptist and the Apostle Peter.157
For Kierkegaard, humility and striving are both crucial to the proper
engagement with the God-man essential to sacred tension. With respect to the latter, for
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example, in Fragments, the individual who embraces the paradoxical God-man strives in
perpetually pushing forward in pursuit of the paradox without falling into offense. In
Postscript Climacus makes it clear that in relating to the absolute paradox of the God-man
that closes off the objective way, the properly subjective individual who is not offended
will respond with a fundamental striving that is “motivated and repeatedly refreshed
[forfrisket] by the decisive passion of the infinite…”158 And, for Anti-Climacus striving is
precisely what it means to turn away from the possibility of offense in the halt and
instead to move forward in imitation of Christ. With respect to the former, for example,
in Fragments humility is what underlies recognition of the paradox as superior to the
human understanding.159 Moreover, humility in recognizing the paradox also involves the
humble acceptance of revelation and grace. To recall our discussion from above, given
that the knower finds himself in a state of sin in which he is fundamentally opposed to
the truth, it becomes necessary for the god not only to reveal the truth but also to create
the condition for the knower to grasp such truth by transforming him. Although
Climacus allows for the possibility that one may freely reject such revelation out of pride
and thereby fall into offense,160 he is clear that it is only in humbly receiving what the god
reveals as well as the god’s transforming work that one is able to come into the truth. In
other words, while the sinful individual refuses to allow himself to be helped,161 the
person of humility accepts help and thus through the power of the divine becomes a new
being. In addition, the task of imitation essentially involves humility.162 Whereas
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York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 88.
160 Lee Barrett, “The Paradox of Faith in Philosophical Fragments: Gift or Task?” in International
Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press, 1994), 275-6; Timothy P. Jackson, “Arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace
and Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 250.
161 See, e.g., SKS 12, 90 / PC, 78.
162 See, e.g., SKS 16, 244 / JFY, 198.
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Christendom responds to the demands made by Jesus in his call to imitation by
diminishing the demand, which is actually a veiled form of pride, for Kierkegaard
authentic Christianity requires instead that the demand is radically emphasized and that
one’s inevitable failure to meet the demand in the attempt to imitate Christ is followed by
humble confession and repentance.163 As Anti-Climacus puts it, “each individual in quiet
inwardness before God [i stille Inderlighed for Gud] is to humble himself [ydmyge sig] under
what it means in the strictest sense to be a Christian, is to confess honestly before God
where he is so that he still might worthily accept the grace that is offered to every
imperfect person—that is, to everyone.”164 In the end, then, we may say that humble
striving as outlined here is for Kierkegaard the most appropriate manner by which to
engage the paradoxical God-man. It is for this reason that he identifies such humble
striving as true worship:
[I]n order to worship God properly and to have the proper joy from
worshipping, a person must conduct himself in this way: he must strive [stræbe]
with all his might, spare himself neither night nor day; he must accumulate, and
the more the better, what people of integrity, speaking humanly, would call good
deeds. And when he then takes them and deeply humbled before God [dybt
ydmyget for Gud] sees them transformed into something miserable and base—this
is what it is to worship God…165
In order to lend further support to my claim that humble striving operates as the central
virtue of what it means to exist within sacred tension in relation to the paradoxical Godman, we may conclude this section with an excursus into the biblical figures of John the
Baptist and the Apostle Peter as concrete exemplars of such humble striving. Let us
begin with John.166
SKS 12, 15 / PC, 7.
SKS 12, 79 / PC, 67. See also SKS 12, 80 / PC, 68 where Anti-Climacus ties such humility to
consciousness of sin.
165 SKS 16, 203 / JFY, 154.
166 Portions of this section are reproduced verbatim from Matthew T. Nowachek, “John the
Baptist as Exemplar for the Understanding: Reading Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments alongside an
Upbuilding Discourse,” Theology 116, no. 4 (2013), 254-65. Permission for reuse of this material has been
granted by the publisher.
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One important glimpse into John the Baptist as exemplar comes in John 3:2730. This gospel text recounts John’s second testimony about Jesus in which he
recognizes the superiority of Christ with the confident statement “This joy of mine is
full. He must increase; I must decrease.” In reflecting on this passage, Kierkegaard, in an
upbuilding discourse from 1844 appropriately entitled “He Must Increase; I Must
Decrease,” focuses on both John’s disposition (Sindelag) and his task (Gjerning). As
Kierkegaard describes it, John’s disposition is one of humble self-denial.167 In contrast to
the improper forms of self-denial associated with the grumbling decreasing of one who is
still egotistically concerned with his own status168 or a grudging and peevish continuation
in one’s lowliness,169 Kierkegaard describes John’s disposition of “diminishing” (at gaae
ned)170 as one in which John recognizes, accepts, and lives out his subservient position to
that which is superior, namely the Messiah. In denying himself, however, John does so
neither in meekness nor in dour self-hatred, but rather in courage and bold confidence.
Furthermore, John’s task is one of preparation, which is the fulfilment of John’s
prophetic commissioning that he accepts and carries out with zeal. For Kierkegaard, this
task centers on the two roles of servant and witness: in preparing the way for the
Messiah, John takes an active step in serving the message and the mission of the one who
is greater, and in this fashion he also witnesses to the one who is greater who has come.
What this task means is not that John therefore disappears into the background; to the
contrary, and paradoxically, by decreasing in order that the Messiah may increase, John
himself is likewise elevated and increases.171 For our purposes here, we may note that
John’s joyful diminishing that incorporates the zealous tasks of serving and witnessing

SKS 5, 273 / EUD, 279.
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169 SKS 5, 275 / EUD, 281.
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171 SKS 5, 278 / EUD, 285.
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provides an excellent concrete picture of what it means to practice humble striving in
relation to the paradoxical God-man.
Another picture of John the Baptist as exemplar is that from Matthew 11:2-6.
This passage recounts the situation in which John, who has been imprisoned by King
Herod, sends his disciples to Jesus to enquire about whether or not Jesus is the expected
Messiah. In response to John’s disciples, Jesus offers a striking reply: “Go back and
report to John what you hear and see: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who
have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is
proclaimed to the poor. Blessed is anyone who is not offended on account of me.”172 In Practice,
Anti-Climacus draws attention to this text by focusing on the peculiar nature of Christ’s
response and how this opens up the possibility of offense. As he notes, “Christ does not
answer directly; he does not say: Tell John I am the expected one. That is, he requires
faith…”173 Christ’s reply, then, entails that John is provided with no objective certainty
on which to rest, but rather he is left to engage in a subjective fashion with the
paradoxical sign of contradiction that has engaged him.174 What we see in this text, and
what plays out in the remainder of the Gospel account concerning John, is that John the
Baptist faces the existential challenge of the paradoxical God-man with full earnestness
by taking the active step of striving to believe in Jesus Christ as the Messiah despite the
inherent ambiguity of Christ’s manifestation. To put this differently, in the face of
uncertainty and in incredible risk, John humbles himself to follow Christ, and in this
fashion he annuls the possibility of offense so as to live in faith. It is precisely within
such humble striving, which Christ identifies as “blessed,” that John moves forward with
bold confidence to face his execution. As an account of what it means to exist in relation

Matthew 11:4-6 (NIV; translation modified; the italicized emphasis is my own). Kierkegaard
alludes to this passage in the same 1844 discourse discussed above. See SKS 5, 276-7 / EUD, 283-4.
173 SKS 12, 103 / PC, 94.
174 For a nice description of this dynamic, see Cappelørn, “Movements of Offense,” 113.
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to the paradoxical God-man, John’s example is among the greatest within the New
Testament.
Along with John the Baptist, the Apostle Peter likewise provides the Christian
with a valuable concrete example of humble striving in relation to the paradoxical Godman.175 In particular, this plays out most clearly in the dramatic and turbulent process of
Peter’s imitation of Christ. Peter certainly offers an unambiguous picture of what it
means to fall short of the demand established by the prototype. For example, he doubts
Christ and sinks into the Sea of Galilee after beginning to walk on water; he wrongly
rebukes Christ for predicting his impending death, which is met by Christ’s own rebuke
of Peter, “Get behind me Satan!”; three times he fails to remain awake with Christ at
Gethsemane; and three times after Christ’s arrest he denies his master. Additionally, in
Practice Anti-Climacus lays particular emphasis on Peter’s offense at the lowliness of the
God-man associated with Christ’s suffering and powerlessness. As he notes,
[W]hat causes Peter to be quite beside himself, what hits him like a stroke, is
that he had believed that Christ was the Father’s only begotten Son. That a
human being falls into the power of his enemies and then does nothing, that is
human. But that the one whose almighty hand had done signs and wonders, that
he now stands there powerless and paralyzed—precisely this is what brings
Peter to deny him.176
In his writings Kierkegaard makes not a few references to these failures, and, moreover,
on account of Peter’s sin Kierkegaard even identifies him as a “pitiful prototype” (sørgelige
Forbillede).177 Despite this pitifulness, Kierkegaard nevertheless still views Peter as “the

175 Compared to some biblical figures such as Abraham, Peter receives far less attention in
Kierkegaard’s authorship. Despite this, Kierkegaard nevertheless describes Peter as an important figure.
See, e.g., SKS 9, 114 / WL, 110; SKS 9, 168 / WL, 167-8; SKS 12, 126 / PC, 119. On this point, see Joel
D.S. Rasmussen, “The Pitiful Prototype: Concerning Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the Apostle Peter as a
Model for Christian Witness,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2007, ed. Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and Karl
Verstrynge (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 274.
176 SKS 12, 112 / PC, 104. Cf. SKS 12, 125-6 / PC, 118-19.
177 SKS 10, 298 / CD, 278.
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most honest and faithful disciple”178 and the “epitome of all perfections.”179 Although
Kierkegaard is clear that Peter serves as a prototype because of the risk he takes to follow
Christ and to leave “the certain [det Visse] and choose the uncertain [det Uvisse],”180 we
may also point out that Peter is a powerful example of what it means in humility to
receive redemption and because of this to be saved from offense in order to continue to
strive. Both the Bible and Kierkegaard focus on more than simply Peter’s failure to live
up to the ideal demand; they also stress how his life is informed by grace: as Peter sinks
into the Sea of Galilee, Christ comes and raises him out of the water; after Peter falls
asleep three times and denies Jesus three times, the resurrected Christ meets him with a
three-fold forgiveness and a new commission to carry on the task of striving; and as
Peter in offense improperly rebukes Christ, Jesus nevertheless moves forward in building
his church upon Peter. In Peter, therefore, what we observe is not humility and striving
that work against one another, but rather the vitalizing dialectic of humble striving. In his
sinful failures, in his acceptance of Christ’s redemption, and in his recommitment to
imitation, Peter thus displays precisely how such humble striving is central to Christian
existence as it plays out in relation to Jesus Christ. And by living in a manner expressed
by such humble striving, not only is Peter blessed (salig), but through such blessing Christ
himself receives incredible joy (Glæde):
[Christ’s] joy over the believer is like a human being’s joy over becoming
understood, completely understood, by another. He is indeed not like a human
being; he cannot be understood or comprehended—he must be believed—but
in faith you belong to him completely, and his joy is as great as that of the
person who found someone who understood him. How great was his joy when
he considered Peter blessed—“Blessed are you, Simon Peter,”—because Peter
believed; how great his joy was you can see in his asking Peter three times: Do
you love me?181
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In the end, then, we may say that with his humble striving, Peter provides the Christian
with one of the greatest examples of what it means to relate in a proper manner to the
paradoxical God-man.

4.5 - Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I argued that Kierkegaard, in contrast to what he understands to
be the problematic Christological views of his era, develops his own account of the
Incarnation by appealing to the notion of paradox. Moreover, I focused on two
variations of the paradoxical God-man as presented in the Climacean works and in
Practice, which I suggested carry significant implications for Christian existence. In
particular, I claimed that in contrast to the loss of tension associated with both indirect
and direct rejection of the paradoxical God-man, embracing the paradox of Jesus Christ
represents yet another expression of sacred tension in Kierkegaard’s thought, of which
the central virtue proves to be humble striving.
In converging on humble striving as the central virtue for what it means to exist
as a Christian within the sacred tension associated with the paradoxical God-man, we
have once again come full circle to Chapter 1. More specifically, from our discussion in
this chapter it becomes apparent that humble striving mirrors the fundamental dialectic
of grace/works that we previously outlined. On the one hand, by emphasizing the
importance of striving in continuously running up against the paradox that stands as a
boundary to human understanding without succumbing to offense as well as by
emphasizing the tasks of passionate limitation, holding on to certainty in uncertainty and
security in insecurity, perpetually annulling offense, and imitation, Kierkegaard clearly
points to the centrality of works in the life of the believer. On the other hand, by placing
significant stress on humble acceptance of one’s limitations as revealed by the paradox,
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on embracing the God-man in the role of savior who overcomes one’s sin by providing
the condition, and on the necessity of resting restlessly in the lowly inviter who calls all to
come to him so that they may be redeemed and transformed, Kierkegaard emphasizes
the irrevocable importance of grace for the Christian. Just as with grace and works, we
may also point out that for Kierkegaard neither striving nor humility is to be stressed to
the exclusion of the other, but rather they are both to be held in dynamic tension.
Moreover, humble striving also mirrors the grace/works dialectic outlined in Chapter 1 in
the sense that it is likewise intimately tied to the fear and trembling that the Apostle Paul
describes in Philippians 2:12-13 and to which Kierkegaard repeatedly returns in his
authorship. In Anti-Climacus’ words, the task of the Christian is “above all [to] maintain
humility and fear and trembling in relation to what it truly means to be a Christian. For it
is along that way that you must go in order to learn and to practice resorting to grace in
such a way that you do not take it in vain…”182 As we have argued in this chapter, such a
task is possible only when one remains in a continuous and intimate relationship with the
paradoxical God-man. In this sense, Climacus’ words are entirely appropriate when he
notes, “O blessed fear and trembling! How blessed to be able to fulfil God’s
requirements while smiling at the demands of the times. How blessed to despair over not
being able to do it as long as one does not let go of God!”183 For his Danish
contemporaries who attempt to avoid the tension as well as the fear and trembling
associated with humble striving in particular and the dialectic of grace/works in general,
Kierkegaard’s account of the paradoxical God-man thus serves as a radical challenge and
a crucial piece of his overarching ethico-religious task of (re)introducing Christianity to
Christendom.
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One important theme we have discussed in this chapter has been the love of
God and the God-man for the individual human being. Love, for Kierkegaard, is one of
the central components of the life of faith. For this reason, in our final chapter we may
turn to Kierkegaard’s account of love that he develops in Works of Love. As we will see,
paradox and sacred tension are also at play in significant ways within this text.
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CHAPTER 5
PARADOX AND LOVE:
ON DOUBLE-VISION, GROUNDING, AND CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE
Just as the quiet lake originates [grunder] deep down in hidden springs no
eye has seen, so also does a person’s love originate even more deeply in
God’s love. If there were no gushing spring at the bottom, if God were not
love, then there would be neither the little lake nor a human being’s love.1
[T]he life of love is hidden, but its hidden life is in itself motion [Bevægelse]
and has eternity within itself.2
[A] life without loving is not worth living…3

In this chapter I turn to the fourth and final expression of paradox we will
consider, namely that which Kierkegaard associates with Christian love (i.e., Kjerlighed).
Up to this point I have not been overly explicit in my argument to emphasize the
fundamental role played by human others as well as the centrality for the Christian life of
relating to and remaining in relationship with such others. I have thereby run the risk of
construing Kierkegaard as an advocate for a spiritualized individualism in which the
solitary individual’s relationship to the divine is set up as the only factor that really matters
for the life of faith.4 My focus here on Kierkegaard’s foundational text Works of Love
(Kjerlighedens Gjerninger),5 with its emphasis on the importance of loving both God and
human beings, therefore makes a much needed contribution to my overall project. When

SKS 9, 17-18 / WL, 9-10.
SKS 9, 18 / WL, 10.
3 SKS 9, 45 / WL, 38. Cf. Socrates’ claim from the Apology that “the unexamined life is not worth
1
2

living.”

4 This impression emerges in Chapter 2 in my emphasis on Abraham’s relationship to God, in
Chapter 3 in my emphasis on the individual as existing before God, and in Chapter 4 in my emphasis on the
individual’s pursuit and imitation of Christ. Mark C. Taylor criticizes Kierkegaard on this front in his work
Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1975), 343-72, which has in turn been nicely answered in Gregory R. Beabout and Brad Frazier, “A
Challenge to the ‘Solitary Self’ Interpretation of Kierkegaard,” History of Philosophical Quarterly 17, no. 1
(2000): 75-98.
5 As Ronald Green and Theresa Ellis correctly put it, “Works of Love is not just a study of
Christian love. It is the capstone of Kierkegaard’s entire philosophy of love.” See “Erotic Love in the
Religious Existence-Sphere,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Works of Love, ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 367. See also M. Jamie Ferreira, “Love,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
328.
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we assume the lens of this work, what emerges is a picture of Christian existence as
sacred tension characterized by the lover who remains perpetually engaged in loving
relationships with God and with others—a dynamic existential stance I characterize in
this chapter as loving within the sacred tension.
The task undertaken here, however, might appear at first glance to be an
improper attempt to import the concept of paradox from Kierkegaard’s earlier
philosophical writings into his explicitly Christian work on love where it is not entirely at
home.6 Indeed, this perception is sharpened by the fact that Kierkegaard employs neither
the word Paradox nor its cognate forms a single time within Works of Love. In response,
we may note that the absence of the terminology of paradox in Kierkegaard’s exposition
does not thereby entail that the notion of paradox has no important role to play therein.7
To the contrary, Kierkegaard makes use of this notion in a manifold of ways. For
example, both M. Jamie Ferreira and William McDonald have pointed to dialectical
parings such as one/many, gift/need, sameness/difference, and transparency/hiddenness
as expressions of paradox.8 As such, I suggest we would not be incorrect to side with
Ferreira when she notes that for Kierkegaard “love is filled with paradox” and with
McDonald when he writes that “Christian love is characterized by paradox…”9 My aim
in what follows, therefore, is not to argue that paradox is at play in Works of Love, but
rather to articulate what paradox looks like with respect to Christian love and the manner
by which such paradox thereby informs Christian existence.

See, e.g., Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard: ‘Paradox’ and Irrationalism,” Journal of Existentialism
7, no. 27 (1967): 401-16.
7 The term Modsigelse, however, which at certain places can stand in for the term paradox, does
occur on numerous occasions in the Danish version of Works of Love. See, e.g., SKS 9, 15; SKS 9, 19; SKS 9,
31; SKS 9, 68; SKS 9, 135; SKS 9, 157; SKS 9, 225; SKS 9, 233; SKS 9, 273; SKS 9, 309; SKS 9, 310; SKS 9,
336; SKS 9, 355; SKS 9, 356-7; SKS 9, 360.
8 Ferreira, “Love,” 329; William McDonald, “Love,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts: Tome IV: Individual to
Novel, ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2015), 109.
9 Ferreira, “Love,” 329; McDonald, “Love,” 109.
6
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I develop my argument in five sections. In Section 5.1, I make a few preliminary
remarks on Kierkegaard’s view concerning the importance of love for human beings as
well as the polemical purposes underlying Works of Love. For Section 5.2, I trace out the
manner by which paradox is at play in the text both in terms of vision and in terms of
the grounding of love. For the next two sections I discuss the existential implications of
such paradox, namely how departing from it is tied to enervation and loss of tension
(Section 5.3) and how embracing it represents a vitalized state of sacred tension
characterized by the virtues of humility, courage, and hope (Section 5.4). Finally, I
conclude in Section 5.5 by drawing a connection between loving within the sacred tension and
the fundamental grace/works dialectic introduced in Chapter 1.

5.1 - Preliminary Remarks on Love and Works of Love
A good question with which to lead off our analysis of Works of Love is, why
afford so much attention to love? The simple response is that for Kierkegaard love (both
Elskov and Kjerlighed) is central to what it means to be human. In his view, love is
fundamentally implanted by God in every human being, but not only this, God has also
implanted a need (Trang) and a longing (Længsel) for such love—both to love and to be
loved.10 As he describes it at the beginning of his deliberation “Our Duty to Love the
People We See,” “How deeply the need of love [Kjerlighedens Trang] is rooted in human
nature [i Menneskets Væsen].”11 A few lines later he connects this need to the longing of
human beings for companionship that he once again describes as essential to human
nature—a claim he strengthens by pointing to how even Jesus Christ experienced such a
need:

10 See, e.g., SKS 9, 155-6 / WL, 154-5; SKS 9, 175 / WL, 175. On this point, see Pia Søltoft,
Kierkegaard og Kærlighedens Skikkelser (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2014), 35.
11 SKS 9, 155 / WL, 154.
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Throughout all ages everyone who has deeply pondered human nature has
acknowledged this innate need for companionship [Trang til Selskab]…So deeply
is this need rooted [Grundet] in human nature…and so essentially [væsentligen] does
it belong to being human, that even he who was one with the Father and in the
communion of love [Kjerlighedens Samfund] with the Father and the Spirit, he who
loved [elskede] the whole human race, our Lord Jesus Christ, even he humanly
felt this need to love and be loved [at elske og at blive elsket] by an individual
human being.12
All of this would suggest, then, that if we want to speak about Christian existence in a
manner faithful to Kierkegaard we must necessarily do so in terms of love.
Given what he sees as the importance of love, one of the central purposes
Kierkegaard assumes in Works of Love is to challenge inadequate conceptions of love at
play in his 19th century cultural context.13 For example, Kierkegaard narrows in on the
manner by which the misappropriation of grace within Christendom has adversely
affected the practice of love. In short, by taking in vain the Lutheran teaching of faith by
grace alone, individuals within Denmark have forgotten the demand and the difficulty
essential to Christian love, that is, that love requires radical sacrificial action as part of
working out one’s salvation.14 It is because of this issue that Kierkegaard focuses his
attention, as made evident by the title of his book, not on describing love as a
philosophical or theological concept, but rather in characterizing works of love as a concrete
practice.15 With this emphasis on works we see the deeply Socratic nature of Kierkegaard’s
polemic in that Kierkegaard employs his reflections to disturb his comfortable

12 SKS 9, 155-6 / WL, 154-5. For good commentary on this point, see M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s
Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21;
Sharon Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 158; Søltoft,
Kierkegaard og Kærlighedens Skikkelser, 33.
13 SKS 9, 66 / WL, 59; Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, “Historical Introduction,” in Søren
Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1995), xvi.
14 Cf. Philippians 2:12-13. See also Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 248-9; Amy Laura Hall,
Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 41.
15 As Kierkegaard succinctly puts it in the two prologues of the text, his reflections “are Christian
deliberations, therefore not about love but about works of love.” See SKS 9, 11 / WL, 3; SKS 9, 211 / WL, 207.
For a nice gloss on this point, see M. Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard (Oxford and Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2009), 126.
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Christendom readers, or as Ferreira describes it, to awaken and to provoke.16 Alongside
such unsettling is also the Socratic incitement to self-examination.17 As Kierkegaard puts
it early on in his text in reference to the Christian lover, it is “beneficial and necessary
that the single individual carefully and consciously pay attention to himself and, if
possible, help others (in such a way as one person can help another, since God is the true
helper) to become Christians in an even deeper sense.”18 In summary, then,
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the works of love extends from his view of the significance of
love for existence and functions as a Socratic challenge to Christendom that is meant to
unsettle at the same time it is to encourage.19
Such a focus on works, however, would seem to leave Kierkegaard in a rather
un-dialectical position. In Chapter 1 we pointed out that Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious
task often functions as a corrective, and, as such, Kierkegaard tends to place greater
emphasis on the counter-position that stands against the problematic view he is
attacking. The corrective, however, does not mean that Kierkegaard thereby ignores the
opposite position or advocates for a one-sided account.20 Put differently, in undertaking
his attack on misconceptions of love, Kierkegaard does not desire for his counteremphasis on works of love to become the new norm, which would then require yet
another corrective. As such, despite the un-dialectical impression of love one may receive
on a surface reading of Works of Love, Kierkegaard’s account, I argue, is far richer and

16 Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 125. Hall also picks up on this point nicely in emphasizing the role of
Kierkegaard’s text in unsettling the individual in order to turn her to dependence upon God. See Hall,
Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 3, 13, 15.
17 Robert C. Roberts, “Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard,
ed. Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 84; Anthony
Rudd, “‘Believing All Things’: Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt, and Love,” in International Kierkegaard
Commentary: Works of Love, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 124.
18 SKS 9, 55 / WL, 48.
19 Cf. Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 45.
20 J. Michael Tilley, “Corrective,” in Kierkegaard Concepts: Tome I: Absolute to Church, ed. Steven M.
Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 84. See
also Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 252.
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more nuanced. In order to develop this point, we may turn now to our discussion of
paradox and love.

5.2 - Paradox in Works of Love
In this section I discuss the particular expressions of paradox that I argue are at
the heart of Kierkegaard’s argument in Works of Love. To begin, I focus on what I identify
as the paradoxes of vision, namely the dialectic of blindness/sight associated with love for
all and love for one, and the dialectic of seeing/unseeing associated with forgiveness. As
such, I follow the lead of several scholars in pointing to the central role the theme of
vision plays in Works of Love;21 however, my aim here is to afford even more explicit
attention to the paradoxical nature of such vision. In addition, I argue that Christian love
for Kierkegaard is also paradoxical in an etymological sense in that Kierkegaard
emphasizes how such love originates in and depends upon the hidden and unfathomable
love of God that is “in the ground” (i Grunden) and that, although an enabling force,
nevertheless serves as a limitation and a challenge to human understanding and ability.

Blindness and Sight: The Work of Love in Loving All and Loving One
The first paradox of vision we may discuss assumes the form of the dialectic of
blindness/sight, by which the Christian lover is called to love all human beings as the
neighbor, apart from distinctions, at the same time that she is to love the single individual

21 See, e.g., M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 201-6; M. Jamie Ferreira, “Equality, Impartiality, and Moral Blindness in
Kierkegaard’s ‘Works of Love’,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 (1997): 65-85; Arne Grøn, “The
Dialectic of Recognition in Works of Love,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1998, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn
and Herman Deuser together with Jon Stewart and Christian Tolstrup (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter
de Gruyter, 1998), 147-57; Patrick Stokes, “Kierkegaardian Vision and the Concrete Other,” Continental
Philosophy Review 39, no. 4 (2006): 393-413.
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in his or her concrete particularity and concrete situation. Let us focus on each of these
dialectical elements in turn.
On the one hand, to carry out the Christian task of love entails, in Kierkegaard’s
view, a certain type of blindness. But what does it mean talk about blindness in relation
to love? In assuming Matthew 22:39 as his starting point, Kierkegaard develops the
commandment that one shall love all human beings, each and every human being, as the
neighbor. For Kierkegaard, however, the neighbor as object of love is only revealed
when it is mediated through God’s love as “the middle term” (Mellembestemmelsen)
between self and other.22 What this means, then, is that in turning to God’s love the lover
is thereby able to love all people, each and every person, as the neighbor. In
Kierkegaard’s words, “because God is the middle term” there are therefore “no limits to
the objects [of love], because the neighbor is all human beings, unconditionally every
human being.”23 To meet the neighbor in this fashion requires one to turn away from
externals and difference. As Kierkegaard describes it, external difference is like the
actor’s costume, which is to say that it is secondary to a common and shared humanity:
“when the curtain falls on the stage, then the one who played the king and the one who
played the beggar etc. are all alike; all are one and the same—actors. When at death the
curtain falls on the stage of actuality…then they, too, are all one, they are human
beings.”24 To elaborate further on this inner core of humanity to which the lover turns
her gaze in loving the neighbor, Kierkegaard draws on the metaphor of a watermark:
[T]he neighbor is eternity’s mark [Evighedens Mærke]—on every human being.
Take many sheets of paper, write something different on each one; then no one
will be like another. But then again take each single sheet; do not let yourself be
confused by the diverse inscriptions, hold it up to the light, and you will see a
22 Kierkegaard makes reference to this concept on several occasions—at times identifying the
concept of neighbor as the middle term. See, e.g., SKS 9, 60 / WL, 54; SKS 9, 61 / WL, 54; SKS 9, 64 /
WL, 58; SKS 9, 65 / WL, 59; SKS 9, 74 / WL, 67; SKS 9, 83 / WL, 77; SKS 9, 111 / WL, 107; SKS 9, 122
/ WL, 119; SKS 9, 144 / WL, 142; SKS 259 / WL, 260.
23 SKS 9, 74 / WL, 67.
24 SKS 9, 92 / WL, 87.

189
common watermark [et fælles Mærke] on all of them. In the same way the neighbor is
the common watermark, but you see it only by means of eternity’s light when it shines
through the dissimilarity.25
As Kierkegaard argues, carrying out this act of vision in which one turns away from
dissimilarity and instead looks through the lens of God’s love whereby one focuses on
eternity’s hidden internal mark on the other, requires that one ultimately close one’s eyes.
Succinctly put, one “sees the neighbor only with closed eyes, or by looking away from the
dissimilarities.”26 Involved in such willed blindness, then, is the act of resignation (i.e., at
opgive; Opoffrelse)27: not only does one relinquish the attempt to hold onto any difference
that would distinguish one from others and that would afford one a position of
superiority in relation to them, but in closing one’s eyes one also relinquishes one’s
preferential love (Forkjerlighed) in the sense that one refrains from granting such love a
privileged position in one’s loving. For example, in closing one’s eyes one loves the
enemy as the neighbor while looking beyond the “costume” of enemy just as one loves
the son as the neighbor while looking beyond the “costume” of son. Such love thus does
not look outward for its cues to concrete difference and the cultural categories informing
such difference, but rather in becoming blind to such things it looks for direction from
the eternal and aligns its vision with the divine perspective provided by God’s own love.
On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s view of love, contrary to the manner by which
it has been portrayed by some critics,28 is not limited to blindness, but also fundamentally
involves a certain kind of sight in which one turns one’s gaze to the concrete particular in
his or her concrete situation. In relief to the task of closing one’s eyes to externals and
SKS 9, 94 / WL, 89 (my emphasis).
SKS 9, 75 / WL, 68. See also SKS 9, 164 / WL, 163.
27 SKS 9, 62 / WL, 55; SKS 9, 111 / WL, 106-7.
28 See, e.g., Theodor W. Adorno, “On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,” Studies in Philosophy and
Social Science 8 (1939-40), 413-29; Knud Ejler Løgstrup, Den Etiske Fordring (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1957);
and more recently, Sharon Krishek, “Two Forms of Love: The Problem of Preferential Love in
Kierkegaard’s ‘Works of Love’,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (2008): 595-617. These views have
been subjected to a great deal of criticism and for this reason I do not feel that it is necessary to revisit this
debate here.
25
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difference, Kierkegaard describes this second act of vision in terms of loving the people
that we see before us with open eyes. This is precisely the point he makes in his deliberation
“Our Duty to Love the People We See” in which he reflects on the biblical passage 1
John 4:20 concerning loving the brother one sees, and through this he presents the
dialectical contrast to his deliberation on the other as the neighbor. Thus, as Kierkegaard
remarks in describing his discourse, “the duty to love the people we see, but not in the sense as
if the discourse were about loving all the people we see, since that is love for the
neighbor, which was discussed earlier. It means rather that the discourse is about the
duty to find in the world of actuality the people we can love in particular and in loving
them to love the people we see.”29 Such a turn to the object of love that exists before
one’s earthly eyes is thereby to embrace difference and particularity. As Kierkegaard
succinctly puts it, “So it is also in the relationships of love [Kjerlighedens Forhold] among
human beings; only true love [den sande Kjerlighed] loves [elsker] every human being
according to the person’s distinctiveness.”30 What this means, for example, is that in
loving my wife Helena as the neighbor I am at the same time still required to love her as
the concrete particular person she is with all of the requirements that accompany loving
her as my wife. To ignore her particular situation, needs, desires, longings, and so forth
associated with her unique status as the woman of whom I am her husband in pursuit of an
abstract or spiritualized love would be to fail to see her properly and thereby to fail to
love her properly. Moreover, for Kierkegaard this account of vision is not incidental or
secondary, but rather is central in that it represents the bearing of fruit essential to
Christian love. As he argues in “Love’s Hidden Life and Its Recognizability by Its
Fruits,” in order for Christian love to be complete it must move out from the hidden

29 SKS 9, 160 / WL, 159. One important challenge of this act of vision, then, is constantly to
prevent oneself from loving in a manner that idealizes love and the other. See SKS 9, 162 / WL, 161.
30 SKS 9, 268-9 / WL, 270.
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depths into the concrete world where the lover and the beloved exist.31 Turning one’s
gaze outward so as to take concrete action in loving the concrete particular other is thus
for Kierkegaard essential to what it means to love in a properly Christian manner.

Seeing and Unseeing: The Work of Love in Forgiveness
A second way in which Kierkegaard construes love as paradoxical vision is
through the dialectic of seeing/unseeing that he associates with forgiveness.32 This is an
account he develops most explicitly in “Love Hides a Multitude of Sins.”33 The focus of
this deliberation is the work of love in hiding sins. As Kierkegaard puts it, “Love hides a
multitude of sins. It does not discover sins; but not to discover what still must be there, insofar as it can be
discovered—that is hiding.”34 Hiding sins, however, is not simply to overlook them, but
rather involves the dialectical activity of seeing and unseeing—a dialectic where the sin is
seen but at the same time is unseen. Let us touch upon each of these dialectical elements
in turn.
On the one hand, in addressing a wrong committed by the other, it is important
that one not merely ignore the wrong, but see the wrong clearly for what it is. In
understanding this point, it is crucial to remember that for Kierkegaard the purpose of
love is edification of the other,35 which in this particular case is edification of the sinner
who is an offender. To overlook the sin, to ignore it, or to downplay it in such a way that
one thereby fails to challenge the offender and thereby leaves him to his wrongdoing,
however, would be utterly unedifying. As Kierkegaard puts it in a later deliberation, “It

See, e.g., SKS 9, 18-19 / WL, 10-11; 1 John 3:18.
Portions of this section are reproduced verbatim from Matthew T. Nowachek, “Challenging
the Violence of Retributivism: Kierkegaard, Works of Love, and the Dialectic of Edification,” Journal for Peace
and Justice Studies 23, no. 2 (2014): 19-50. Permission for reuse of this material has been granted by the
publisher.
33 Cf. SKS 5, 65-86 / EUD, 55-78.
34 SKS 9, 280 / WL, 282.
35 SKS 9, 212-26 / WL, 209-24.
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would be a weakness, not love, to make the unloving one believe that he was right in the
evil he did…No, it is of importance, it is part of love’s work, that with the help of the
loving one it becomes entirely clear to the unloving one how irresponsible he has acted
so that he deeply feels his wrong.”36 Thus, just as a doctor might need to sharpen her
focus on a cancerous growth so as to be able to attack and to remove it, in carrying out
the work of love in forgiveness it is crucial that one focus one’s vision with surgical
precision on the particular wrong that was committed so that it may be forgiven.37
On the other hand, love for the sinner requires that one also carry out the
particular task of vision in unseeing the same sin that is seen. Regardless of the offense,
the offender still remains a bearer of love and one who is stamped with the eternal mark
of the divine. As such, Kierkegaard is clear that this person ought to be loved, and loved
in such a manner that the sin committed is not itself multiplied. In Kierkegaard’s view,
everything (even, for example, an upright demand for justice) may become an occasion
for the multiplication of sin so long as such multiplication is not actively and perpetually
opposed. To employ again the image of cancer, sin is like the malignant growth that, left
untreated, will simply continue to grow. This means that to deny forgiveness by
remaining focused on the sin is not only unloving, but also serves as a catalyst by which
such sin is multiplied. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard writes about forgiveness in
terms of unseeing. To unsee the sin is to remove it from one’s vision and to hide it such
that one is able to love the other fundamentally as the beloved and not to remain
transfixed on the other as the sinner and offender who has wronged the lover. To drive
home this point concerning making unseen what has been seen, Kierkegaard draws on

SKS 9, 333 / WL, 338.
Kierkegaard does not dedicate too much explicit attention to the issue of justice in Works of
Love, with one exception being his deliberation “Love Does Not Seek Its Own” (SKS 9, 263-77 / WL, 26479). Nevertheless, the demand to see the wrong is clearly a requirement of justice—albeit a form of justice
that centers on edification of the wrongdoer as opposed to, say, retribution. On this point, see Nowachek,
“Challenging the Violence of Retributivism,” 19-50.
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the metaphor of hiding sins behind one’s back: “What is hidden from my eyes, that I
have never seen; but what is hidden behind my back, that I have seen.”38 In this sense,
one sees the sin but then puts it out of sight by placing it behind one’s back. And, by
unseeing the wrong in this fashion, by hiding it, the lover creates a space in which the
sinner can be met not as a moral monster for whom there exists no hope in this life or
the next, but rather as the neighbor and the bearer of love out of whom love can be
enticed in the process of forgiveness and reconciliation. For Kierkegaard, such
paradoxical vision is at the very heart of faith. As he puts it, “Just as one by faith believes
the unseen into what is seen, so the one who loves by forgiveness believes away what is
seen. Both are faith. Blessed is the believer, he believes what he cannot see; blessed is the
one who loves, he believes away that which he indeed can see!”39
From the discussion above we see how paradox with respect to vision, what we
may now identify as loving double-vision,40 is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s account of
Christian love. This dialectical expression of paradox, however, is not the only way in
which paradox is at play in Works of Love. Rather, paradox also shows up in an
etymological sense in relation to God’s love as a foundation “in the ground” (i Grunden)
that underlies and enables human love. In order to develop this point, we may begin with
the notion of grounding itself after which we may then draw out the particular
paradoxical nature of grounded love.

The Paradoxical Grounding of Love
In the deliberation “Love Builds Up” Kierkegaard describes the edifying nature
and function of Christian love by dwelling on the metaphor of building. Just as

SKS 9, 293 / WL, 296. This image is itself a Hebrew metaphor. See Isaiah 38:17.
SKS 9, 292 / WL, 295.
40 Cf. Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 104.
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constructing [i.e., at bygge op] a physical structure requires that one build upon a
foundation “from the ground up [fra Grunden af],”41 love, in order to edify (at opbygge) must
likewise be built up from a foundation. Without such a foundation for one’s love, the
lover would merely be “building in the air,”42 which is to say not building at all. For
Kierkegaard, then, the edifying work of love is indeed grounded, and it is love itself that
serves as the foundation. As he describes it,
Love [Kjerlighed] is the source of everything and, in the spiritual sense, love is the
deepest ground [dybeste Grund] of the spiritual life. In every human being in
whom there is love, the foundation, in the spiritual sense, is laid. And the
building that, in the spiritual sense, is to be erected is again love, and it is love
that builds up. Love builds up, and this means it builds up in love.43
Such foundational love, however, cannot be laid by any human being since this task
would be “suprahuman,”44 but rather, it is laid by the divine.45 Thus, God, who is himself
love, not only determines the nature of love, but also implants love into each and every
human being.46 Importantly, this grounding is fundamentally hidden—concealed in the
heart of the individual and thereby hidden from the world, but even concealed in part
from the individual lover herself.47 In making this claim, Kierkegaard, in the lead-off
deliberation of Works of Love, employs the image of the hidden spring: “Love’s hidden life
is in the innermost being, unfathomable [uudgrundeligt], and then in turn is in an
unfathomable connectedness [uudgrundeligt Sammenhæng] with all existence. Just as the
quiet lake originates [grunder] deep down in the hidden springs no eye has seen, so also
does a person’s love originate [grunder] even more deeply in God’s love.”48 With respect

SKS 9, 218 / WL, 216. See also SKS 9, 226 / WL, 224.
SKS 9, 214 / WL, 212.
43 SKS 9, 218 / WL, 215.
44 SKS 9, 219 / WL, 216.
45 SKS 9, 219 / WL, 216. See also SKS 9, 147-8 / WL, 146.
46 SKS 9, 129 / WL, 126.
47 See SKS 9, 221 / WL, 218.
48 SKS 9, 17 / WL, 9. On this point, see Sylvia Walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an
Existential Mode (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 162; Steven Shakespeare, Kierkegaard and the
Refusal of Transcendence (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 190.
41
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to grounding, then, the picture we are given here is that divine love serves as the hidden
foundation for all human love that is at the same time both the force that carries out the
edification and the love that results from such edification.
It is here with Kierkegaard’s identification of God’s love as the hidden and
unfathomable foundation for human love that paradox is clearly at work. More
specifically, grounded love is associated with the etymological function of paradox as a
limiting boundary. To continue with the image introduced above, because love originates
in the deep spring of God’s love it thus remains outside of what human understanding
can fully grasp and what human beings have the ability to create and to control. As
Kierkegaard puts it, “Just as the quiet lake originates darkly in the deep spring, so a
human being’s love originates mysteriously in God’s love. Just as the quiet lake invites
you to contemplate it but by the reflected image of darkness prevents you from seeing
through it, so also the mysterious origin of love in God’s love prevents you from seeing
its ground.”49 Moreover, Kierkegaard also points out that such divinely grounded love
that is expressed through the divine command you shall love the neighbor “did not arise in
any human being’s heart.”50 As such, the understanding runs up against a limit that
cannot be crossed, or better put, the hidden grounding of love and its associated divine
commandment leads to a collision between the “merely human” and the “essentially
Christian.”51 Rather than creating or discovering love on his her own power, then, it is
imperative that every human being come to a standstill in order thereby to “come to
know the deeper love from God…”52 The paradoxicality of love in serving as a limiting
force for human understanding and ability as described here mirrors the etymological
descriptions of paradox we have outlined in previous chapters: the same dynamic is at

SKS 9, 18 / WL, 10.
SKS 9, 32 / WL, 25.
51 SKS 9, 117 / WL, 113. See also SKS 9, 32 / WL, 24-5.
52 SKS 9, 358 / WL, 364 (my emphasis). See also SKS 9, 17-18 / WL, 9.
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work in the paradox in Fear and Trembling whereby Abraham is unable to fall back on his
human moral categories but instead runs up against the mystery of God in relation to
which he must in faith wait upon God’s empowering (Chapter 2); in the paradox in The
Sickness unto Death whereby the self is unable to serve as its own grounding, but rather in
receptivity must ground itself in the power that established it (Chapter 3); and in the
paradox of the Incarnation in Fragments that serves as a boundary for the understanding
in relation to which one must humbly decrease as well as in the paradox of the
Incarnation in Practice that brings with it the possibility of offense in its demand that the
individual meet God in humility (Chapter 4).
Such identification of grounded love as paradoxical in an etymological sense is
supported by the fact that in describing such love Kierkegaard points to the possibility of
offense. It is important to remember that for Kierkegaard the possibility of offense
always accompanies the paradoxical and is a sign that paradox is at work in fundamental
ways.53 But why pair Christian love with the possibility of offense? Or, put in another
way, what exactly is so offensive about grounded love?
First, the paradox of grounded love is offensive in that it demands that human
understanding avow self-sufficiency in accepting divinely-imposed limitations. In a clear
allusion to 1 Corinthians 1:23 and its reference to the perceived foolishness and
offensiveness (Daarskab og Forargelse) of the gospel,54 Kierkegaard notes that grounded
love as the essentially Christian comes into the world in contention with human reason
(Fornuft) and with the purpose of bringing human sagacity (Klogskab) to the point of being

53 In general, the possibility of offense plays a key role in Works of Love. See, e.g., SKS 9, 65 / WL,
58-9. Indeed, Kierkegaard identifies the possibility of offense as “the greatest danger,” but because it is
something that always accompanies authentic Christianity it is that which in faith must continually be held
open (SKS 9, 197-8 / WL, 199). Thus, for Kierkegaard it is important that we are weary of those who
would try to do away with the possibility of offense (SKS 9, 198 / WL, 199). As has happened in
Christendom, people have slowly become numb to this reality, and it is for this reason that it is crucial to
rouse the sleeping believers into taking it seriously (SKS 9, 198-9 / WL, 199-200; SKS 9, 198 / WL, 199).
54 SKS 9, 197 / WL, 198; SKS 9, 369 / WL, 376.
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offended.55 While it is nevertheless possible and necessary to understand love in a certain
sense in that such basic understanding is a prerequisite to practicing love,56 it is not
possible to understand such love in the sense of fully grasping its grounding. Again, this
is the direct consequence of the hiddenness and inaccessibility of such grounded love.
Just as is the case in Fragments,57 the collision of offense that results between the
imperialistic understanding and the impenetrable boundary that is the mysterious
grounding of love becomes a painful affair so long as one refuses to embrace his or her
own limitations and to acknowledge the otherness of divine love. As Kierkegaard writes,
“suffering is also the most painful and also the most pernicious when someone, instead
of being gladdened by love in its manifestations, wants to take delight in fathoming [at
udgrunde] it, that is, in disturbing it.”58
Second, the paradox of grounded love is offensive in that it demands self-denial
as part of becoming an instrument of God. Kierkegaard is clear throughout Works of Love
that self-denial is fundamental to the proper practice of love.59 To develop this point he
draws on the language of self-sacrificing and annihilation. With respect to the former, he
writes, “By love…God understands self-sacrificing love in the divine sense, the selfsacrificing love that sacrifices everything in order to make room for God…”60 With
respect to the latter, Kierkegaard employs the same language of “annihilation”
(Tilintetgjørelse) that Anti-Climacus employs in The Sickness unto Death to talk about the task

SKS 9, 198 / WL, 199; SKS 9, 228 / WL, 226. Cf. SKS 9, 28 / WL, 20; Roberts, “Kierkegaard
and Ethical Theory,” 90; Walsh, Kierkegaard, 163; Søltoft, Kierkegaard og Kærlighedens Skikkelser, 273. For a
good discussion of Klogskab, see Mark A. Tietjen, “Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard on Prudence,” in
International Kierkegaard Commentary: Christian Discourses: And, The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed.
Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), 165-189.
56 SKS 9, 32 / WL, 24-5.
57 See, e.g., SKS 4, 253 / PF, 49.
58 SKS 9, 17 / WL, 9.
59 See, e.g., SKS 9, 62 / WL, 56; SKS 9, 354 / WL, 360.
60 SKS 9, 123 / WL, 119.
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of faith in annihilating the possibility of offense,61 but here he ties annihilation
specifically to striving to relate to God properly in one’s loving:
[The world claims]: Above all, be an earnest person by having forgotten the one
and only earnestness, to relate yourself to God, to become nothing [at blive til
Intet]. Oh, but keep in mind—yet it does not help to talk—but would to God
that you might understand what you lost, that this annihilation [Tilintetgjørelse]
before God is so blessed that you at every moment would seek to return to this
annihilation more intensely, more warmly, more fervently than the blood returns
to the place from which it was forcibly expelled. But to worldly wisdom [verdslig
Klogskab] this, of course, is and must be the greatest foolishness [Daarskab].
Therefore [the world claims] never hold fast to God…“never hold fast to God,
because by holding fast to him, you lose what no one who holds fast to the
world ever lost, not even the person who lost the most—you lose
unconditionally everything.”62
The underlying point of both self-sacrifice and annihilation is the demand that the
individual lover become humble before God, particularly in the admission that in one’s
own power one is unable to do anything, let alone successfully carry out the Christian
task of love.63 This, in turn requires that the individual turn to God and his grounded
love in dependence and obedience in order to seek grace and forgiveness so as to allow
oneself to serve as a loving instrument (Redskab) for God64—a movement radically
offensive to the autonomous natural human who wants to retain control over himself
rather than relinquish such control in becoming a tool in the hands of the divine.

5.3 - Loss of Tension: Improper Loves as Departures from Paradox
Having outlined several ways in which paradox is at play in Works of Love, we may
now discuss the concrete implications such paradox carries for existence. To begin, I
briefly outline in this section three forms of love that prove improper in their departures

See, e.g., SKS 11, 131 / SUD, 15; SKS 11, 133 / SUD, 17.
SKS 9, 107 / WL, 103.
63 See SKS 9, 358-9 / WL, 365.
64 SKS, 9, 358 / WL, 364. See also SKS 9, 91 / WL, 86.
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from paradox, and which Kierkegaard in turn associates with enervation and loss of
tension.65 With their improper groundings and their resultant visual impairments, such
loves provide a good contrast to the account of Christian love we develop in Section 5.4.

Three Improper Loves
One improper form of love is the expression of love practiced by the common
citizen in Christendom. Rather than grounding his love on the paradoxical foundation of
God’s love, this person instead grounds his love in the finite and the social. In loving, he
takes his cues from his fellow Danish citizens—the crowd—and as a result, rather than
being a radical response to God’s love and God’s love commandment, his love is
reduced to an exercise in emulating the behavior, customs, and norms of his society. For
example, the Christendom lover would claim that to love in a proper Christian manner
need not require anything as extreme (or even as apparently perverse) as loving one’s
enemies,66 but rather can be as simple as fulfilling one’s marital duties, taking good care
of one’s children or nurturing one’s friendships.67 Moreover, once one has interpreted
and appropriated the Christendom norms for love, all that remains to be done is to
solidify these norms in one’s daily life through habit (Vane).68 Such love can be
appropriately characterized (in keeping with our visual theme) as suffering from the
visual impairment of near-sightedness in the sense that the lover’s vision extends merely
to his own immediate preferential loves, whether mother, father, wife, child, friend or

Whereas Kierkegaard reserves the word Kjerlighed for Christian love, he describes these loves in
terms of Forkjerlighed and Elskov.
66 Though habitual and for the most part unreflective, Christendom love is nevertheless still
informed by a certain kind of sagacity (Klogskab), which means that one nevertheless remains sensible and
calculating in one’s love, never loving in a manner that would be risky or that would place one in a position
of radical vulnerability.
67 Judge William’s apparent conflation of the love expressed through the institution of marriage
with authentic Christian love in Either/Or could qualify nicely here. On this point, see Hall, Kierkegaard and
the Treachery of Love, 112.
68 See, e.g., SKS 9, 43-5 / WL, 36-7.
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colleague. In that such a cultural lover has no sight for the neighbor, we may say that
such vision clearly fails to achieve the paradoxical duplicity Kierkegaard describes as
requisite of Christian love.
A second improper form of love is the aesthetic expression practiced by the
romantic poet. In contrast to the Christendom lover who looks to a finite and cultural
grounding for his love, the poet attempts to ground his love on some sense of the
infinite and the eternal. In that the concrete is perceived by the poet as itself imperfect
and incomplete, he perpetually pushes his love away from this to the ideal where it is
apparently rendered safe and secure.69 As Sharon Krishek puts it, “In a way, the aesthetic
lover wants to turn the first moment of love into an eternity. He wants to ‘freeze’ the
moment of interest and create for himself a sphere devoid of the threatening passage of
time…”70 What loving in this fashion means, however, is that the poet no longer loves a
real human being, but merely an ideal projection of his own creation.71 Again, as Krishek
notes, with their love the romantic poets “all manage to hold on safely and securely to
something—but not to what they had originally intended. They all end up without genuinely
relating to the actual object of their love.”72 Although such poetic love involves the
eternal in some form, for Kierkegaard it is nevertheless still improperly grounded in that
such eternity is not God’s eternal love that requires vulnerability and total dependence
upon divine provision, but rather the eternal as an idealized projection of the poet who
ultimately desires to retain control over his love. Such love can be appropriately
characterized as suffering from the visual impairment of far-sightedness in the sense that
the poet is so focused in his love on the distant ideal that he is entirely unable to see the

This is a similar movement that Socrates makes in the Symposium.
Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, 23.
71 What we see here is that such idealized love operates, in fact, as a veiled form of self-love. As
Kierkegaard puts it, “Christianity certainly knows far better than any poet what love is and what it means
to love. For this very reason it also knows what perhaps escapes the poets, that the love they celebrate is
secretly self-love…” SKS 9, 27 / WL, 19.
72 Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, 13. See also Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 86-7.
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concrete particular who is right in front of him. Thus, just as in the case of civic love,
poetic love too fails to achieve the paradoxical duplicity that Kierkegaard describes as
fundamental to Christian love.
A third improper form of love is the expression of self-love practiced by the
person of Indesluttethed. To recall Anti-Climacus’ definition, Indesluttethed is “inwardness
with a jammed lock”73 behind which “sits the self, so to speak, watching itself,
preoccupied with or filling up time with not willing to be itself and yet being self enough to
love [at elske] itself.”74 The key difference, however, between this self-love and the
particular self-love of the Christian lover that Kierkegaard identifies as central to all
proper love,75 is that whereas the latter grounds itself in the love of God and thereby
serves the purpose of fostering love for God and love for others, the latter is grounded
strictly in the prideful self that desires to separate itself from God and from others. In
Works of Love, Kierkegaard identifies such hidden self-love as “the most dangerous traitor
of all” that “consists in selfishly not willing to love oneself in the right way…”76 Similarly,
he describes it as “the most dangerous kind of faithlessness”77 and the ultimate despair
that, in refusing to be changed by duty’s shall, thereby loses the eternal.78 Such prideful
love could appropriately be identified as an extreme expression of narcissistic vision. Just
as Narcissus in the Greek myth becomes so infatuated with the image of himself
reflected in a pool of water that he misses the call of Echo as the concrete other beside
him and thereby dies utterly alone in the isolation of his own self-love, for Kierkegaard
the person of Indesluttethed becomes so selfishly transfixed by his own self-created and
self-sustained image of selfhood that he becomes increasingly cut off from all forms of
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75 SKS 9, 111 / WL, 107.
76 SKS 9, 31 / WL, 23.
77 SKS 9, 166 / WL, 166.
78 SKS 9, 48 / WL, 40-1. See also SKS 9, 251-2 / WL, 252.
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otherness. Such visual impairment, what could be likened to the gradual process of losing
one’s sight due to cataracts, entails that God and human others slowly fade into fuzziness
and darkness with the result that the person of Indesluttethed is left utterly alone in his own
self-centered blindness.

Improper Loves, Enervation, and Loss of Tension
For Kierkegaard, the improper loves outlined above are associated with
enervation and loss of tension in various ways. Consider a few points in support of this
claim.
With respect to civic Christendom love, for example, by departing from the
eternal source of God’s love for the finitude of social comparison one not only ceases
“to move forward”79 (bevæge sig fremad) by focusing on oneself,80 but one thereby slides
into a state of extreme enervation. Kierkegaard puts this point forcefully by drawing on
several striking images:
Comparison is the noxious shoot that stunts the growth of the tree; the cursed
tree becomes a withered shadow, but the noxious shoot flourishes with noxious
luxuriance. Comparison is like the neighbor’s swampy ground; even if your
house is not built upon it, it sinks nevertheless. Comparison is like the secret
consumption’s hidden worm, which does not die, at least not until it has eaten
the life out of love. Comparison is a loathsome rash that turns inward and is
eating at the marrow. Therefore beware of comparison in your love!81
Moreover, with respect to habit in love Kierkegaard writes of the “indolence of habit”
(Vanes Dvaskhed) by which one loses “the tension of eternity” (Evighedens Spændkraft)

SKS 9, 182 / WL, 182.
In criticizing social comparison, Kierkegaard likens it to a flying arrow that “has an impulse to
want to dwell on itself, perhaps in order to see how far it has come, or how high it is soaring above the
earth, or how its speed compares with the speed of another arrow that is also flying with the speed of an
arrow,” which ultimately means that “in that same second the arrow falls to the ground” (SKS 9, 182 /
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much in the same way that over the years “a spring loses its tension [Spændkraft] and
becomes weak.”82 A few pages later he offers this stark critique of habit:
Just as the river that sprang out of the rocks is dissipated further down in the
sluggishness of the dead waters, so also love is dissipated in the lukewarmness
and indifference of habit [Vanes Lunkenhed og Ligegyldighed]. Alas, of all enemies,
habit is perhaps the most cunning, and above all it is cunning enough never to
let itself be seen, because the person who sees the habit is saved from the habit.
Habit is not like other enemies that one sees and against which one aggressively
defends oneself; the struggle is actually with oneself in getting to see it. There is
a predatory creature, known for its cunning, that slyly attacks the sleeping; while
it is sucking blood from the sleeper, it fans and cools him and makes his sleep
even more pleasant. Such is habit—or it is even worse; that creature seeks its
prey among the sleeping, but it has no means to lull to sleep those who are
awake. Habit, however, has this; it sneaks, sleep-lulling, upon a person, and
when this has happened it sucks the blood of the sleeper while it fans and cools
him and makes his sleep even more pleasant.83
With this passage Kierkegaard is not attacking habit in all of its manifestations,84 but
rather he is drawing out how habit becomes problematic when it is tied to worldly
comfort. Kierkegaard is sharply critical of such worldly comfort precisely because of the
manner by which it leads to relaxation of the tension that is at the heart of Christianity
and Christian love. Thus, towards the end of Works of Love, Kierkegaard describes the
comfortable lover in Christendom in critical terms as one who “does not take too much
to heart eternity’s or God’s requirement for an essential and essentially strenuous
[anstrenget] life” but who is much happier to live life “easy and comfortable [let og
beqvemt].”85
Furthermore, the drive for security underlying both the poet’s idealized love and
the demonic individual’s self-love likewise leads to enervation and loss of tension. With
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respect to the former, Kierkegaard points out that in attempting to secure his love
against loss by idealizing it, the poet transforms his love into a form of static self-love
devoid of all of the risk and vulnerability associated with loving the other in her concrete
particularity.86 Without such risk and vulnerability, however, this love is unable to move,
to change, and to grow. As such, rather than a fortress to protect love, such idealized
love becomes instead a prison of selfishness within which the alienated poet slides into
the suffocating and enervating noxiousness of self-love.87 Something similar could be
said of the self-love of the person of Indesluttethed. In attempting to protect his self-love
by pulling away from God and from others, and by attempting to take such love into his
own control, the demonic individual becomes increasingly enervated. To describe this
dynamic, Kierkegaard employs the images of sickness and sinking. Just as the jaundiced
individual “sees everything yellow,” the demonic self-lover in his own despairing revolt
against God and others sees everything in a negative light and thereby “sinks deeper and
deeper [sinker dybere og dybere]” into his own sickness.88 In refusing God and God’s
transformative love as well as by refusing to open himself in love to his fellow human
beings—in other words, by “locking himself out of love” (lukker sig selv ude fra Kjerlighed),89
this person thereby cuts himself off from the power and vitality that sustains human
existence. Such, for Kierkegaard, is an apt description of the despair where one slips into
greater and greater nothingness and thereby becomes ultimately “shut out [udelukket]
from salvation [Saligheden].”90 Thus, far from hell being other people,91 for Kierkegaard
hell could more appropriately be described in C.S. Lewis’ terms as the empty lifelessness
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in which the defiant individual is allowed exactly what he despairingly desires, that is, to
be left utterly alone in his self-love.92

5.4 - Sacred Tension: Christian Love as Embracing Paradox
The paradoxes of love, however, need not result in enervation and loss of
tension. Rather, when embraced in their etymological and dialectical forms they play a
central role in fostering and sustaining an existential state of vitality and tension that is
fundamentally informed by the virtues of humility, courage, and hope. In developing this
claim, we may begin by turning to sacred tension in relation to love’s paradoxical
grounding.

Loving within the Sacred Tension: Love’s Paradoxical Grounding
The attempt to articulate an account of sacred tension in relation to the picture of
grounding sketched above nevertheless leads to an important objection. In short, is not
the claim that love is grounded simply to slip back into a kind of foundationalism that is
antithetical to vitality and tension? Put differently, is it not contrary to sacred tension as
we have been describing it thus far in this dissertation to talk as Kierkegaard does, for
example, about love being made secure or coming to rest in the grounding of God’s
love?
First off, it is important to point out that for Kierkegaard the rejection of God’s
love as a foundation is in no way vitalizing as one may be led to believe. Instead, such a
rejection is deeply nihilistic. To recall our earlier discussion, in relation to divine
grounding Kierkegaard remarks that to build up “without a foundation [Grundvold] at all
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is impossible—it is building in the air,”93 which entails that the humanistic attempt to do
away with such grounding, that is, to “unground” (i.e., udgrunde)94 love, whether by
seeking an alternative pseudo-foundation or by rejecting all foundations, is to slip into
the absurdity of groundlessness. Such is the consequence of social comparison and
poetic idealization, but also of the demonic individual who refuses to bind himself to
divine love as is proper,95 and instead in despair binds himself to himself.96
In contrast to such groundlessness, embracing God, God’s love, and God’s law
as foundational is exactly what allows one to avoid the collapse into nihilism. As
Kierkegaard writes,
God wants each individual, for the sake of certainty [Sikkerhedens…Skyld] and of
equality and of responsibility, to learn for himself the Law’s requirement. When
this is the case, there is durability [er der Hold] in existence, because God has a
firm hold on it [har Hold i den]. There is no vortex [Hvirvel], because each
individual begins, not with “the others” and therefore not with evasions and
excuses, but begins with the God-relationship and therefore stands firm [staaer
han fast] and thereby also stops, as far as he reaches, the dizziness that is the
beginning of mutiny.97
What is implied here, then, is not some static foundationalism, but rather a dynamic
foundation that is God, through his own love and love commandment, perpetually
holding onto the lover. Moreover, for Kierkegaard rather than being enervating and
contrary to tension, such a dynamic grounding is fundamentally vitalizing and enabling.
To make this point, he draws on the language of “nourishment” (Næring): the one who
loves, and particularly loves by believing all things, “is like those plants whose
propagation is hidden—he breathes in God; he draws nourishment from his love for
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God, he is strengthened [styrker] by God.”98 Such nourishment, however, does not
happen once and for all, but rather is a continuous process that extends from an ongoing
relationship of dependence upon God.99
It is with this particular account of grounding as a dynamic, vitalizing, and
enabling force that Kierkegaard thus associates love with stability. For example,
Kierkegaard composes an entire deliberation on how Christian love “abides” (bliver) in
the sense of sustaining all love and even all of existence by means of perpetual activity.100
As he writes, “with regard to human love we say that love abides, it is readily apparent
that this is a work or that it is not an inactive characteristic [hvilende Egenskab] that love
has as such, but a characteristic that acquired at every moment [i hvert Øieblik], and also,
at every moment is acquired, is an active work.”101 Moreover, in the deliberation “You
Shall Love,” Kierkegaard describes the stability of Christian love in terms of “enduring
continuance” (Bestandighed) that is granted by God when love has “undergone the change
of eternity by having become a duty…”102 It is through such stability that love is thereby
liberated. As Kierkegaard puts it with regards to the love commandment, “This shall,
then, makes love free in blessed independence. Such a love stands [staaer] and does not
fall with the contingency of its object but stands and falls with the Law of eternity—but
then, of course, it never falls. Such love is not dependent on this or that; it is dependent
only on that alone which liberates—therefore it is eternally independent.”103 Just as with
SKS 9, 244 / WL, 244.
On this point, see Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 261. As Kierkegaard puts it in drawing on
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the image of the faithful bridesmaid who remains standing in vigilant expectation of the
bridegroom,104 the language employed here of standing (Bestandighed; at staa) is to be read
not as static resting, but rather in terms of dynamic activity.
When love abides in the manner described here, the Christian lover is therefore
afforded a specific kind of security. For example, Kierkegaard remarks, “Only when it is
a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured [evig betrygget] against every change,
eternally made free in blessed independence, eternally and happily secured [evig lykkelig
sikkret] against despair.”105 Later on, he employs even stronger language in talking about
becoming perfectly secured: “only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured [evig
betrygget]. This security of eternity [Evighedens Betryggethed] casts out all anxiety and makes
love perfect, perfectly secured [fuldkommen betrygget].”106 In addition, security also plays out
in the sense of helping the lover to become “eternally and infinitely secured” (evigt og
uendeligt sikkret) against deception.107 This is the main point of Kierkegaard’s deliberation
“Love Believes All Things—and Yet Is Never Deceived,” in which he argues that in
believing all things by grounding one’s love in the eternal, one can never be deceived so
long as one continues to believe by remaining properly grounded in one’s love.108 All of
this discussion of security in love can be summarized in a simple point Kierkegaard
makes in the conclusion to Works of Love: the security of authentic Christianity relies
entirely on the dynamic interrelation between God’s provision and the faithful
individual’s trust in such provision.
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This sense of security in turn carries important implications for how
Kierkegaard construes the notions of rest and comfort. In contrast to the rest associated
with Christendom love, which is actually a destructive form of restlessness,109 proper rest
in love is what it means to find peace in the grounding of the eternal and the eternal love
commandment. For example, Kierkegaard writes, “‘You shall believe’…Never has any
greater security been found, and never will the peace of eternity [Evighedens Hvile] be
found in anything other than this shall.”110 In a striking passage from “Love Abides,”
Kierkegaard likewise describes the Christian lover as finding rest in the eternal. As he
notes, “His love is eternal, relates itself to eternity, rests [hviler] in the eternal. Therefore at
every moment he is waiting for the same thing he is waiting for eternally, and therefore
without restlessness [Uro], because in eternity there is time enough.”111 It is exactly such
vigilant and active waiting that is the “elevated calmness”112 (ophøiet Ro) and “holy
stillness”113 (hellige Stilhed) characteristic of faithful dependence on God and which is
another expression of Kierkegaard’s metaphor of the “quiet” (stille) surface of the lake
fed at its bottom by a gushing spring.114 Thus, in contrast to the “emptiness and
loathsomeness in human grounds of comfort [menneskelige Trøstegrunde]” that offer no
consolation,115 Christianity provides the only genuine sense of comfort: “Christianity
always has consolation [Trøst], and its consolation is different from all human consolation
in that the latter is aware only of being a compensation for the loss of joy—Christian
consolation is joy.”116
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From the discussion above we now see how the sacred tension associated with
embracing love’s paradoxical grounding is indeed informed by a certain sense of stability,
security, rest, and comfort. Given this point, however, it is important in order to avoid
confusion to conclude this discussion of grounding by reiterating that for Kierkegaard
love still necessarily involves some element of instability, insecurity, restlessness, and
discomfort. It is not as if in grounding one’s love on God’s love one need no longer take
any risk in love or that one may settle back in comfort with the coziness of divine
assurance. To the contrary, the human lover always finds himself in a state of
vulnerability where he is constantly faced with the possibility of loss, suffering, and the
threat of meaninglessness. As we noted above, it is the desire to overcome such
instability and insecurity that pushes the lover in civic Christendom to seek certainty in
his cultural categories, the poet in his idealizations, and the demonic individual in his selflove. For Kierkegaard, though, in carrying out the task of loving one is not to avoid such
instability and insecurity, but rather to embrace it while at the same time throwing
oneself in faith onto the firm (albeit dynamic) foundation of God’s love. Furthermore,
such love is restless and uncomfortable not only because it is “in itself motion
[Bevægelse],”117 but also because such motion is fundamentally a motion of perpetual
struggle. It is precisely in this sense that Kierkegaard writes of how “the certitude of
faith” (Troens Vished) is inseparable from the “struggle of faith” (Troens Strid).118 By
emphasizing such a duality in love, Kierkegaard thereby pushes his reader into a place of
tension where one remains vulnerable in the insecurity of one’s earthly loves but
simultaneously remains secure both in one’s trust in God’s love and in the belief that
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such love will nevertheless work all things for good.119 Such a faithful existential stance of
heightened tension is exactly that which Kierkegaard characterizes over and over again in
his writings in terms of fear and trembling where one is out over 70,000 fathoms of
water but still remains joyful. And it is exactly this stance in relation to the paradoxical
grounding of God’s love that proves central to what it means to love within the sacred
tension.

Loving within the Sacred Tension: Love’s Paradoxical Double-Vision
In embracing the paradoxes of vision the Christian lover is likewise ushered into
a state of sacred tension. One way this plays out is that in practicing the dialectical vision
of Christian love the lover finds resolve in neither of the dialectical poles, but rather she
lives in a manner by which she perpetually holds together both in a tense relationship.
Regarding the blindness/seeing dialectic, although Kierkegaard does assign a priority of
sorts to blindness given both his concern regarding how love in Christendom has been
reduced to preferential love and his corrective aim, he is also clear that to attempt to love
God in a manner antithetical to love for the other in his or her particularity would be a
radical departure from authentic Christianity. As such, the Christian lover is required by
paradox to remain in a state of tension whereby she both sees the other as neighbor and
sees the other as concrete particular, and thus perpetually plays each of these forms of
vision against the other in order to sharpen the practice of both. With respect to the
seeing/unseeing dialectic, both acts of seeing and unseeing are likewise essential to what
it means to love in a proper fashion. Neither act of merely unseeing the sin or merely
seeing the sin would be edifying. Thus, Christian love likewise necessitates that the lover

119 Cf. Romans 8:28; SKS 5, 28 / EUD, 19: “What, then, is the eternal power in a human being? It
is faith. What is the expectancy of faith? Victory—or, as Scripture so earnestly and so movingly teaches us,
that all things must serve for good those who love God.”
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exist in such a manner that she hold together both of these acts of vision in constant
tension and without allowing one to undermine the other. It is only through such tension
that she may continue to move forward in living out the loving task of forgiveness.
A second way in which sacred tension plays out with respect to the paradoxes of
vision is in the sense that the lover is required to love in a manner by which she
perpetually carries out her loving vision even as this vision is never completed. For
Kierkegaard, this is what it means to talk about loving vision in terms of action. Such a
sense of action is that which Kierkegaard points to in his striking description of Christian
love as the holy process of fulfilling the law:
Christian love, which is the fulfilling of the Law…is sheer action [idel Handlen];
consequently it is as far from inaction [Uvirksomhed] as it is from busyness. It
never accepts anything in advance or gives a promise in place of action; it never
rests [tilfredsstiller] satisfied in the delusion of being finished; it never dwells on
itself; it never sits idle [sidder den ørkesløs] marveling at itself…Christian love is
sheer action, and its every work is holy, because it is the fulfilling of the Law.120
Moreover, Kierkegaard describes this perpetual carrying out of loving vision in terms of
striving (Stræben).121 In loving the other through loving double-vision one is required to
adopt a militant (stridende)122 disposition in which one remains in a constant struggle
(Strid)123 to see the other as both neighbor and concrete particular, both sinner and
beloved, and thereby perpetually to carry out the tasks of loving and forgiveness. In
attempting to shed some light on the idea of such active and striving love, Ferreira offers
a helpful distinction between fulfilment and completion:
The word “fulfill” is ambiguous—it can mean two quite different things.
Kierkegaard assumes that I can fulfill the love commandment whenever I act in
the appropriate way: love can be shown “in the least little triviality as well as in
the greatest sacrifice” (WL, 181). There is nothing that cannot be done lovingly,
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with a sense of responsible caring—for this reason, Kierkegaard thinks
fulfillment of the commandment is something of which everyone is capable
(with grace). If I can at a given point in time perform a loving action, then I am
capable of fulfilling the duty to love. But this is different from completing the duty
to love—there will always be more I can do. I can never finish the task, but that
does not mean that I can never fulfill the duty. So we can fulfill the command to
love or take infinite responsibility even though we cannot complete it.124
What Ferreira describes here is exactly the state of tension of the lover of double-vision.
In her loving vision the lover is perpetually pushed to love perfectly by actively striving
to hold together both dialectical aspects of vision. And in this fashion she exists in the
space of radical tension in which she is continuously bringing her loving vision to
fulfillment even as she is never capable of bringing the same loving vision to
completion.125
In order to provide a concrete picture of the sacred tension associated with
paradoxical double-vision, and particularly the paradoxical dialectic of seeing/unseeing
that is forgiveness, Kierkegaard turns his reflections in Works of Love to the figure of
Christ. For Kierkegaard, Christ serves as the “prototype,” “the explanation,” the one
whose life is “sheer love,” and the “highest example” of what it means to fulfil and to
perfect the law.126 As such Kierkegaard also understands Christ’s particular loving vision
as the greatest exemplar of what it means to love within the sacred tension.127 But what,
exactly, is this loving vision to which Kierkegaard refers?
One way in which Christ manifests his loving vision is in relation to the crowd
and Sanhedrin council that he faces prior to his crucifixion. In setting up this account in
“Love Hides a Multitude of Sins,” Kierkegaard begins by asking his readers to envision
Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 137. See also Ferreira, “Love,” 339-40.
Such tension is particularly clear in the task of paradoxical double-vision that is forgiveness in
the sense that forgiveness is never simply granted once and for all, but rather is continuously upheld in the
action and striving of the one forgiving to continue to see the other in a paradoxical fashion as simul justus et
peccator—simultaneously sinner and saved.
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Christ’s condemners and their harmful gaze: “imagine the raging crowd; imagine the
circle of dignitaries—and then imagine how many a glance [Blik] was directed at [Christ],
aimed at him, only waiting for him to look in that direction so that its glance could also
convey its mockery, its contempt, its pity, its scorn for the accused!”128 In response to
such condemnation Christ could justifiably have paid back the crowd and the council
with his own righteously wrathful gaze. But this is not how the scene plays out in
Kierkegaard’s retelling. Christ’s vision was instead the look of loving blindness in which
he discovered nothing and thereby hid the multitude of sins of his accusers.129 In this
fashion, just as with the children’s game in which one pretends not to see what is before
oneself, Christ, with his particular vision “loves with his eyes open” and in this way he is
“unable to see the evil that takes place right in front of [him].”130 For Kierkegaard,
Christ’s radical love of his accusers in this fashion is indeed a form of madness. It is,
however, not madness as understood by the offended human sensibility, but rather a
“divine kind of madness”131 that is a pure expression of compassion and forgiveness.
A second way in which Christ manifests his loving vision is in relation to his
disciple Peter. Kierkegaard describes this dynamic in “Our Duty to Love the People We
See” within his discussion of what it means to love irrespective of any change in the
object of love. Regarding this theme he writes, “there is no limit to love; if the duty is to be
fulfilled, love must be limitless, it is unchanged, no matter how the object becomes changed.”132 For
Kierkegaard, this account of love is particularly applicable to Peter: over the course of
Christ’s ministry, Peter changed in many ways with the most tragic change being his
transformation from friend to traitor who, rather than rushing to the aid of Jesus in his
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time of need prior to the crucifixion, becomes instead a cowering spectator. As
Kierkegaard describes the betrayal,
[Peter] came, he was present, but he did not lift a finger; he calmly stood there
and looked on—yet, no, he did not stand calmly; his one and only thought was
to save himself and on any condition; he did not even take flight (that would
have been almost more forgivable); no, he remained standing there as a
spectator [blev staaende som—Tilskuer], which he made sure he could be, by
denying [Christ]…133
With this particular spectator’s gaze Peter therefore joins the “blinded [forblindet], raging
crowd” and its own harmful gaze in heaping insult upon Christ.134 How, then, did Christ
react? Indeed, as a response to such betrayal one would think that a gaze of vengeance
would be entirely warranted. Or, if nothing else, it would seem that Christ would be
justified simply in “look[ing] away from Peter” and saying “I would rather not see that
traitor before my eyes!”135 But this is not how Christ responded. Rather, he practiced an
altogether different kind of vision. As Kierkegaard puts it, “How differently Christ acted!
He did not look away from Peter in order to become seemingly unaware of his existence;
he did not say, ‘I do not want to see that traitor’; he did not leave to take care of himself.
No, he ‘looked at him.’ He immediately caught him with a look…”136 In contrast, for
example, to the threatening gaze described by Sartre in which self and other are set up in
conflict and competition with one another,137 Christ’s gaze is the gentle and
compassionate look of a welcoming subject. In Kierkegaard’s terms, “And how did
Christ look at Peter? Was this look repelling; was it like a look of dismissal? Ah, no, it
was as when a mother sees the child in danger through its own carelessness, and now,
since she cannot manage to grasp the child, she catches it with her admittedly

SKS 9, 169 / WL, 168.
SKS 9, 169 / WL, 169.
135 SKS 9, 170 / WL, 170.
136 SKS 9, 170 / WL, 170.
137 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. by Hazel
E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1958), 340-400.
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reproachful but saving look.”138 Ultimately, it is because of such vision that the possibility
of reconciliation is opened up by which Peter in his apostolic commissioning can later be
forgiven three times,139 and that Peter himself can thus write in his epistle about the work
of perfect love in hiding a multitude of sins.140
With these two accounts of loving vision we see clearly how Christ serves as a
paradigmatic exemplar of what it means to live within the sacred tension associated with
paradoxical double-vision. In his relation to the crowd and the council, Christ exists in a
space of absolute tension in which he affirms both aspects of the seeing/unseeing
dialectic. Clearly, Christ sees the sin of the crowd in its condemnation of him, but at the
same time it is precisely because he sees this sin that he is thereby able to unsee it in his
compassionate forgiveness of his accusers. Likewise, in his relation to Peter Christ exists
in the space of absolute tension in which he affirms both aspects of the blindness/sight
dialectic. In loving Peter despite Peter’s transformation, Christ closes his eyes to Peter as
betrayer and instead focuses his vision on Peter as the neighbor who ought to be loved.
At the same time, however, Christ also sees Peter in his concrete particularity with his
particular faults and his particular sin. It is because Christ sees this sin and thereby
understands Peter’s concrete fear and sorrow that results from such sin, that Christ can
meet Peter in love in precisely the manner needed by Peter qua betrayer—as a
compassionate motherly figure concerned for her destitute child who is in mortal danger.
Ultimately, though, what makes such loving vision exemplary is not only that through it
Christ exists in such a manner that he holds together both dialectical aspects of vision in
perpetually unresolved tension, but that he does so perfectly. At no point does Christ
slide to either side of the dialectic, but at every moment he actively strives to remain in

SKS 9, 170 / WL, 170.
See John 21:15-17; SKS 12, 90 / PC, 78-9. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes of Christ’s love
as “the same love that with a look rebuked—or forgave—Peter.” See SKS 9, 104 / WL, 100.
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the tense position in which he fully and flawlessly affirms both. This is itself a marvel
given the sins of both the crowd and Peter, for Christ was not only able to see the
infinite transgression of his accusers in their rejection of God, but despite this infinite
evil he was nevertheless at the same time able to see his accusers with infinite
compassion. In the end, for Kierkegaard there is no greater example of what it looks like
to love within the sacred tension than this.

Three Virtues: Humility, Courage, and Hope
Having offered an account of sacred tension in Works of Love in relation both to
the paradoxical grounding of love and to the paradoxes of vision, we may now touch
upon what I suggest are three of its central virtues.
First, loving within the sacred tension fundamentally involves the virtue of
humility (Ydmyghed), and particularly humility that stands in opposition to the prideful
claim that one does not have a need for God and God’s love.141 For Kierkegaard, in
embracing God as the unfathomable grounding for all love as well as in binding oneself
to eternity’s commandment the lover thereby avoids “go[ing] astray and turn[ing] into
pride [Stolthed].”142 Such opening up of oneself to the divine is precisely the movement of
self-denial that Kierkegaard identifies as the “holy modesty [hellig Undseelse], which is
inseparable from all true love…”143 Of course, not all forms of humbling are
constructive; some are in fact destructive and lead to both enervation and loss of
tension.144 It is therefore important for Kierkegaard to reaffirm that proper humbling
SKS 9, 46 / WL, 39.
SKS 9, 74 / WL, 67. On the issue of proper pride, see, e.g., John Lippitt, “Kierkegaard and the
Problem of Special Relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God Filter’,” International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion 72, no. 3 (2012), 189.
143 SKS 9, 336 / WL, 341.
144 See, e.g., SKS 9, 269 / WL, 271. For a similar point, see Pap. VII B 92, 306 / WL, 408. As a
particular example of this, I have in mind the social humbling that Kierkegaard describes in Two Ages as
“leveling” (Nivelleringen) and which he suffered in his late life at the hands of the satirical magazine, the
Corsair.
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occurs in relationship with God where God is the edifying force in the ground with
regards to which the lover humbles himself. This is the dynamic Kierkegaard emphasizes
in his discussion of the process of winning the one who is overcome where offender and
lover are humbled not before one another, but before the good:
With the aid of the third [i.e., God and God’s love] that the loving one has
introduced between them, they are both humbled [ydmygede]. The one who loves
humbles [ydmyger] himself before the good, whose lowly servant he is, and, as he
himself admits in frailty; and the one overcome does not humble himself before
the loving one but before the good. But when in a relationship between two
people both are humbled, then there of course is nothing humiliating
[Ydmygende] for either of them.145
Closely associated with such proper humility is the act of confession (Tilstaaelse), by
which one admits of one’s limitations and thereby accepts one’s proper standing in
relationship to God.146 And in adopting such a disposition where one recognizes he is
unable to love under his own strength, the lover is thereby provided power by the
gushing spring of the divine to “hold out” or “persevere” (i.e., at staa til) in carrying on
with the humanly impossible task of Christian love.147 As Kierkegaard nicely describes
this dynamic in relation to the lover winning the one overcome, through the movement
of humility one discovers God to be “the support [den Bistand] with whose help he
continues to stand [bestaaer].”148 In the end, then, such humility before God is for
Kierkegaard at the same time what it means to possess a true sense of pride.149

SKS 9, 334 / WL, 339-40.
See SKS 9, 190 / WL, 190-1.
147 Regarding the etymological nuances of at staa til, see Ordbog over det Danske Sprog, bind 1-28,
udgivet af Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1918-1966), bind 21, 1943,
§6.8.
148 SKS 9, 329 / WL, 333. With the use of the term bestaaer, Kierkegaard is most likely making a
linguistic connection to confession (Tilstaaelse) and the task of persevering (at staa til). On this point, see
Ordbog over det Danske Sprog, bind 21, 1943, §6.3.
149 SKS 9, 269 / WL, 271. Cf. Pap. VII B 92, 306 / WL, 408: “Pride is humility before God and
humility before God is pride. What people call pride is a mean-minded composition of modesty and
vanity…” On this issue, see Lippitt, “Kierkegaard and the Problem of Special Relationships,” 182-9.
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Second, central to loving within the sacred tension is also the virtue of courage
(Mod). Whereas the person who departs from the paradoxical dynamic of Christian love
does so out of a lack of courage both to let go of control and to trust in the mysterious
and unpredictable God, the person of faith who embraces the paradoxes of love does so
through courage.150 With respect to the paradox of grounded love, Kierkegaard is clear
that it requires courage to seek the support of divine love, to allow oneself to be edified
by such love, but most of all in one’s loving to take the step of becoming transparent and
vulnerable before God. Indeed, it is the loving act of throwing oneself entirely into the
arms of the living God that represents for Kierkegaard “the highest courage” (det høieste
Mod).151 Moreover, regarding the paradoxes of vision, much like Abraham’s courage in
being willing to sacrifice Isaac, it requires courage to resign one’s preferential loves in
loving others as the neighbor and to trust that these same preferential loves will
nevertheless be returned as a gift. Likewise, it requires courage to unsee the sins of the
offender in offering forgiveness. Not only must the lover courageously confront the real
possibility that the offender may not turn from his sin and may instead despise the lover
even more, but the lover must also courageously persevere in believing that, regardless of
how impossible reconciliation may seem, by placing one’s trust in God’s love the work of
love in forgiveness will never be disappointed.
Finally, the virtue of hope (Haab) is fundamentally at play in loving within the
sacred tension. Although Kierkegaard, in following the Apostle Paul’s lead in 1
Corinthians 13, is clear that love is greater than hope, for him hope is nevertheless an
indispensable component of love. As he puts it, “love, although greater than hope, would

This is the case not least of all in that it is precisely the love commandment that draws out
courage from the Christian lover when such courage is failing or has been lost. As Kierkegaard puts it,
“wherever the purely human loses courage, the commandment strengthens.” SKS 9, 50 / WL, 43. See also
Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 38.
151 SKS 9, 244 / WL, 244.
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take it upon itself, as its service and its work, to bring hope.”152 It is important to point
out, however, that by hope he does not mean something along the lines of a superficial
wishing such as is implied in the statement “I hope that we will have good weather in
Copenhagen tomorrow.” Rather, for Kierkegaard, hope in Works of Love is fundamentally
hope in the infinite possibility that is opened up by the eternal, which allows the
Christian lover to hope all things. As Kierkegaard writes,
[T]he loving one hopes all things. No indolence of habit, no pettiness of mind,
no hairsplitting sagacity, no quantities of experience, no slackness of the years,
no bitterness of evil passions corrupt for him his hope or counterfeit the
possibility for him; every morning, yes, every moment he renews his hope and
refreshes [forfrisker] possibility, while love abides and he in it.153
This is the same idea Anti-Climacus develops in The Sickness unto Death when he writes
“What is decisive is that with God everything is possible. This is eternally true and
consequently true at every moment.”154 Such hope in possibility is a direct consequence
of grounding oneself in God’s love, and thereby it serves an important role as a vitalitypreserving antidote to the worldly loss of tension. Thus, in the first paragraph of “Love
Hopes All Things—and Yet Is Never Put to Shame,” Kierkegaard makes the following
crucial statement:
When the God-forsaken worldliness of earthly life shuts itself in within itself in
complacency [slutter sig inde med sig selv i Selvtilfredshed], the confined air develops
poison in itself and by itself. And when in temporality time in a certain sense
drags on so slowly and yet so slyly swiftly that one never with concentrated
attentiveness becomes aware of its vanishing, or when the moment gets stuck
and stands still [sætter sig fast og bliver stillestaaende], when everything, everything is
mustered to turn the mind and powers upon the moment—then the prospect is
lost, and this detached, God-forsaken moment of temporality, whether longer or
shorter, becomes a falling away from the eternal [Affald fra det Evige]. See, this is
why so often at various times a need [Trang] is felt for a refreshing, enlivening
breeze [forfriskende, oplivende Luftning], a mighty gale [et mægtigt Pust], that could
cleanse the air and dispel the poisonous vapors, a need [Trang] for the rescuing
movement [en stor Begivenheds frelsende Bevægelse] of a great event that rescues by
SKS 9, 258 / WL, 259.
SKS 9, 257-8 / WL, 258.
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moving what is standing still [at bevæge det Stillestaaende], a need [Trang] for the
enlivening [oplivende] prospect of a great expectancy—lest we suffocate in
worldliness or perish in the oppressing moment!155
Furthermore, with respect to the lover’s relation to other human beings, such hope in
divine possibility means that in love one never abandons the belief that the other is
redeemable and may be transformed by love to become himself a lover. For Kierkegaard,
this is what it means to hope in a loving fashion:
But lovingly to hope all things signifies the relationship of the loving one to other
people, so in relation to them, hoping for them, he continually holds possibility
open [bestandigt holder…aaben] with an infinite partiality for the possibility of the
good. That is, he lovingly hopes that at every moment [i ethvert Øieblik] there is
possibility, the possibility of the good for the other person.156
In the end, it is the dual nature of hope as hope in the possibility of the eternal and hope in the
possibility for the other that makes such hope a central component of what it means to love
within the sacred tension.

5.5 - Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I argued that paradox fundamentally informs Kierkegaard’s
account of Christian love both in a dialectical sense as paradoxical double-vision and in
an etymological sense as the paradox of God’s love that is the limiting yet enabling
dynamic foundation for all love. These paradoxes, I suggested, carry significant
implications for Christian existence. In particular, I claimed that in contrast to the loss of
tension associated with improper love that departs from such paradox, embracing the
paradoxes of love represents another expression of sacred tension in Kierkegaard’s
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thought—what I have identified here in terms of loving within the sacred tension. Moreover, I
pointed to humility, courage, and hope as three central virtues of such tension.
With this account of loving within the sacred tension I suggest that we have
once again come full circle to Chapter 1 and our discussion there of what we identified as
the fundamental sacred tension associated with the grace/works dialectic. This claim is
supported by the fact that throughout his text Kierkegaard draws an explicit connection
between Christian love and the notions of grace and works. On the one hand,
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on works is reflected most obviously in the title of the book, but
also in his insistence of the practical and active nature of love as well as how such love is
necessarily recognized by its fruits. In addition, this emphasis is also particularly apparent
in Kierkegaard’s discussion of double-vision and the sacred tension associated with such
vision in the sense that to love in a properly Christian fashion is to work out one’s
salvation through the perpetual tension-filled task of holding together the dialectic of
blindness/seeing and the dialectic of seeing/unseeing. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s
emphasis on grace comes forth most clearly in his discussion of the grounding of God’s
love as the fundamental enabling force in the life of the Christian lover. In Pia Søltoft’s
reading, God’s gift of grace is not only that which makes possible the striving of the
individual lover, but such a gift is inherent to the task itself. In Søltoft’s reading this point
is reflected in Kierkegaard’s own Danish terminology, for at the heart of every Christian
task (Opgave) is nevertheless the notion of gift (Gave).157 Moreover, it is because of this
dynamic of grace that Kierkegaard gestures time and again to the centrality for love of
self-denial. For example, in “The Work of Love in Praising Love” he notes, “What a
human being knows by himself about love is very superficial; he must come to know the
deeper love from God—that is, in self-denial he must come to know the deeper love
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from God—that is, in self-denial he must become what every human being can
become…an instrument for God.”158 What self-denial in the service of becoming an
instrument implies is the recognition that the individual “is capable of nothing”159 and
that it is only through God’s movement of loving grace in the life of the lover that the
works of love can thus be fulfilled.160
Just as with the grace/works dialectic in Chapter 1, for Kierkegaard it is crucially
important when talking about Christian love to affirm both grace and works in their
robust fullness. Put differently, for Kierkegaard the individual lover exists in the tension
where she is both able to do nothing and at the same time nevertheless able to do
everything. Appropriately, Kierkegaard describes this dynamic by pointing to the
contradiction involved in being God’s “co-worker” (Medarbeider):
Precisely this becomes the contradiction [Modsigelsen] in blessedness and terror [i
Salighed og i Forfærdelse]: to have an omnipotent one as one’s co-worker. An
omnipotent one cannot be your co-worker, a human being’s co-worker, without
its signifying that you are able to do nothing at all; and on the other hand, if he
is your co-worker you are able to do everything. The strenuousness
[Anstrengende] is that it is a contradiction or is simultaneous; thus you do not
experience the one today and the other tomorrow. Moreover, the strenuousness
is that this contradiction is not something you must be aware of once in a while
but is something you must be aware of at all times [i ethvert Øieblik].161
Such a contradiction in love associated with the grace/works dialectic serves as a radical
challenge to Kierkegaard’s Christendom contemporaries. Not only does the emphasis on
works in characterizing love confront those in Christendom who have become
comfortable in their civic faith, who have adopted a false sense of rest in their love, and
who thereby have lost the radical demand of what it means to work out one’s salvation
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through love, but the emphasis on grace also challenges the same individuals to find a
proper sense of stability, security, rest, and comfort by turning to God in holy respect
and utter dependence through self-denial. In leveling this challenge Kierkegaard once
again draws on the language of fear and trembling.162 As he writes in the conclusion to
Works of Love, “just as the well-disciplined child has an unforgettable impression of
rigorousness, so also the person who relates himself to God’s love…is bound to have an
unforgettable fear and trembling [Frygt og Bæven], even though he rests [hviler] in God’s
love.”163 In the end, then, we may say that Kierkegaard’s account of the paradoxes of
love as fostering the sacred tension where one is called upon to remain both fearful and
restful in one’s love proves to be a central piece of Kierkegaard’s overarching ethicoreligious task of (re)introducing Christianity to Christendom. Yet, far from being an
abusive and vitriolic attack, this task is for Kierkegaard instead a loving celebration and
reaffirmation of the simple and profound truth that God has already revealed to each and
every human being, namely that “to love people is the only thing worth living for, and
without this love you are not really living.”164

Although the notion of fear and trembling is crucial to Christian existence as sacred tension,
Kierkegaard is clear that love (Kjerlighed) nevertheless remains “the primus motor in the Christian life” (SKS
18, 14, EE:25 / JP 3, 2383).
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CONCLUSION
Command the seaman to sail without ballast—he capsizes; let the
generation, let every individual in it try to exist without the
unconditional—it is and remains a vortex [Hvirvel]. In the
intervening period, for a longer or shorter time, it may seem
otherwise, that there is steadfastness and security—fundamentally [i
Grunden] it is and remains a vortex.1
There must be weight—just as the clock or the clock’s works need a
heavy weight in order to run properly, and the ship needs ballast.
Christianity would furnish this weight, this regulating weight
[regulerende Tyngde], by making it every individual’s life-meaning
[Livets Betydning] that whether he becomes eternally saved is decided
for him in this life.2
According to the teaching of Christianity…there is only one loftiness
[Høihed]: to be a Christian—and one abyss [Afgrund]: paganism.3

In the concluding remarks here we may now bring to a close our study of
paradox and its significance for Christian existence in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard.
Towards this end, I begin with a brief recounting of several of the major conclusions we
have drawn out over the course of the study. Following this, I then touch upon three
brief points concerning the importance of the study and I sketch out one particular
possibility for future research that the study has opened up regarding the issue of
nihilism. Last of all, I conclude with a final personal note.

A Brief Recounting
Given the extensive ground covered in this study both thematically and in terms
of engaging with a wide range of Kierkegaard’s writings, there are indeed many
conclusions that we have drawn out over the course of the preceding five chapters.

SKS 13, 26 / PV, 19-20.
SKS 25, 443, NB30:71 / JP 1, 1003.
3 SKS 10, 68 / CD, 59 (translation modified).
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Although it would not be possible here to offer a full recounting of all of these
conclusions, we may nevertheless touch upon a few of the major ones. With this aim in
mind, I begin by considering several conclusions from Chapter 1 followed by several
conclusions from Chapters 2-5.
The purpose of Chapter 1 was to articulate and to establish the particular reading
of Kierkegaard’s thought that was to serve as the foundation upon which the argument
concerning paradox and Christian existence in Chapters 2-5 was to be built. Towards this
end, we began by outlining Kierkegaard’s account of his nominally Christian Danish
culture (i.e., Christendom) and we focused particularly on several of the problems
Kierkegaard identifies with this culture such as how it entices individuals into worldly
comfort away from striving and thereby undermines genuine Christian existence.
Moreover, we pointed out how Kierkegaard, in drawing inspiration from Socrates, takes
upon himself the ethico-religious task of (re)introducing Christianity into Christendom
with the goal of helping his contemporaries to become authentic Christians. These points
are themselves fairly well-established in Kierkegaard scholarship, and are thus not
entirely new. The more novel conclusions of this chapter, in contrast, dealt with what I
claimed to be Kierkegaard’s specific understanding of what it means to exist as an
authentic Christian and the specific means by which the individual is to strive after and is
ushered into this goal. As we argued, becoming an authentic Christian for Kierkegaard
does not mean that one attains a static state in which one ceases to develop or to grow.
To the contrary, I claimed that this telos can be better understood as the restless process
of becoming that I identified in terms of living within the sacred tension. With the
introduction of the notion of sacred tension, I suggested that Kierkegaard is not
primarily asking his readers to carry out specific moral actions or to perform specific
religious practices, but rather he is encouraging each one to adopt a general disposition where
Christian faith can take root and be perpetually fostered. In making this point, I narrowed in on
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what I identified as the fundamental sacred tension Kierkegaard associates with the
dialectic of grace/works. This was an important conclusion in that I would later make
the argument in Chapters 2-5 that the particular accounts of sacred tension associated with
the various expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s writings are in one way or another
related back to this fundamental sacred tension. Furthermore, in focusing on the
grace/works dialectic, I also suggested at the end of the chapter that paradox has a key
role to play in encouraging and fostering sacred tension—a point that served to set up
the argument concerning paradox and Christian existence in Chapters 2-5. In summary,
then, Chapter 1 accomplished three broad goals: first, it located the study firmly within the
context of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious attack upon Christendom; second, it introduced
the new concept and new terminology of sacred tension as well as suggested how such
sacred tension serves as the telos of Kierkegaard’s attack; and third, it pointed to paradox
as a crucial means for encouraging and fostering such sacred tension.
In Chapters 2-5 we considered four different expressions of paradox in
Kierkegaard’s thought: 1) paradox that is associated with the faith of Abraham; 2)
paradox that is associated with the nature of the self and the task of selfhood; 3) paradox
that is associated with the God-man; and 4) paradox that is associated with Christian
love. In each of these cases, we displayed, on the one hand, how rejection of or departure
from the specific paradox(es) under consideration leads to enervation and loss of tension
and, on the other hand, how embracing the specific paradox(es) we outlined increases
and fosters tension, thereby helping to usher the individual into a state of sacred tension
akin to that which we outlined in Chapter 1. Given the differing expressions of paradox
and the differing ways in which they fostered vitality and tension, the state of sacred
tension associated with each looked slightly different. Despite such variation, each
nevertheless involved similar virtues as the others. With respect to paradox and faith, we
pointed to the centrality of the virtues of courage, trust, humility, love, and joy.
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Regarding paradox and the self, we narrowed in on the virtues of dedicated patience and
humble courage. Concerning the paradox of the God-man, we discussed the centrality of
the virtue of humble striving. And finally, in relation to the paradox of Christian love, we
settled upon the significance of the virtues of humility, courage, and hope. By reflecting
in this manner on these concrete virtues, we therefore provided a concrete picture both
of the robust implications for Christian existence that paradox carries and of the nature
of the disposition one assumes as living within the sacred tension. In this regard, we may
at this point conclude that at the heart of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is his
employment of paradox to help usher his contemporaries into a state of sacred tension in
which these contemporaries are challenged to become individuals who practice the
Christian virtues of courage, dedication, hope, humility, joy, love, patience, striving, and
trust. Thus, far from Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious project being merely deconstructive
or negative in nature, Kierkegaard infuses his existential challenge with the thick and
robust positive content of the virtues that are inextricably tied to his particular
understanding of Christianity.

Significance of the Study: Three Brief Points
In beginning to round off this conclusion we may touch upon three brief points
regarding the significance of our study. First, on the most basic level, this study is
important simply in that it offers another interesting and worthwhile angle on what
proves to be a central notion within Kierkegaard’s thought. The in-depth discussion of
paradox provided above is certainly needed in Kierkegaard studies particularly given that
paradox has received less attention in recent years within Anglophone scholarship than at
certain times in previous decades, and certainly far less attention than it deserves. At the
same time, however, a growing number of Anglophone scholars such as Noel S. Adams,
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Matthew Bagger, Ronald L. Hall, M. Jamie Ferreira, and Anthony Rudd have in the last
couple of decades been increasingly returning to and engaging with the notion of
paradox. As such, this study also makes a valuable contribution to what I would suggest
is a positive emerging trend in Kierkegaard studies to locate paradox once again at the
center of Kierkegaard’s thought. Second, this study is important in that it makes an
explicit connection between paradox and Christian existence, and in doing so it provides
further support for the view that paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought operates not merely
as a philosophical concept but as an existential as well as moral and ethical notion. More
specifically, by reaffirming the concrete significance carried by paradox for the question
of how one is to live and particularly how one is to live as a Christian, this study has
much to contribute to the growing interest within Kierkegaard research on Kierkegaard’s
relation to ethics in general and Kierkegaard’s relation to virtue ethics in particular.
Finally, this study is valuable in that it introduces and develops the new concept and new
terminology of sacred tension.4 As we pointed out in Chapter 1, several scholars have
alluded to the significance of the notion of tension in Kierkegaard’s thought, but what
this study does is to draw out in even more explicit terms how this tension looks, how it
is sacred in the sense of being directly tied to Kierkegaard’s understanding of
Christianity, and how it is specifically connected to paradox. The hope of this study is
that with this new concept and new terminology the scholarly engagement with
Kierkegaard’s thought and writings might be enriched in interesting and productive ways,
particularly within the recent movement in Kierkegaard studies to reassess Kierkegaard’s
existentialism and its significance for the 21st century.5

4 See also Matthew T. Nowachek, “Living within the Sacred Tension: Kierkegaard’s Climacean
Works as a Guide for Christian Existence,” Heythrop Journal 55, no. 5 (2014), 883-902.
5 For example, the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre has been hosting a series of annual
conferences with the following themes: “Reconsidering Kierkegaard’s Existential Approach” (2015),
“Reconsidering the Existential: the Aesthetic, the Ethical, the Religious” (2016), and “Existence and
Communication: Kierkegaard and the Philosophies of Dialogue” (2017).
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One Possibility for Future Research: Sacred Tension and the Issue of Nihilism
As the penultimate section of this conclusion, I would like to entertain briefly the
claim that this study carries the potential to make a particularly valuable contribution to
further scholarly work concerning the issue of nihilism.6 More specifically, I would like to
suggest that the Kierkegaardian account of living within the sacred tension we have
developed above is uniquely apt for offering a promising new way forward in responding
to the challenge of nihilism that is an alternative to other Western responses of the past
two centuries. Before drawing out this claim, however, we should first offer a brief
characterization of nihilism as well as outline two central responses to it. Although such a
survey paints with broad brush strokes and thus misses some of the nuance of the
discussion, it should nevertheless suffice for our purposes here.
Nihilism is a convoluted notion that has been employed in a variety of ways and
thus is notoriously difficult to tie down.7 A good place to turn in offering a broad
characterization of it, however, is to Friedrich Nietzsche. As Bernard Reginster and Roe
Fremstedal have pointed out, nihilism for Nietzsche is both a socio-cultural
phenomenon and a consequence of the particular Platonico-Christian commitments that
have been made within Western societies to foundationalist accounts of truth.8 With
respect to the latter, Nietzsche claims that our religious and philosophical views have

6 This connection has recently begun to be (re)explored in the secondary literature. See, e.g.,
Bartholomew Ryan, “The Plurality of the Subject in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: Confronting Nihilism with
Masks, Faith and Amor Fati,” in Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, ed. João Constâncio, Maria João
Mayer Bronco, and Bartholomew Ryan (Berlin and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 317-42; Roe
Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Despair and Nihilism Converge” in Modernity—Unity in Diversity?
Essays in Honor of Helge Høibraaten, ed. Kjartan Koch Mikalsen, Erling Skjei, and Audun Øfsti (Oslo: Novus,
2016), 458.
7 Karen Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-century Responses to Meaninglessness (Albany, NY:
State University Press of New York, 1992), 9. On pages 17-18 Carr provides a nice schema of various
overlapping senses of nihilism that include the following: epistemological nihilism, alethiological nihilism,
metaphysical or ontological nihilism, ethical or moral nihilism, and existential or axiological nihilism.
8 Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006); Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,” 458.
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been responsible for erecting a hollow edifice of meaning and value that is unrealizable
because of its life-negation and otherworldliness, and as such this edifice collapses in
upon itself. This implosion is what Nietzsche describes as the death of God,9 and for him
it represents the coming to fruition of the emptiness of our categories of truth and the
consequent meaninglessness and valuelessness that thereby emerges. Put differently, the
death of God is the realization that the truths we once believed to be so intuitively wellgrounded and upon which we have built all meaning and value within our Western
culture in fact prove to be thoroughly groundless—the consequence of which is that
existence itself is seen as meaningless.10 In Nietzsche’s view, such is the weighty and
horrifying reality confronting the modern individual. As he remarks in The Gay Science,
[A]nd, now that this faith [in the traditional account of truth] has been
undermined, how much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned
on it, had grown into it—for example, our entire European morality. This long,
dense succession of demolition, destruction, downfall, upheaval that now stands
ahead: who would guess enough of it today to play the teacher and herald of this
monstrous logic of horror, the prophet of deep darkness and an eclipse of the
sun the like of which has probably never before existed on earth?11
In another passage from The Gay Science Nietzsche describes the nihilism that emerges
from the cataclysmic event of the death of God in this fashion: “What were we doing
when we unchained the earth from its sun? Where is it moving to now? Where are we
moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards,
sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an up and a down? Aren’t we straying
as through an infinite nothing?”12 Such a radical challenge of nihilism would become one
of the central philosophical problems for Nietzsche and for the generation following
him, with a variety of thinkers attempting various responses to it.

See, e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, ed. Bernard Williams
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119-20.
10 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 21.
11 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 199.
12 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 120.
9
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One response, what we may characterize in broad terms as the atheistic and
humanistic existential response, begins by embracing the challenge of nihilism brought
on by the death of God and employs this challenge as the catalyst for the humanistic
creation of new values. Nietzsche himself was the first to follow this line of thought.
Thus, within the same aphorism in which he characterizes the death of God as the
greatest horror, he also identifies it as the reason for “cheerfulness.”13 In his view, the
implosion of traditional accounts of truth opens up a radical new possibility in which the
free spirits of the world are liberated to create new values, to become gods themselves,
and to set out in a new direction away from the failed foundationalism of the Western
tradition with its dehumanization and existential malaise.14 As Nietzsche movingly
describes it,
Indeed, at hearing the news that “the old god is dead,” we philosophers and “free
spirits” feel illuminated by a new dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude,
amazement, forebodings, expectation—finally the horizon seems clear again,
even if not bright; finally our ships may set out again, set out to face any danger;
every daring of the lover of knowledge is allowed again; the sea, our sea, lies open
again; maybe there has never been such an “open sea.”15
Following closely in Nietzsche’s footsteps, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus
formulated similar responses to nihilism revolving around the humanistic creation of
value in the face of the abyss and the absurdity of a universe devoid of any inherent
meaning and value.16 For Sartre, this assumes the form of the radical freedom of the
individual who chooses himself and his own morality precisely in the act of choice,17 and

Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 199.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 120.
15 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 199.
16
Both Sartre and Camus are seen as representative voices of modern existentialism even as they
themselves ultimately disavow the label.
17 See, e.g., Sartre’s response to the student who is forced to make a choice between going off to
war or remaining at home with his mother. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol
Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 46: “Man makes himself; he does not come into
the world fully made, he makes himself by choosing his own morality, and his circumstances are such that
he has no option other than to choose a morality. We can define man only in relation to his
commitments.”
13
14
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for Camus this is perhaps best represented by his depiction of Sisyphus who, despite the
absurdity associated with his eternal punishment to roll a stone up a hillside, nevertheless
revolts against this absurdity through the willful choosing of his own fate.18 What is
striking about all three of these responses is how Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus embrace
the groundlessness of existence, but also how serious each of them understands the
threat of nihilism to be for the human being and the human experience.
In more recent years, a second sort of response to nihilism, one that assumes the
form of something of a nonchalant or cheerful resignation, has begun to replace the first.
Karen Carr has identified this as “the banalization of nihilism” characterized not by
seriousness and anxiety, but rather by “joyous affirmation,” “lighthearted playfulness” or
“benign indifference.”19 In Carr’s view, this response is characteristic of those she
identifies as the deconstructionists, but also particularly of Richard Rorty and his antifoundationalist neo-pragmatism.20 With respect to the latter, argues Carr, the removal of
truth from its pedestal of absolutism is happily embraced and cheerfully replaced with an
account of truth where truth becomes nothing more than those agreed-upon ideas,
beliefs, and opinions that emerge within the discourse of a particular community in a
particular time and place.21 Consequently, then, nihilism is simply no longer seen as a
problem. One important and insightful point of Carr’s analysis is her claim that in
rejecting absolutes and grounding in the cheerful embrace of nihilism, the antifoundationalists nevertheless still gravitate towards some kind of ideology, which, in the
end, proves merely to be the most powerful voice in the discourse.22 Given the force of
capitalism in our culture, I would suggest that a good case can be made that the banal

18 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 1955).
19 Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism, 86.
20 Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism, 88.
21 See Carr, The Banalilzation of Nihilism, 122.
22 Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism, 139-40.
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resignation to nihilism at play in our Western societies is intimately tied to materialism
and the ethos of consumption. As such, we could say that the modern human being no
longer experiences or takes seriously the challenge and anxiety of nihilism in the same
way as earlier generations because she has nonchalantly left behind the question of truth
to instead become immersed in the distractions of consumer products, material
comforts, and entertainment.23
In returning to Kierkegaard after this short excursus through nihilism and a few
of the responses to it, we should begin by pointing out that Kierkegaard is certainly
aware of and wrestling with the issue of nihilism as we have been describing it above. At
numerous places within his writings—a handful of which we have pointed to over the
course of this study—Kierkegaard writes about the threats of the abyss [Afgrund] and of
the vortex [Hvirvel] that emerge when one falls away from Christianity, from God, and
from the eternal. With respect to the former, for example, Kierkegaard in Christian
Discourses draws a contrast between the “loftiness” of the Christian and the “abyss”
[Afgrund] of paganism.24 Or, with respect to the latter, Kierkegaard, in The Point of View
writes of the vortex that emerges when one is no longer tied to the unconditional:
Command the seaman to sail without ballast—he capsizes; let the generation, let
every individual in it try to exist without the unconditional—it is and remains a
vortex [Hvirvel]. In the intervening period, for a longer or shorter time, it may
seem otherwise, that there is steadfastness and security—fundamentally it is and
remains a vortex. Even the greatest events and the most strenuous lives are
nevertheless a vortex or like sewing without fastening the end—until the end is
once again fastened by the application of the unconditional, or by the single
individual’s relating himself to an unconditional, even though at ever so great a
distance.25

23 Cf. Blaise Pascal’s discussion of diversion in Pascal’s Pensées, trans. W.F. Trotter (New York, NY:
E.P. Dutton & Co., 1958), 41. This is ultimately to slide back into what Kierkegaard characterizes as the
aesthetic world-view. Thus, for example, in the first part of Either/Or the aesthete A, in an essay entitled
“Rotation of Crops” remarks, “what was it that delayed the fall of Rome? It was panis and circenses. What is
being done in our day? Is consideration being given to any means of amusement?” See SKS 2, 276 / EO1,
286.
24 SKS 10, 68 / CD, 59.
25 SKS 13, 26 / PV, 19-20.
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Moreover, Fremstedal is correct to equate the notion of despair [Fortvivlelse] in
Kierkegaard’s thought with nihilism,26 and as such we can say that Kierkegaard’s
reflections on despair, and in particular the entirety of The Sickness unto Death, are meant
as a sustained engagement with the challenge of nihilism.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard is acutely sensitive to nihilism as it emerges in relation
to the rise of modernity and modern society. In particular, Kierkegaard dedicates a good
portion of his work of social criticism, Two Ages, to diagnosing and responding to
precisely the nihilistic implications of what he calls the present age. In the shift of Danish
society from a monarchical to constitutional government, a new entity has emerged, “the
public” (Publiken), armed with the weapon of what Kierkegaard calls “levelling”
(Nivellering). In levelling the crowd strikes out against the single individual in the attempt
to shape all into conformity with a sickly sense of enervated sameness. Such loss of
individualism entails the triumph of a corporate existence in which there no longer exists
any meaning and value for the individual as an individual. For Kierkegaard, such nihilism
of the crowd is closely tied to comfort in the sense that within this nihilistic state nobody
rises up and takes a risk, but rather everyone simply sits back in calculated ease. Again,
this is precisely the idea behind the image discussed in Chapter 1 above of the spectacle of
the treasure on the thin ice in which nobody really ventures out to claim the prize, but
instead everyone is content to sit back in comfort and to be entertained.27 In
Kierkegaard’s view, this is perhaps the greatest malady of the modern era: we go for rides
in the park, we go to the theater, we visit church for its aesthetic elements, and so forth;
in short, we live our lives for the most part within superficial aesthetic categories. And at
the same time, in failing in this fashion to take the risk of becoming an individual before

26
27

Fremstedal, “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.”
SKS 8, 69-70 / TA, 71-2.
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God, we slide into the vortex and the abyss of a nihilistic coma all the while we
apathetically shrug our shoulders in comfort and false security.
All of this, I would argue, suggests that Kierkegaard’s thought is adequately
equipped to engage with the contemporary discussion of nihilism. Moreover, with
respect to this particular study, I would also argue that his thought has much to offer by
way of formulating a new and interesting response to the challenges and issues nihilism
raises that is itself an alternative to the responses outlined above. In particular, the
Kierkegaardian account of sacred tension is potentially relevant on two fronts. First, as
we have argued above, with respect to the issue of grounding, the notion of sacred
tension is dialectical in the sense that it departs from tradition forms of foundationalism
while nevertheless still retaining a certain kind of grounding on the divine—the divine
which itself operates as a dynamic foundation. As such, we could speak of sacred tension
in terms of what we may call dynamic foundationalism. In this respect, in responding to the
challenge of nihilism, Kierkegaard is entirely consistent with the atheistic existentialist
thinkers in looking beyond traditional foundationalism; but, at the same time he need not
follow them in rejecting divinity as a form of grounding. Instead, sacred tension offers a
way of moving forward with a response to nihilism that functions as a form of grounded
groundlessness and that remains intimately tied to Christian faith.28 Second, sacred
tension also provides a response to nihilism that need not go the way of cheerful or banal
resignation that inevitably ends up in consumerism and materialistic comfort. For
Kierkegaard, faith as living within the sacred tension is a serious and earnest (i.e., Alvor)
affair that does not allow for indifference or existential malaise in the face of questions of
truth. Rather, in sacred tension one must always remain seriously and earnestly
committed to striving in relation to the dynamic foundation provided by God, and one is

28
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constantly being pushed out of the comfort and security associated with modern
consumerist society in order to grow and to develop through an edifying sense of tension
into greater relationship with the living God.29 This is precisely what Kierkegaard means
when he writes of Christianity and the God-relation as the “regulating weight” that
provides each and every individual with the deep sense of meaning associated with the
task of struggling and striving in this life in order, through grace, to become eternally
saved.30 In the end, then, the Kierkegaardian account of sacred tension would appear to
provide great resources for those engaging with the issue of nihilism that need not settle
with either of the two responses outlined above, but instead points out a new path to
move forward in engaging with an old problem. This line of thought, however, will not
be developed here, but instead will be left to be picked up and carried on by others.

A Final Personal Note
As is consistent with Climacus’ “truth is subjectivity” thesis and Kierkegaard’s
insistence that all engagement with Christian truth must be carried out in a personal
manner, I would like to end this academic study with a brief personal note. As anyone
who has undertaken the daunting task of dissertating knows, the process is a long one
that is filled at various times with doubt and uncertainty. Despite this, I can nevertheless
say in the spirit of Aristotle that this philosophical project both began and was sustained
by a deep sense of wonder. In addition, this wonder has been ambivalent in the
Kierkegaardian sense in that it has been informed in equal measure by both fear and
blessedness. As such, the process of completing this study has in many ways mirrored the
account of living within the sacred tension that I have been developing in the pages
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above—a process in which I have found myself restlessly moving forward but
nevertheless doing so with an assurance provided by the hope that the telos I have been
pursuing is indeed worthy of the pursuit. Moreover, just as with the sacred tension
associated with grace and works, I have been reminded time and again that in working
towards fulfillment of the idea I began several years ago I have all the while been
graciously upheld and supported by a power that extends beyond myself. Rather than
attempting to elaborate any further on these points, I would prefer to allow Kierkegaard
the opportunity to do so, for he has, after all, already articulated what I am trying to
communicate here far better than I ever could. Thus, as is appropriate for a study on the
thought of Kierkegaard, the final word is left to Kierkegaard himself:
Wonder…which is the beginning of all deeper understanding is an ambivalent
passion that in itself contains fear and blessedness. Or was it not fearful, my
listener, that what was sought was so close to you, that you did not seek but God
sought you? Was it not fearful that you could not stir without being in him, could
not be stilled without being in him, could not be so unnoticed that you were not
in him, and could not flee to the farthest limits of the world without his being
there and everywhere along the way, could not hide in the abyss without his
being there and everywhere along the way, and could not say to him, “In a
moment,” because he also was in the moment when you said this?…But was it
not blessed that the powerful one could confine you in the darkest nook and yet
could not shut God out? Was it not blessed that you could fall into the deepest
abyss where one sees neither the sun nor the stars and yet can see God? Was it
not blessed that you could go astray in the lonely desert and yet immediately find
the way to God? Was it not blessed that you could become an old man who had
forgotten everything and yet never forget God because he cannot become
something past, that you could become mute and still call to him, deaf and still
hear him, blind and still see him? Was it not blessed that you dare to rely upon
him, that he would say as we human beings say, “In a moment,” because he was
with you the moment he said it!31
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